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SUPER REGULATOR: A COMPARATIVE 
ANALYSIS OF SECURITIES AND 
DERIVATIVES REGULATION IN THE 
UNITED STATES, THE UNITED 
KINGDOM, AND JAPAN 
Jerry W. Markham* 
I. INTRODUCTION 
he value of competition among regulators has been the 
subject of debate in the United States (“U.S.”) for some 
time.1  On the one hand, its advocates contend that com-
peting regulatory bodies will not only govern less, but also more 
efficiently.2  Proponents of centralized regulation, on the other 
hand, argue that overlapping regulation is costly, inefficient, 
and allows exploitation and abuses along regulatory seams.3  In 
supporting their arguments, however, both sides of this debate 
rely largely on intuitive arguments or anecdotal evidence.  This 
is due to a lack of regulatory models that would provide a more 
substantive measure of the efficacy of a monolithic regulator 
over that of a more dispersed and competitive regulatory sys-
tem.  The Financial Services Authority in the United Kingdom 
  
 * Professor of Law, University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill.  The 
author would like to thank Scot J. Halvorsen for his research assistance at the 
law school and Elly Baxter for her research work in Japan. 
 1. See generally BLUEPRINT FOR REFORM : THE REPORT OF THE TASK GROUP 
ON REGULATION OF FINANCIAL SERVICES 8 (1984) [hereinafter BLUEPRINT FOR 
REFORM] (study considering effects of multiple regulators).  The concept of 
competitive regulation is often referred to as “functional” regulation.  See, e.g., 
Melanie L. Fein, Functional Regulation: A Concept for Glass-Steagall Reform, 
2 STAN. J. L. BUS. & FI N. 89, 90 (1995) (“According to its history, functional 
regulation seeks to promote competitive equality, regulatory efficiency, and 
investor/consumer protection.”).  
 2. See generally Jonathan R. Macy, The Business of Banking: Before and 
After Gramm-Leach-Bliley, 25 J. CORP. L. 691, 713 (2000) (discussing why 
regulatory competition can be beneficial). 
 3. See generally Heidi Mandanis Schooner, Regulating Risk Not Function, 
66 U. CIN. L. REV. 441, 459 (1998) (arguing for regulation of risk rather than 
function); Bert Ely, Functional Regulation Flunks: It Disregards Category 
Blurring, AMER. BANKER, Feb. 21, 1997, at 4 (criticizing competitive regula-
tion). 
T 
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(“FSA-UK”) and the Financial Services Agency in Japan (“FSA-
Japan”) are two agencies of recent vintage with a unified regu-
latory structure that should provide a basis of comparison with 
the competitive regulatory approaches of the U.S. 
Part II of this Article first describes the development of com-
peting U.S. regulatory bodies for banking, insurance, securities, 
and derivatives.  Part III focuses on the regulatory roles of the 
Securities and Exchange Commission (“SEC”) and the Commod-
ity Futures Trading Commission (“CFTC”) and Part IV de-
scribes the competition between these two agencies and its ef-
fects.  Part V discusses the changes within the structure of the 
financial markets that affected the regulatory climate.  After 
that review, Parts VI and VII examine the roles of the FSA-UK 
and FSA-Japan.  Finally, Part VIII discusses the arguments for 
and against competitive regulation and attempts to discern 
whether a unified regulatory structure such as those in Japan 
and the United Kingdom (“U.K.”) is preferable to the competi-
tive approach of the SEC and CFTC.   
II. FUNCTIONAL OR COMPETITIVE REGULATION IN THE U.S. 
A. Banking 
While the regulation of the financial services industry has 
been widely dispersed among a number of regulators, this de-
centralization is a reflection of history rather than design.  
Banking regulation is illustrative.4  The federal government 
exercised an indirect role in the regulation of banking through 
the First and Second Banks of the U.S., until President Andrew 
Jackson crushed that institution in the fight over the renewal of 
its charter,5 leaving a regulatory vacuum that the states filled 
with their own banking commissions.6 
  
 4. See generally Jerry W. Markham, Banking Regulation: Its History and 
Future, 4 N.C. BANKING INST. 221 (2000) [hereinafter Markham, Banking 
Regulation: Its History and Future]. 
 5. See generally CLAUDE G. BOWERS, THE PARTY BATTLES OF THE JACKSON 
PERIOD 222–26 (1922) (describing this political battle between Andrew Jack-
son and Henry Clay); ROBERT V. REMINI , HENRY CLAY: STATESMAN FOR THE 
UNION 397-99 (1991) (same).    
 6. The states had already imposed some regulatory requirements on 
banks, but the “bank mania” that followed the destruction of the Bank of the 
U.S. and the Panic of 1837, which was also precipitated by Jackson, led to the 
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The Civil War and the disarray of the nation’s currency led to 
the introduction of federal bank regulation that established the 
national banks and gave regulatory authority over these insti-
tutions to the Comptroller of the Currency.7  This created a 
“dual” system of banking regulation — state and federal — 
which is said to have: 
[F]ostered what is probably the greatest mass of redundant, 
otiose, and conflicting monetary legislation and the most com-
plex structure of self-neutralizing regulatory powers enjoyed 
by any prominent country anywhere.  It has put the federal 
government and the states in competition for the number and 
size of banks under their respective jurisdictions . . . .8 
The creation of the Federal Reserve Board in the wake of the 
Panic of 19079 and the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation 
(“FDIC”) after widespread banking failures at the outset of the 
Great Depression in the 1930s,10 added further layers to this 
regulatory competition.  If that were not enough, Congress and 
the states also provided separate regulation for savings banks11 
and credit unions.12  
  
creation of more formal banking commissions or departments.  Markham, 
Banking Regulation: Its History and Future, supra note 4, at 226–27. 
 7. National Bank Act of 1864, ch. 106, 13 Stat. 99 (codified as amended in 
scattered sections of 12 U.S.C.). 
 8. BRAY HAMMOND, SOVEREIGNTY AND AN EMPTY PURSE: BANKS AND 
POLITICS IN THE CIVIL WAR 349–50 (1970). 
 9. See generally 1–2 PAUL M. WARBURG, THE FEDERAL RESERVE: ITS ORIGIN 
AND GROWTH (1930). 
 10. Banking Act of 1933, ch. 89, 48 Stat. 162, 168–69.  One in four banks in 
the U.S. failed during the bank panic.  The Bubble Burst, LIFE, Spring 1992, 
at 26. 
 11. States had overseen the operations of building and loan societies and 
savings banks since their appearance early in the nineteenth century.  Fed-
eral charters for savings banks were not available until 1978.  LISSA L. 
BROOME & JERRY W. MARKHAM , REGULATION OF BANK FINANCIAL SERVICE 
ACTIVITIES 79–81, 87 (2001).  The Federal Home Loan Bank Act of 1932 cre-
ated the Federal Home Loan Bank Board to charter and supervise federal 
savings and loan associations.  Federal Home Loan Bank Act, Pub. L. No. 107-
252, 47 Stat. 725 (1932) (codified as amended at 12 U.S.C. § 1421 (2000)).  
Federal insurance for these institutions was created by the National Housing 
Act 1934, ch. 847, 48 Stat. 1246 (codified as amended at 12 U.S.C. § 1724 
(2000)), repealed by Act of Aug. 9, 1989, Pub. L. No. 101-73, tit. IV, § 407, 103 
Stat. 363. 
 12. Federal Credit Union Act, Pub. L. No. 107-252, 48 Stat. 1216 (1934) 
(codified as amended at 12 U.S.C. § 1759 (2000)), authorized national charters 
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The Great Depression had even broader effects in fostering 
the balkanization of regulation in financial services.  The activi-
ties of banks were already limited in scope by statute,13 but the 
Glass-Steagall Act sought to further seal off banking from other 
financial service businesses by prohibiting banks from dealing 
in investment banking activities.14  No justification has ever 
been shown for this prohibition,15 and Senator Glass himself 
unsuccessfully sought its repeal one year after adoption.16  Nev-
  
for credit unions.  See Nat’l Credit Union Admin. v. First Nat’l Bank & Trust 
Co., 522 U.S. 479, 479–85 (1998) (describing scope of Federal Credit Union 
Act). Most states already had legislation regulating such entities after Presi-
dent William Howard Taft wrote to the states in 1908, asking them to enact 
authorizing legislation for credit unions.  BROOME & MARKHAM, supra note 11, 
at 89.  
 13. Traditionally, banks had no power to engage in commercial and real 
estate  transactions, except to secure a debt or as an accommodation to a cus-
tomer.  1 CARL ZOLLMANN, THE LAW OF BANKS AND BANKING §§ 223, 224 (1936).  
See also Jemison v. Citizens Savings Bank of Jefferson, 25 N.E. 264 (N.Y. Ct. 
App. 1890) (bank could not deal in cotton futures as either principal or agent). 
The National Bank Act of 1864 also limited national bank activities in a simi-
lar fashion.  See generally First Nat’l Bank of Charlotte v. National Exchange 
Bank of Baltimore, 92 U.S. 122 (1875) (discussing limitations on the opera-
tions of national banks). The Bank Holding Company Act of 1956 sought to 
further circumscribe the activities of banks by limiting the operations of enti-
ties within a bank holding company structure to “activities so closely related 
to banking or managing or controlling banks as to be a proper incident 
thereto.”  Bank Holding Company Act of 1956, ch. 240, 70 Stat. 133 (codified 
as amended at 12 U.S.C. § 1843(c)(8) (2000)).   
 14. The Glass-Steagall Act was a part of the Banking Act of 1933, ch. 89, 
48 Stat. 162 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 12 U.S.C.).  See Se-
curities Industry Assoc. v. Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, 
839 F.2d 47 (2d Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 486 U.S. 1059 (1988) (describing pro-
visions of the Glass-Steagall Act).    
 15. The Glass-Steagall Act was concerned principally with the operations 
of the securities affiliates operated by several large banks, the most important 
of which was the First National City Co. affiliated with the National City 
Bank (now Citigroup). The affiliates had been created despite a ruling from 
the Solicitor General of the U.S. that such operations were not permitted by 
the National Bank Act.  2 JERRY W. M ARKHAM, A FINANCIAL HISTORY OF THE 
UNITED STATES: FROM J.P. MORGAN TO THE INSTITUTIONAL INVESTOR  (1900–
1970), at 57–58 (2002) [hereinafter 2 MARKHAM, A FINANCIAL HISTORY OF THE 
U.S.].  A study of some 3,000 national bank failures before 1936 found that 
bank securities activities were low on the list of factors that resulted in bank 
insolvencies. A representative from the Federal Reserve Board also testified 
during the hearings on the Glass-Steagall legislation that such a prohibition 
was unnecessary.  Id. at 168.     
 16. Id. at 371.     
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ertheless, the legislation remained the “‘Maginot Line’ of the 
financial world,”17 excluding banks from many of the financial 
activities of broker-dealers until its repeal in 1999 by the 
Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act (“GLBA”).18 
B. Insurance 
Another sector of the financial services industry is insurance.  
It too owes its competing regulatory structure to history.  The 
states had gradually imposed regulation on insurance compa-
nies to prevent abuses and regarding the maintenance of re-
sources adequate to meet claims.19  A scandal in the insurance 
industry at the beginning of the twentieth century resulted in 
an investigation by a legislative committee of the New York leg-
islature.20  Headed by State Senator William Armstrong, the 
investigation uncovered several abuses resulting in legislation 
that, among other things, barred the insurance industry from 
underwriting and other securities activities, restricted its abil-
ity to invest in stocks, and separated insurance companies from 
the banking industry.21  Since New York was then the center of 
insurance, its lead was followed by other states. 
Thereafter, the doctrine of unexpected consequences came 
into play.  Sealed off from the securities industry, the insurance 
companies could not participate in the market excesses of the 
1920s and thus avoided the devastation visited on investors fol-
  
 17. Bevis Longstreth, Current Issues Facing the Securities Industry and the 
SEC, Address Before the Securities Industry Association, May 4, 1982, quoted 
in, Jonathan Macey, Special Interest Groups Legislation and the Judicial 
Function: The Dilemma of Glass-Steagall, 33 EMORY L.J. 1, 5 (1984). 
 18. Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act, Pub. L. No. 106-102, 113 Stat. 1338 (1999) 
(codified as amended in scattered sections of 12 and 15 U.S.C.).  
 19. Massachusetts regulated its insurance companies in 1837 and New 
York in 1851.  Lissa L. Broome & Jerry W. Markham, Banking and Insurance: 
Before and After the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act, 25 IOWA J. CORP. L. 723, 728 
(2000). 
 20. Id. at 730.  The Committee was formed after news reports that James 
Hyde, a twenty-three year old heir who had assumed control of the Equitable 
Life Assurance Co. in New York, had thrown a $100,000 party at Sherry’s 
restaurant.  Id.  Concern was expressed that Hyde was looting the insurance 
company to fund his extravagant life style.  2 MARKHAM, A FINANCIAL HISTORY 
OF THE U.S., supra note 15, at 18–20.  Among the attendees at the party at 
Sherry’s was Franklin D. Roosevelt.  DENIS BRIAN, PULITZER: A LIFE 299 
(2001).  
 21. 2 MARKHAM, A FINANCIAL HISTORY OF THE U.S., supra note 15, at 18–20. 
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lowing the Stock Market Crash of 1929.  The insurance compa-
nies also escaped the massive failures in the banking sector and 
thus eluded the scrutiny of President Roosevelt and Congress in 
the New Deal legislation regulating banking and commodity 
futures.  But this escape was a narrow one — the Temporary 
National Economic Committee (“TNEC”) rejected an SEC pro-
posal to create a federal agency to regulate insurance compa-
nies only after vigorous opposition from the industry.22 
The next federal regulatory threat came from the Supreme 
Court’s decision in United States v. South-Eastern Underwriters 
Association,23 which held that the insurance industry was sub-
ject to the federal antitrust laws.  There was fear that this 
would impair the ability of insurance companies to pool statis-
tics and preempt state regulation.  Receptive to such concerns, 
Congress then passed the McCarran-Ferguson Act,24 which 
granted insurance companies immunity from the antitrust laws 
to the extent that they were regulated by state insurance laws. 
The McCarran-Ferguson Act largely excluded any federal 
regulation until insurance companies began offering var iable 
annuities in 1952.25  The SEC claimed that variable annuities 
were securities subject to regulation under the federal securi-
ties laws because returns were based on the investment of the 
annuitants’ premium payments in securities.  The Supreme 
  
 22. Another SEC proposal would have allowed federal agents to inspect 
insurance companies, but it too failed to be adopted.  The SEC also wanted 
insurance companies, which were one of the largest sources of finance for 
large corporations, to invest in greater amounts of common stocks.  Corporate 
balance sheets were becoming over-leveraged by debt sold to the insurance 
companies, and this concerned the TNEC, as well as the SEC.  Id. at 245–50.   
  The insurance industry defeated these proposals by pointing out that 
avoiding stocks as an investment for insurance company reserves had saved 
the industry from disaster when the market collapsed in the wake of the Stock 
Market Crash of 1929. TNEC, Investigation of Concentration of Economic 
Power, Monograph No. 28A: Statement of Life Insurance, 76th Cong., 3d Sess. 
4 (1941).  
 23. United States v. South-Eastern Underwriters Ass’n, 322 U.S. 533 
(1944). 
 24. McCarran-Ferguson Act, ch. 20, 59 Stat. 33 (1945) (codified as 
amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 1011–15 (2000)). 
 25. The variable annuity was the invention of the College Retirement Eq-
uities Fund (“CREF”), an affiliate of the Teachers Insurance and Annuity 
Association (“TIAA”).  See CEDRIC V. FRICKE, THE VARIABLE ANNUITY: ITS 
IMPACT ON THE SAVINGS-INVESTMENT MARKET 2 (1959).   
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Court found for the SEC in these cases,26 resulting in dual regu-
lation of insurance companies selling variable contracts, as they 
were required to separate reserves for such products from re-
serves for more traditional insurance.27 
Despite some frightening losses in the late 1980s that led to 
calls for federal regulation, the insurance industry was able to 
avoid most other federal intrusions.28  What the industry could 
not avoid, however, was competition from the banking and se-
curities industries.  This was because the variable annuity was 
a product that was sold by stockbrokers, who did so in large 
numbers.29  Federal bank regulators also opened the door for 
banks to sell insurance products in the 1990s.30  This resulted in 
a restructuring of the insurance industry — insurance compa-
nies demutalized and expanded their own financial service of-
ferings.31    
C. Securities 
Further separation of financial services into distinct sectors 
came through the adoption of legislation to regulate the securi-
ties industry during the Great Depression.  The SEC’s history 
and background is well-known32 — it was a product of the Stock 
Market Crash of 1929 and the subsequent depression.33 The 
  
 26. SEC v. United Benefit Life Ins. Co., 387 U.S. 202 (1967); SEC v. Vari-
able Annuity Life Ins. Co. of Am., 359 U.S. 65 (1959).  
 27. Broome & Markham, supra note 19, at 737. 
 28. See id. 
 29. See id. at 743 (describing broker-dealer competition). 
 30. The banks used a statute that many thought had been repealed to gain 
entry into the insurance industry.  See U.S. Nat’l Bank of Oregon v. Indep. 
Agents of Am., 508 U.S. 439 (1993).  See also Barnett Bank of Marion County, 
N.A. v. Nelson, 517 U.S. 25 (1996) (states unable to restrict banks from selling 
insurance). 
 31. Broome & Markham, supra note 19, at 745–46. 
 32. For the uninitiated, see generally JOEL SELIGMAN , THE 
TRANSFORMATION OF WALL STREET: A HISTORY OF THE SECURITIES AND 
EXCHANGE COMMISSION AND MODERN CORPORATE FINANCE  (1995).       
 33. The causes of the Stock Market Crash of 1929 are still widely debated. 
Blame is attributed to, inter alia, excessive speculation through margin ac-
counts and abusive market practices, such as the organized pools that oper-
ated in over one hundred NYSE stocks in the 1920s.  More recent focus has 
centered on the blunders of the Federal Reserve System, which first eased 
credit in order to support England’s effort to return to the gold standard, 
thereby boosting the market.  The Federal Reserve then reversed course and 
sought to curb the market through ill-conceived interest rate increases, an 
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SEC, which was ultimately given regulatory authority over the 
statutes that now comprise the federal securities laws, operates 
on a principle of full disclosure.34  In adopting this legislation, 
Congress did not preempt the regulation of sales of securities 
under state blue-sky laws, thereby creating a competing layer of 
governmental regulation that was not lessened until late in the 
twentieth century.35 Aside from some tinkering principally de-
  
echo of recent events.  There is also the possibility that the market was simply 
over-heated and needed correction.  See 2 MARKHAM, A FINANCIAL HISTORY OF 
THE U.S., supra note 15, at 143–45, 150–53.  Similar controversy exists over 
what caused and prolonged the Great Depression.  Some claim that the mar-
ket crash itself caused the depression — post hoc, ergo propter hoc. Indeed, 
recessions and depressions often follow a market crash, but that may suggest 
no more than that the market anticipates the economic decline. Today, most 
economists seem to agree that the Stock Market Crash of 1929 was not the 
cause of the Great Depression or its impressive duration. See generally Marco 
A. Espinosa-Vega & Jang-Ting Guo, On Business Cycles and Countercyclical 
Policies; Statistical Data Included, 86 ECON. REV. 1 (2001) (discussing eco-
nomic theories on causes of the Great Depression).  One author has even 
stated that the Stock Market Crash of 1929 “was probably an event of rela-
tively minor significance” in causing the Great Depression.  CHARLES R. 
MORRIS, MONEY, GREED, AND RISK: WHY FINANCIAL CRISES AND CRASHES 
HAPPEN 73 (1999).  See also The Crash of 1929 — A New View, WALL ST. J., 
Oct. 28, 1977, at 16 (blaming tariff increases and increases in income tax). 
 34. The statutes administered by the SEC are the Securities Act of 1933, 
15 U.S.C. § 77a–77bbbb (2000) (requiring full disclosure in connection with 
new offerings of securities to the public); the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 
15 U.S.C. §§ 78a–78mm (2000) (creating the SEC and requiring continual 
financial reporting by public companies, providing SEC regulatory control 
over proxy solicitations and tender offers, and regulating the secondary mar-
kets in publicly owned securities); the Public Utility Holding Company Act of 
1935, 15 U.S.C. §§ 79–79z-6 (2000) (simplifying the holding company struc-
ture of public utilities); the Trust Indenture Act of 1939, 15 U.S.C. §§ 77aaa-
bbbb (2000) (regulating the administration of debentures issued under trust 
indentures); the Investment Company Act of 1940, 15 U.S.C. 80a-1 to 80a-64 
(the world’s most complex statute seeks to regulate investment companies, 
including mutual funds); and the Investment Advisors Act of 1940, 15 U.S.C. 
§§ 80b-1 to 80b-21 (2000) (regulating and registering investment advisors).   
 35. The National Securities Markets Improvement Act of 1996 preempted 
much state securities regulation or required the states to conform their stan-
dards to those of the SEC. The act exempted Nasdaq and exchange listed 
stocks from state regulation.  Also exempted were investment companies and 
investment advisers with significant amounts of funds under management.  
State broker-dealer record-keeping, net capital, and other requirements regu-
lating such entities were required to conform to those of the SEC. The SEC 
broadened its record-keeping requirements for broker-dealers to address the 
states’ fear that such preemption would frustrate their regulation of broker-
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signed to increase regulation, the federal securities laws remain 
more or less in the form arrived at in the 1930s.36 
Another competing regulatory structure also remains — that 
of the self-regulatory organizations (“SROs”).  These non-
governmental organizations were given regulatory authority, 
  
dealers.  See generally 23A JERRY W. MARKHAM & THOMAS LEE HAZEN, 
BROKER-DEALER OPERATIONS UNDER SECURITIES AND COMMODITIES LAW § 6.02 
(2001) (describing SEC rule amendments).    
 36. Tinkering may be a bit of an understatement.  For example, amend-
ments were made in 1964 to strengthen financial reporting by public compa-
nies.  15 U.S.C. § 78m(a) (2000).  See generally Richard Phillips & Morgan 
Shipman, An Analysis of the Securities Acts Amendments of 1964, 1964 DUKE 
L.J. 706.  In 1968, the Williams Act began regulating tender offers and played 
an important role in the merger mania of the 1980s.  Williams Act, Pub. L. 
No. 90-439, 82 Stat. 454 (1968) (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 78n(d)–(f) (2000)).  For 
a description of the Williams Act, see Miriam P. Hechler, Toward a More Bal-
anced Treatment of Bidder and Target Shareholders, 1997 COLUM. BUS . L.  
REV. 319.  In 1970, after a “paperwork crisis” that resulted in the failure of 
numerous firms, Congress created the Securities Investor Protection Act 
(“SIPA”) and the SIPA Corporation (“SIPC”) that provides insurance for bro-
ker-dealer bankruptcies.  15 U.S.C.  § 78aaa (2000). For a description of the 
problems that led to the paperwork crisis and the creation of SIPA, see SEC, 
STUDY OF UNSAFE AND UNSOUND PRACTICES OF BROKERS AND DEALERS , REPORT 
AND RECOMMENDATIONS , H.R. DOC. NO. 91-231 (1971).  Legislation enacted in 
1975 regulated clearing and settlement activities, imposed more stringent 
regulation over broker-dealer operations, established regulation over munici-
pal bond dealers, and sought to create a national market system.  For a de-
scription, see S. REP. NO. 94-75 (1975), reprinted in 1975 U.S.C.C.A.N. 179; 
H.R. REP. NO. 94-123 (1975). Dealers in U.S. government securities were regu-
lated after scandals involving unregistered “repo” dealers.  Government Secu-
rities Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-571, 100 Stat. 3208 (1986).  For a description 
of the problems in the repo market, see H.R. REP. NO. 99-258 (1985); S. REP. 
NO. 99-426 (1986), reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5395; Regulating Govern-
ment Securities Dealers: Hearing on H.R. 2032 Before Subcomm. On Tele-
comm., Consumer Prot., and Fin. of the House Comm. on Energy and Com-
merce, 99th Cong. 201–13 (1985) (Report by John S. R. Shad, Chairman, Secu-
rities and Exchange Commission (June 20, 1985)).  Insider trading sanctions 
were also strengthened after a series of scandals.  See Insider Trading Sanc-
tions Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-376, 98 Stat. 1264 (codified as amended at 15 
U.S.C. § 78u(d) (2000)); Insider Trading and Securities Fraud Enforcement 
Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-704, 102 Stat. 4677 (codified as amended at 15 
U.S.C. §§ 78t-1, 78u-1 (2000)).  For a description of those scandals, see DAVID 
A. V ISE & STEVE COLL, EAGLE ON THE STREET (1991).  Additional legislation 
was enacted to deal with penny stock fraud after a series of swindles. Securi-
ties Enforcement Remedies and Penny Stock Reform Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 
101-429, 104 Stat. 931 (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. 78q-2 (2000)).  
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and shelter from the antitrust laws,37 by the Securities Ex-
change Act of 1934,38 under which the exchanges, and later the 
National Association of Securities Dealers, Inc. (“NASD”),39 are 
required to regulate the conduct of their members.  The role of 
the SEC in this self-regulation is to oversee the exchanges, as 
well as to act directly where SRO oversight fails.40 The SRO 
concept actually added several layers of regulators.  In addition 
to the NASD and the New York Stock Exchange (“NYSE”), the 
SROs came to include the regional exchanges (e.g., the Ameri-
can Stock Exchange and the Philadelphia Stock Exchange) and 
the Chicago Board Options Exchange, Inc. (“CBOE”).  The crea-
tion of the Municipal Securities Rulemaking Board added an-
other element of self-regulation that gave rulemaking authority 
to this entity, but left enforcement with the SEC and bank regu-
lators.41  
Though the SROs generally attempt to coordinate their regu-
lation in order to avoid duplication, there has been some compe-
tition among the SROs (such as the rivalry between the stock 
exchanges over options trading once it became clear that the 
CBOE would succeed).42  The SEC initially sought to quash the 
  
 37. Gordon v. New York Stock Exchange, 422 U.S. 659 (1975); United 
States v. Nat’l Ass’n of Sec. Dealers, Inc., 422 U.S. 694, 734–35 (1975); Silver 
v. New York Stock Exchange, 373 U.S. 341 (1963).  
 38. 15 U.S.C. § 78f (2000).  
 39. Self-regulation by the NASD was added in 1938 by the Maloney Act, 52 
Stat. 1070 (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. § 78o-3 (2000)).  See generally 
United States v. Nat’l Ass’n of Sec. Dealers, Inc., 422 U.S. 694 (1975) (discuss-
ing role of NASD). 
 40. This process has been most vividly described by Supreme Court Justice 
William O. Douglas, a former SEC chairman. His concept of self-regulation is:     
[O]ne of letting the exchanges take the leadership with Government 
playing a residual role. Government would keep the shotgun, so to 
speak, behind the door, loaded, well oiled, cleaned, ready for use but 
with the hope it would never have to be used. 
WILLIAM O. DOUGLAS , DEMOCRACY AND FINANCE  82 (James Allen ed., 1940). 
 41. See 15 U.S.C. § 78o-4(b)(1), (c) (2000). 
 42. The American Stock Exchange was the first to seek to add options trad-
ing to its products after the creation of the CBOE.  In the Matter of the Ameri-
can Stock Exchange, Inc. Plan to List and Trade Options, Exchange Act Re-
lease No. 34-11,144, (Dec. 19, 1974), 1974 SEC LEXIS 2108.  The NYSE was 
at first uninterested in options trading and encountered opposition from the 
SEC when it did seek entry in later years.  The SEC feared that options 
traded on the NYSE would be subject to abuse by specialists.  It also ex-
pressed a similar concern with market makers trading over-the-counter op-
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competition by requiring coordinated trading and clearance43 
under the aegis of a “central market” doctrine, adopted early in 
the 1970s.44  After endeavoring to regulate competition on the 
  
tions.  See Termination of the Options Moratorium, Exchange Act Release No. 
34-16,701, 19 S.E.C. Docket 998 (Mar. 26, 1980).  This concern with side-by-
side trading was not overcome by the SEC until 1985. It then allowed the 
NYSE to trade options, but required the exchange to conduct such trading 
from a location separate from its stock trading floor.  3 JERRY W. MARKHAM, A  
FINANCIAL HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES: FROM THE AGE OF DERIVATIVES INTO 
THE NEW MILLENNIUM  (1970–2001), at 53 (2002) [hereinafter 3 MARKHAM, A  
FINANCIAL HISTORY OF THE U.S.].  By that time, the market was too mature for 
successful competition by the NYSE, and it transferred its options operations 
to the CBOE in the mid-1990s.  Dan Colarusso, Investing: A New Options 
Market That Hums, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 16, 2001, Sec. 3, at 7. 
 43. Jerry W. Markham & David J. Gilberg, Stock and Commodity Options 
— Two Regulatory Approaches and  Their Conflicts, 47 ALBANY L. REV. 741, 
749–50 (1983). 
 44. As noted by one authority: 
[I]n 1971, in a letter transmitting its Institutional Investor Study to 
Congress, the SEC stated: “A major goal and ideal of the securities 
markets and the securities industry has been the creation of a strong 
central market system for securities of national importance, in 
which all buying and selling interest in these securities could partici-
pate and be represented under a competitive regime.” 
The SEC acknowledged that “this represented something of a shift in 
the historic position of the Commission, which over many years, ex-
tending from before World War II to at least the Special Study Report 
of 1963, tended to favor competing but separate markets.”  The shift 
was prompted not by any lessened concern over the dangers of con-
solidation, but, rather, by the deus ex machina of modern technology.  
The SEC and others saw in the technological developments in com-
munications and computers a way to capture the benefits of consoli-
dation without inhibiting competition. 
In 1975, Congress indicated that it agreed with the SEC, enacting the 
Securities Acts Amendments of 1975, which called for the SEC to “fa-
cilitate the establishment of a national market system for securities.”  
In this national market system the efforts of individual marketplaces 
to achieve consolidation at the expense of other marketplaces were to 
be displaced by a much grander national effort that would no longer 
recognize marketplace boundaries.  
Jeffry L. Davis & Lois E. Lightfoot, Fragmentation Versus Consolidation of 
Securities Trading: Evidence from the Operation of Rule 19c-3, 41 J. L. &  
ECON . 209, 210–11 (1998).  
  The central market got nowhere in the stock markets. The SEC sought 
to require a “universal message switch” that would have required customer 
orders to be routed to the market with the best execution price.  The agency 
was unable to mandate such a system and instead agreed to the creation of 
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options exchanges for many years, the SEC finally began en-
couraging the multiple trading of options on the same securi-
ties.45  Still, after the creation of the Nasdaq market the compe-
tition between the NYSE and the NASD was even fiercer,46  and 
in later years led to criticism that the NASD had allowed its 
competitive role in marketing Nasdaq to outweigh its regula-
tory responsibilities.47 In the end, the NASD was forced to sepa-
rate and spin off its regulatory body into NASD Regulation, Inc. 
(“NASDR”).48 
The SEC regulatory structure also increased in complexity 
over the years with the introduction of other entities that have 
now been designated “gatekeepers,”49 such as the accountants 
that certify the financial statements of public companies and 
broker-dealers.50  Accountants had maintained control over 
  
the “Intermarket Trading System,” under which exchange specialists execute 
orders at the best price available on any other exchange.  This essentially 
meant that specialists on the regional exchanges would have access to NYSE 
quotes and could key off those quotes instead of competing separately.  See 
generally U.S. CONGRESS, OFFICE OF TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT, ELECTRONIC 
BULLS AND BEARS: U.S. SECURITIES MARKETS & INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY 47–
48 (Sept. 1990) (description of universal message switch and Intermarket 
Trading System); U.S. GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE , REPORT TO 
CONGRESSIONAL COMMITTEES ON SECURITIES TRADING : SEC ACTION NEEDED TO 
ADDRESS NATIONAL MARKET SYSTEM ISSUES (March 1990) (description of cen-
tral market system issues).  
 45. The SEC has been allocating options on particular stocks to the options 
exchanges by lottery. It was not until 1989 that the SEC allowed options on 
particular securities to be traded on more than one exchange. 3 MARKHAM , A 
FINANCIAL HISTORY OF THE U.S., supra note 42, at 85.  Thereafter, it sought to 
encourage such trading.  See Multiple Trading of Standardized Options, Ex-
change Act Release No. 34-26,870, 43 S.E.C. Docket 1498 (May 26, 1989). The 
options exchanges were censured in 2000 for agreeing not to multiply list op-
tions as mandated by the SEC. 3 MARKHAM, A FINANCIAL HISTORY OF THE U.S., 
supra note 42, at 331.   
 46. Michael J. Simon & Robert L.D. Colby, The National Market System for 
Over-the-Counter Stocks, 55 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 17 (1986) (description of de-
velopment and growth of the Nasdaq market). 
 47. See generally In the Matter of National Association of Securities Deal-
ers, Inc., Exchange Act Release No. 34-37,542, 62 S.E.C. Docket 1385 (Aug. 8, 
1996) (describing collusion by Nasdaq market makers).   
 48. Id. 
 49. See Frank Partnoy, Barbarians at the Gatekeepers?: A Proposal for a 
Modified Strict Liability Regime, 79 WASH. U. L.Q. 491 (2001) (discussing role 
of gatekeepers and advocating liability).  
 50. The role of accountants was widely expanded by the adoption of the 
federal securities laws. Publicly owned companies were required to publish 
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their audit procedures for some time, though the SEC would 
occasionally intervene.51  One concern was competition, i.e., that 
corporate management would shop for the least strict auditor.  
The SEC has attacked such practices,52 and, further, adopted 
rules that sought to assure that auditors remained independent 
of their audit clients.53  However, the independence standards 
were questioned after the SEC discovered that numerous part-
ners in audit firms held stock in the ir audit clients.54 Consulting 
operations created by accounting firms were also creating con-
flicts.  As a result, the SEC acted to strengthen its independ-
  
certified accounting statements. The SEC also imposed auditing requirements 
on broker-dealers.  Reports to be Made by Certain Brokers and Dealers, 17 
C.F.R. § 240.17a-5 (2002) (FOCUS report requirement).  
  The gatekeeper role of accountants, and their “deep pockets,” led to 
efforts to impose liability under the federal securities laws when a company 
unexpectedly failed during an accounting firm audit.  The Supreme Court 
relieved the accounting profession of liability under SEC Rule 10b-5 (17 C.F.R. 
§ 240.10b-5 (2002)) based on negligence in their audits.  Ernst & Ernst v. 
Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185 (1976). Further protection was provided when the 
Supreme Court rejected private rights of action for aiding and abetting on the 
part of professionals such as accountants and lawyers.  Central Bank v. First 
Interstate Bank, 511 U.S. 164 (1994). 
 51. The SEC deferred for the most part to the accounting profession in 
developing what are called “generally accepted accounting principles,” or 
“GAAP.”  2 THOMAS LEE HAZEN, TREATISE ON THE LAW OF SECURITIES 
REGULATION § 9.6[1] (4th ed. 2002) [hereinafter HAZEN TREATISE]. The Finan-
cial Accounting Standards Board (“FASB”), an industry group, took the lead 
in developing or changing particular GAAP standards. See generally Marshall 
S. Armstrong, The Work and Workings of the Financial Accounting Standards 
Board, 29 BUS. LAW. 145 (1974) (describing role of FASB).  Regulation S-X, 
however, imposed various accounting requirements in public offerings. Appli-
cation of Regulation S-X (17 C.F.R. part 210), 17 C.F.R. §§ 210.1-01 to 210.1-
02 (2002).  The SEC has also adopted particular accounting standards in its 
filings by rule, and issues Accounting Series Releases on matters it deems not 
adequately addressed by the accounting profession. 
  Until recently, the American Institute of Certified Public Accountants 
(“AICPA”) set “generally accepted auditing standards,” or “GAAS.”  2 HAZEN 
TREATISE, supra § 9.6[1].  The SEC further assumed the authority to discipline 
accountants that failed to meet what the agency deemed were appropriate 
auditing standards. 17 C.F.R. § 210.102(e) (2002). 
 52. 2 HAZEN TREATISE, supra note 51, § 9.6[1]. 
 53. Qualifications of Accountants, 17 C.F.R. § 210.2-01(b) (2002). 
 54. In one large accounting firm, the SEC found that thirty-one of the top 
forty-three partners held stock in audit clients. A total of 8,000 violations of 
independence standards were found by partners and employees of the ac-
counting firm.  3 MARKHAM , A FINANCIAL HISTORY OF THE  U.S., supra note 42, 
at 257. 
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ence standards.55  Congress also jumped on the bandwagon and 
required auditors to report violations by their clients.56  Most 
recently, the Enron debacle and other accounting scandals 
heightened regulatory concern over the role of these gatekeep-
ers.57  In the end, the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 (“Sarbanes-
Oxley”) created a Public Company Accounting Oversight Board 
to oversee the auditing principles and practices of auditors.58 
Another set of gatekeepers is the Nationally Recognized Sta-
tistical Ratings Organizations (“NRSROs”), i.e., ratings agen-
cies such as Moody’s and Standard & Poor’s.  The SEC gave 
such organizations a quasi-official role in applying its net capi-
tal rule.59  That status, and the increasingly important role of 
  
 55. Revision of the Commission’s Auditor Independence Requirements, 
Exchange Act Release No. 34-43,602, 65 Fed. Reg. 76,008 (Dec. 5, 2000). 
 56. Section 10A of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 required audits to 
be conducted in accordance with GAAS. Independent auditors were required 
to conduct their audits in a manner that would uncover illegal activities and 
to report that conduct to management and to the board of directors if man-
agement fails to act. The board of directors must then report the violative 
activity to the SEC or if it fails to do so, the auditor must inform the SEC.  15 
U.S.C. § 78j-1 (2000).  
 57. Enron Corporation was the seventh largest company on the Fortune 
500 index when it failed in October 2001. After the Enron scandal, a number 
of other firms were also found to have engaged in various questionable ac-
counting practices. Several energy companies were involved in “round trip” 
trades that artificially increased their income by billions of dollars.  Global 
Crossing Ltd., a large telecommunications firm declared bankruptcy after an 
accounting scandal. It was followed by WorldCom, Inc., which  had improperly 
booked some $7 billion in revenues.  The bankruptcy of WorldCom was the 
largest such event in U.S. history, superseding Enron for that dubious honor.  
See Greg Hitt, Bush Signs Sweeping Legislation Aimed at Curbing Corporate 
Fraud, WALL ST. J., July, 31, 2002, at A4. 
 58. The Public Company Accounting Oversight Board took away control of 
accounting standards from the accounting profession.  Accountants certifying 
the financial standards of public companies are now required to register with 
the Board and conform to the standards it sets.  See Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 
2002, §§ 101–09, Pub. L. No. 107-204, 116 Stat. 745.  Some large accounting 
firms had already spun off consulting services (e.g., Accenture), and immedi-
ately after this legislation IBM purchased the consulting operations of an-
other giant accounting firm.  William Bulkeley & Kemba Dunham, IBM 
Speeds Move to Consulting With $3.5 Billion Acquisition, WALL ST. J., July 31, 
2002, at A1. 
 59. For example, the SEC defers to the NRSROs in determining whether a 
“ready market” exists for purposes of valuing securities in inventory under its 
net capital rule. See, e.g., Net Capital Requirements for Brokers and Dealers, 
17 C.F.R. § 240.15c3-1(c)(2)(vi)(E) (2002) (valuation of money instruments); 
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the ratings agencies, created the impression that these entities 
were gatekeepers.  Although NRSROs compete with each other 
for business, critics have claimed that the ratings agencies do 
not fulfill their gatekeeping responsibilities due to the conflict of 
interest they face, i.e., their compensation is paid by the very 
companies they rate.60  Sarbanes-Oxley now requires the SEC to 
conduct a study of the NRSROs and to report to Congress on 
any deficiencies, raising the likelihood that these gatekeepers 
will be subject to regulation in the future.61  
Financial analysts are another class of securities sector par-
ticipants that have been elevated to gatekeeper status.  The 
Investment Advisers Act of 1940 first applied some regulation 
to this field.62  However, Congress sought to limit this regula-
tion to those entities rendering personal advice, which excluded 
publications to the general public, a distinction the SEC was 
unable to discern.63  Financial analysts have also been a par-
ticularly sharp thorn in the SEC’s side.  While the analysts’ 
product value depends to some degree on their ability to ana-
lyze the massive amounts of information influencing the value 
of the stocks, the real value they added over the years was their 
ability to obtain information that was not generally available to 
  
Capital Committee of the Securities Industry Association (c/o Merrill Lynch & 
Co.), SEC No-Action Letter, [1992 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) ¶ 
76,280, at 77, 051 (June 12, 1992) (“ready market” treatment for debt securi-
ties of foreign issuers).   
 60. See generally Frank Partnoy, The Siskel and Ebert of Financial Mar-
kets? Two Thumbs Down for the Credit Rating Agencies, 77 WASH. U. L.Q. 619 
(1999) (describing shortcomings of rating agencies). The rating agencies were 
also criticized for not predicting the demise of the Enron Corporation. See 
Hearings before the United States S. Comm. on Governmental Affairs, 107th 
Cong. (2002) (testimony of Frank Partnoy, Professor of Law, University of San 
Diego School of Law). 
 61. Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, § 702. 
 62. Investment Advisors Act of 1940, 15 U.S.C. §§ 80b-1 to 80b-21 (2000).  
The investment adviser is relatively new to the securities industry, having 
appeared in force only after World War I.  SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE 
COMMISSION, INVESTMENT TRUSTS AND INVESTMENT COMPANIES, REPORT OF THE 
SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION PURSUANT TO SECTION 30 OF THE 
PUBLIC UTILITIES HOLDING COMPANY ACT OF 1935: INVESTMENT COUNSEL, 
INVESTMENT MANAGEMENT , INVESTMENT FUTURE PRICES, AND INVESTMENT 
ADVISORY SERVICES 3 (1939) (“The emergence of investment counselors as an 
important independent occupation, or profession, did not appear until after 
the close of the World War”).   
 63. Lowe v. SEC, 472 U.S. 181, 211 (1985). 
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the public.  The SEC’s mandate was full disclosure, but the 
agency wanted such disclosure only on its terms, prompting it 
to bring an insider trading case against an analyst that sold out 
his institutional clients when he learned of a massive fraud at 
Equity Funding, a company he had been following.64  The Su-
preme Court threw out the case,65 but the SEC remained con-
cerned with the role of financial analysts.66  Selective disclosure 
given to analysts by corporate officials was an informational 
advantage at which the SEC balked, and subsequently pro-
scribed under Regulation FD.67  
Denied this informational advantage as a product to sell, ana-
lysts were left to tout stocks like snake oil salesmen.68  This led 
to scandal when it was discovered that Henry Blodget, an ana-
lyst at Merrill Lynch, had been publicly praising one stock 
while describing it as a “piece of junk” in an internal email.  
  
 64. Mitchell C. Lynch, Security Analysis and the Law, WALL ST. J., Sept. 
15, 1978, at 16.  
 65. Dirks v. SEC, 463 U.S. 646 (1983).  
 66. Broker-dealers are required to maintain a “Chinese Wall” (an “inviola-
ble wall” for the politically correct) between the analysts and the underwriting 
arms of the firm.  Restricted lists are also used to assure that analysts do not 
have access to non-public information.  See generally David A. Lipton & 
Robert B. Mazur, The Chinese Wall Solution to the Conflict Problems of Secu-
rities Firms, 50 N.Y.U. L. REV. 459 (1975). 
 67. General Rule Regarding Selective Disclosure, 17 C.F.R. § 243.100 
(2002).  This regulation seems to be based on a bit of twisted government 
logic, i.e., full disclosure to everyone at the same time or no disclosure to any-
one.  In the apparent view of the SEC, it is better that the market not receive 
information that will more efficiently value a company unless everyone has 
the information at precisely the same time.  The SEC should be encouraging 
information flows, not discouraging access by professionals who will be paid 
for ferreting out material information, analyzing it, and disseminating it to 
the market through their clients.  See generally Jerry Duggan, Regulation FD: 
SEC Tells Corporate Insiders to “Chill Out,” 7  WASH. U. J.L. & POLICY 159 
(2001) (criticizing Regulation FD).    
 68. Mary Meeker, an analyst at Morgan Stanley, was given the title of 
“queen of the net” for hyping IPO internet stock offerings that her firm was 
underwriting.  JOHN CASSIDY , DOT.CON, THE GREATEST STORY EVER SOLD 206-
17 (2002).  See also generally Randall Smith & Susanne Craig, Will Grubman 
Case Tone Down the Exaggeration by Analysts?, WALL ST. J., Sept. 24, 2002, at 
C1.  Jack Grubman, an analyst at Salomon Smith Barney, was alleged to have 
pumped telecommunications stocks so that his firm could obtain their under-
writing business.  Charles Gasparino, Salomon’s Grubman Resigns: NASD 
Finds “Spinning” at Firm, WALL ST. J., Aug. 16, 2002, at A1; Charles Gas-
parino, Salomon Agrees to Settle Stock-Hype Case, WALL ST. J., Sept. 24, 2002, 
at C1.  
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Merrill Lynch was fined $100 million after this was discov-
ered.69  The fine was imposed by Eliot Spitzer, the New York 
State Attorney General, whose recent crusades provide evidence 
of another layer of regulation in the securities industry.70  Fi-
nally, Sarbanes-Oxley sought to further separate the analysts 
from their investment banking associates and gave the SEC 
authority to adopt rules for that purpose.71  The SEC, thereaf-
ter, began examining proposals to require analysts to be inde-
pendent of their investment banking colleagues.72     
Sarbanes-Oxley added still another gatekeeper, as the SEC 
was given authority to issue rules setting forth standards of 
conduct for attorneys advising public companies.73  Attorneys 
are now required to report violations of securities laws, inter 
alia, to a board committee composed entirely of outside direc-
tors if the company fails to take corrective action.74  This means 
that lawyers are now policemen and not just advisors.75  More-
over, the reference to outside directors is further evidence of yet 
another gatekeeper — the outside director himself.76  The SEC 
has long attempted to strengthen the role of these directors, to 
  
 69. Patrick McGeehan, E-Mail Gaps May Mean Fines for Big Firms, N.Y. 
TIMES, Aug. 2, 2002, at C1. 
 70. See infra note 429 and accompanying text.  
 71. See Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, § 501, Pub. L. No.107-204, 116 Stat. 
745 (2002). 
 72. Michael Schroeder, SEC to Consider Step in Analysts’ Independence, 
WALL ST. J., Sept. 9, 2002, at C7. 
 73. The SEC adopted the Final Rule: Implementation of Standards of Pro-
fessional Conduct for Attorneys, Exchange Act Release Nos. 33-8185, 34-
47,276, 17 C.F.R. Part 205 (S.E.C. Jan. 29, 2003), available at 
www.sec.gov/rules/final/33-8815.htm. 
 74. 17 C.F.R. § 205.3(b)(3); Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, § 307. 
 75. Such a role for lawyers had been rejected many years ago.  A scandal at 
the National Student Marketing Corporation resulted in a drive by the SEC to 
punish lawyers representing companies violating the federal securities laws.  
See Stan Crock, SEC to Consider Rule Requiring Lawyers to Disclose Fraud  
by Corporate Clients, WALL ST. J., Aug. 3, 1978, at 5 (American Bar Associa-
tion asserts that lawyers are advisors and not policemen).  However, the SEC 
later rejected a proposal that would have required corporate lawyers to report 
management wrongdoing to the board of directors and to the SEC.  See SEC 
Rejects Bid to Force Firms’ Lawyers to Tell Boards of Employee Wrongdoing, 
WALL ST. J., May 1, 1980, at 4 (SEC defers to ABA on this issue). 
 76. The NYSE has also ruled that outside directors must constitute a ma-
jority of the board of directors of publicly owned corporations listed on the 
exchange.  Gaston Ceron, Deals & Deal Makers: NYSE to Firm Governance, 
Add Trading Floor, WALL ST. J., Aug. 2, 2002, at C5. 
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the point of seeking to require all but one director to be inde-
pendent of management, thereby leaving the running of a com-
pany in the hands of those unfamiliar with its day-to-day opera-
tions.77 Finally, various “whistleblower” statutes seek to protect 
employees reporting misconduct.78  One such employee achieved 
fame for reporting Enron’s questionable accounting practices to 
senior management before they became publicly known.79  Sar-
banes-Oxley enshrines her act into legislation by requiring pub-
lic corporations to adopt procedures to encourage such whistle-
blowing.80    
If all of these gatekeepers and regulators are not enough, 
there are still real gorillas to contend with — the private attor-
neys general bringing class action lawsuits under the federal 
securities laws.81  As corporate America was drowning in a mo-
  
 77. See Burt Schorr, Board Breakup, Corporate Directors Scored for Lax 
Scrutiny of Managements’ Acts, WALL ST. J., Apr. 10, 1978, at 1 (describing 
efforts by SEC to make corporate board more independent of management).  
In 1978 the NYSE began requiring its listed companies to have an audit com-
mittee composed of outside directors.  Peter F. Drucker, The Real Duties of a 
Director, WALL ST. J., June 1, 1978, at 20.  An SEC Chairman went so far as to 
advocate that management should have only one slot on the board of directors.  
Management Should Fill Only One Seat on of Firms’ Board of Directors, WALL 
ST. J., Jan. 19, 1978, at 3.  The SEC Chairman soon had to backtrack from 
this wild proposal.  Letters to the Editor, WALL ST. J., Nov. 2, 1978, at 22.  
Compare, Joann S. Lublin, Outsiders In, Firms Add More Independent Direc-
tors, But Finding Doing So Can Mean Headaches, WALL ST. J., May 26, 1978, 
at 38 (describing shortcomings of outside directors), with, Joann S. Lublin, 
How CEOs Retire in Style, WALL ST. J., Sept. 13, 2002, at B1 (describing 
twenty-four years later lucrative compensation given to executives after nego-
tiation with independent directors).  See generally SEC Report Warns Outside 
Directors of Duty to Investors, WALL ST. J., Jan. 18, 1978, at 3 (outside direc-
tors should have called board meeting to challenge management disclosures or 
should have resigned).  
 78. See, e.g., 5 U.S.C. § 2301(b)(9) (2000) (federal whistleblower statute); 
KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 61.102 (2002) (state whistleblower statute).  The Cali-
fornia Senate has passed a bill that would require corporate officers to report 
accounting abuses to the attorney general.  Robert Salladay, “Snitch” Bill 
Passed by State Senate, S.F. CHRON., June 21, 2002, at A17.  
 79. See Newsmakers, HOUSTON CHRONICLE , May 22, 2002, at A2.  Sherron 
Watkins honored for disclosing questionable accounting practices at Enron to 
the Company’s Chief Executive Officer, Ken Lay.  She did not report the prob-
lem to any regulator.  Id. 
 80. Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, § 806, Pub. L. No.107-204, 116 Stat. 745. 
 81. Broker-dealers might be viewed either as gatekeepers or as a part of 
the SRO structure.  Broker-dealers are required to register with the SEC (15 
U.S.C. § 78o (2000)) and to supervise their employees (15 U.S.C. § 
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rass of litigation from these plaintiffs, efforts to curb some of 
the worst abuses led to the passage of the Private Securities 
Litigation Reform Act of 1995.82  Nonetheless, the amount of 
litigation only increased.83 Additional pressure was coming from 
an increasingly active Justice Department that had created 
special units in several of its U.S. Attorney offices to prosecute 
securities violators.  Sarbanes-Oxley furthers that effort by in-
creasing criminal penalties for violations of the federal securi-
ties laws to draconian levels.84 Another phenomenon of recent 
years has been the attorney general “wolf packs” that are at-
tacking businesses, including Microsoft and the tobacco compa-
  
78o(b)(4)(E), (G)(iii) (2000)).  See also Bevis Longstreth, Duty to Supervise is 
Critical to Effective Self-Regulation, NAT. L.J., May 16, 1983, at 24.  Broker-
dealers are also subject to the rules of the exchanges of which they are mem-
bers and to the rules of NASDR.  Adoption of Rules under Section 15(b)(10) of 
the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, Exchange Act Release No. 34-8135 
[1966-1967 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) ¶ 77,459, at 82,890 (July 
27, 1967). 
 82. Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995, Pub. L. No. 104-67, 
109 Stat. 737.  The abuses in litigation included the use of “professional plain-
tiffs” to bring class action lawsuits and the routine filing of lawsuits whenever 
there was a significant change in the price of a stock.  Jordan Eth & Daniel S. 
Drossman, The Private Securities Litigation Reform Act: Five Years Young, 34 
Sec. & Commodities Reg. 153, 153 n.3 (July 2001).  See generally Richard M. 
Phillips & Gilbert C. Miller, The Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 
1995: Rebalancing Litigation Risks and Rewards for Class Action Plaintiffs, 
Defendants and Lawyers, 51 BUS. LAW . 1009 (1996) (describing abuses).  The 
Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995 was avoided by bringing class 
actions in state court.  See Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995, 
Pub. L. No. 104-67, 109 Stat. 737.  The Securities Litigation Uniform Stan-
dards Act of 1998, Pub. L. No. 105-353, 112 Stat. 3227, sought to plug that 
loophole, but another gap was found.  See Joshua D. Ratner, Shareholders’ 
Holding Claim Class Actions Under State Law After the Uniform Standards 
Act of 1998, 68 U. CHI. L. REV. 1035 (2001). 
 83. Critics claim that reform efforts to curb abusive litigation have had 
little effect.  Id.  Compare Common Sense Legal Reform Act, Hearings on H.R. 
10 Before the Subcomm. on Telecomm. and Fin. of the House Comm. on Com-
merce, 104th Cong., 73–86 (1995) (testimony of William S. Lerach, partner, 
Milberg Weiss Bershad Hynes & Lerach) (statistics suggesting that there was 
no inordinate increase in the number of class action lawsuits involving securi-
ties claims), with CORNERSTONE RESEARCH , POST REFORM ACT SECURITITES 
CASE SETTLEMENTS, 2001: A YEAR IN REVIEW (2002).  This study by the Stan-
ford Law School Securities Class Action Clearing House and Cornerstone Re-
search found a 60% increase over 2000 in the number of class actions filed.  
The companies who were defendants in those actions lost more than $2 tril-
lion in market capitalization after those suits were filed.  Id. 
 84. See Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, § 1106. 
File: Markham Base  Macro  Final.doc Created on:  3/20/2003 5:05 PM Last Printed: 4/28/2003 11:31 AM 
338 BROOK. J. INT’L L. [Vol. 28:2 
nies, on a national scale, thereby setting their own national 
regulatory policies.85 
D. Commodity Futures and Options 
Like the securities sector, the regulation of commodity fu-
tures trading was cordoned off from other parts of the financial 
services industry.  That decision was again the result of history, 
rather than the implementation of a measured economic theory 
of regulatory competition.  In response to the agricultural reces-
sion that followed World War I, Congress enacted the Futures 
Trading Act of 1921,86 which was then declared unconstitutional 
by the Supreme Court as an impermissible use of the congres-
sional taxing powers.87  A manipulation of grain prices occur-
ring just a few days after the Supreme Court’s decision, how-
ever, convinced Congress that regulation was needed,88  and it 
passed the Grain Futures Act of 192289 under its commerce 
powers.  This legislation was upheld as constitutional by the 
Supreme Court.90 
The Grain Futures Act required commodity futures trading to 
be conducted on organized exchanges, such as the Chicago 
Board of Trade, which would register with the government as 
“contract markets.”91  The goal was to stop “bucket shop” opera-
  
 85. See Michael Freedman, Wall Street’s Worst Nightmare, FORBES, Aug. 
12, 2002, at 44 (describing tactics of attorney general wolf packs and noting 
that Alabama securities administrator wants to pursue Wall Street); Russell 
Gold & Andrew Caffrey, United Crimebusters, WALL ST. J., Aug. 1, 2002, at B1 
(describing attorney general network).  The Connecticut Supreme Court re-
cently held that the state attorney general did not have standing to bring 
action to correct wrongs wherever they might be found.  Blumenthal v. Bar-
nes, 804 A.2d 152 (Conn. 2002).  Eliot Spitzer, the New York Attorney Gen-
eral, has been particularly aggressive in attacking businesses in order to gar-
ner publicity for himself.  See infra note 429 and accompanying text.  
 86. Futures Trading Act, ch. 86, 42 Stat. 187 (1921).  This legislation was 
preceded by an intensive study of the grain markets by the Federal Trade 
Commission (“FTC”), which found numerous abuses.  1–7 FED. TRADE COMM’N, 
REPORT OF THE FED. TRADE COMM’N ON THE GRAIN TRADE (1920–1921). 
 87. Hill v. Wallace, 259 U.S. 44, 71 (1922). 
 88. H.R. REP. NO. 67-1095, at 2 (1922). 
 89. Commodity Exchange Act (Grain Futures Act), ch. 369, 42 Stat. 998 
(1922) (codified as amended at 7 U.S.C. §§ 1–25 (2000)). 
 90. Board of Trade v. Olsen, 262 U.S. 1, 42 (1923). 
 91. Grain Futures Act, ch. 369, §§ 5–7, 42 Stat. 998, 1000 (1922). 
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tions that were fleecing unsuspecting investors92 and to provide 
some regulatory controls that would halt the manipulation of 
agricultural commodity prices that all too often roiled the mar-
kets.93  The Act was administered by the Grain Futures Ad-
ministration, an agency within the Department of Agriculture.94  
It proved to be unsuccessful in stopping manipulations or pre-
venting devastation in the agricultural community during the 
Great Depression, when prices dropped to unprecedented 
lows.95 
President Roosevelt added to his call for regulation of the se-
curities markets a request for legislation to regulate the futures 
markets.96  History intervened to assure that such regulation 
  
 92. Bucket shops accepted customer orders and funds but did not execute 
the orders on any exchange.  Rather, they simply bet the customer would lose 
and kept the customer’s funds in such an event.  If the customers won too 
much, the bucket shop would fold its operations and move to a new location.  
JOHN HILL, JR., GOLD BRICKS OF SPECULATION 37–39 (1904).  The Supreme 
Court had already provided an effective means for stopping the bucket shops, 
i.e., shutting off the quotations from the legitimate exchanges on which the 
bucket shop operators relied for their trading.  See Board of Trade v. Christie 
Grain & Stock Co., 198 U.S. 236, 252–53 (1905) (upholding cutting off quota-
tions to the operations of C.C. Christie, the “Bucket Shop King”).  
 93. Price manipulations were occurring on a monthly basis on the Chicago 
Board of Trade.  See Jerry W. Markham, Manipulation of Commodity Futures 
Prices — The Unprosecutable Crime, 8 YALE J. ON REG. 281 (1991) [hereinafter 
Markham, Manipulation].  The traders conducting manipulations became 
legends.  See Leon Kendal, The Chicago Board of Trade and the Federal Gov-
ernment: A Study in their Relationship, 1848 to 1952, at 56 (Masters Thesis, 
Ind. U. School of Bus. 1956) (on file with author) (“The feats of Leiter, Armour, 
Patten, and others in cornering the markets are legends of American com-
merce.”).    
 94. GEORGE WRIGHT HOFFMAN , FUTURE TRADING UPON ORGANIZED 
COMMODITY MARKETS IN THE UNITED STATES 372 (1932).  The Grain Futures 
Administration was subject to oversight by a commission composed of the 
Secretary of Commerce, the Secretary of Agriculture and the Attorney Gen-
eral.  Grain Futures Act, ch. 369, § 6, 42 Stat. 998, 1001 (1922). 
 95. By 1932, wheat prices were at a three-hundred-year low, and a bushel 
of corn cost less than a pack of chewing gum.  Wheat’s Plunge to a 300 Year 
Low, THE LITERARY DIGEST, Nov. 12, 1932, at 6. 
 96. The President’s message stated that: 
It is my belief that exchanges for dealing in securities and commodi-
ties are necessary and of definite value to our commercial and agri-
cultural life.  Nevertheless, it should be our national policy to restrict, 
as far as possible, the use of these exchanges for purely speculative 
operations. 
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would be separately conducted.  The agricultural committees in 
Congress had jurisdiction over the commodity exchanges, while 
the banking committees controlled securities matters.  Neither 
would cede authority to the other.  The agricultural committees 
acted somewhat more slowly than the banking committees and 
were unable to pass legislation until 1936.  The result, the 
Commodity Exchange Act of 1936,97 continued much of the leg-
islative approach of the Grain Futures Act.  The name of the 
Grain Futures Administration was changed to the Commodity 
Exchange Authority, which was still subject to oversight by the 
same three cabinet officials (“Commodity Exchange Commis-
sion”).98  The analogue to the securities broker-dealer in the 
commodity futures business is the futures commission mer-
chant (“FCM”).  These firms were required to register as such 
with the government under the Commodity Exchange Act99 and 
to segregate customer funds into trust accounts.100 Option trad-
ing was prohibited on regulated commodities.101  
Manipulation of commodity prices was also prohibited — but 
that term was not defined in the Commodity Exchange Act of 
1936, and the government proved unable to stop such prac-
tices.102  Scandals in commodity options on unregulated com-
modities in the early 1970s raised concern in Congress,103 and 
the incredible inflation in commodity prices during that period 
  
I therefore recommend to the Congress the enactment of legislation 
providing for the regulation by the Federal Government of the opera-
tions of exchanges dealing in securities and commodities for the pro-
tection of investors, for the safeguarding of values, and so far as it 
may be possible for the elimination of unnecessary, unwise, and de-
structive speculation. 
H.R. REP. NO. 74–421, at 2 (1935) (emphasis added). 
 97. Commodities Exchange Act of 1936, ch. 545, 49 Stat. 1491 (1936) (codi-
fied as amended in scattered sections of 7 U.S.C.). 
 98. JERRY W. MARKHAM , THE HISTORY OF COMMODITY FUTURES TRADING AND 
ITS REGULATION  27 (1987) [hereinafter MARKHAM, HISTORY OF COMMODITY 
FUTURES TRADING]. 
 99. 7 U.S.C. § 6f(a) (2000). 
 100. 7 U.S.C. § 6d (1990). 
 101. 7 U.S.C. § 6c(b) (2000). 
 102. See Markham, Manipulation, supra note 93, at 313–23 (describing 
unsuccessful government actions against manipulative activities in the fu-
tures markets). 
 103. See infra notes 146–57 and accompanying text. 
File: Markham Base  Macro  Final.doc Created on: 3/20/2003 5:05 PM Last Printed: 4/28/2003 11:31 AM 
2003] FINANCIAL REG. IN U.S., U.K., & JAPAN 341 
also led to calls for additional legislation.104  It came in the form 
of the Commodity Futures Trading Commission Act of 1974,105 
which carried forward the provisions of the Commodity Ex-
change Act and created the CFTC.  The agency was given exclu-
sive jurisdiction over the trading of commodity futures and 
commodity options on all commodities.106  Moreover, the CFTC 
was given increased enforcement powers, 107 and the regulatory 
reach of the Commodity Exchange Act was expanded to include 
commodity trading advisors, commodity pool operators, and as-
sociated persons of futures commission merchants.108  
III. DISTINCTIVE REGULATION DEVELOPS BETWEEN SECURITIES 
AND FUTURES 
During the first forty years of its existence, the SEC found lit-
tle reason to compete with the Commodity Exchange Authority 
(“CEA”), as commodity futures and securities operated more or 
less independently.  Indeed, while considering the adoption of 
the Commodity Exchange Act of 1936, Congress found that 
some large speculators had transferred their manipulative ac-
tivities from the stock markets to the grain exchanges in order 
to escape regulation under the Securities Exchange Act of 
1934.109  SEC Chairman William O. Douglas, therefore, sought 
further regulation of grain speculators, especially those dealing 
in puts and calls.110  President Roosevelt responded by asking 
his Secretary of Agriculture, Henry Wallace, to take action 
  
 104. See id. 
 105. Commodity Futures Trading Commission Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-
463, 88 Stat. 1389 (codified in scattered sections of 7 U.S.C.). 
 106. 7 U.S.C. § 2 (2000). 
 107. Commodity Futures Trading Commission Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-
463, 88 Stat. 1389 (codified in scattered sections of 7 U.S.C.). 
 108. 7 U.S.C. § 6k (2000) (associated person registration requirement); 7 
U.S.C. § 6n (2000) (commodity trading advisor and pool operator registration 
requirement). 
 109. MARKHAM, HISTORY OF COMMODITY FUTURES TRADING, supra note 98, at 
25.  At least one large and vicious speculator crossed over the other way, i.e., 
from the commodity exchanges to the stock markets during the 1920s.  This 
individual, Arthur Cutten, was involved in numerous commodity manipula-
tions before moving his activities and operating on an even grander scale in 
the securities markets.  Id. at 26.  
 110. See 2 MARKHAM, A FINANCIAL HISTORY OF THE U.S., supra note 15, at 
143. 
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against the commodity exchanges.111  Wallace refused to do so, 
viewing the SEC’s concern as mere pretense, cloaking a power 
grab by the very ambitious Douglas.112  
The regulatory structures governing securities and commod-
ity futures were thus allowed to develop separately and distinc-
tively.  While the cornerstone of SEC regulation is full disclo-
sure to the public in securities offerings, there is no comparable 
concept in the Commodity Exchange Act of 1936.  The SEC was 
also given authority to enforce margin requirements for securi-
ties set by the Federal Reserve Board, a device Congress con-
cluded would curb speculation and avoid the diversion of scarce 
credit into such activities.113  The CEA, on the other hand, pos-
sessed no such authority and had informed Congress during the 
hearings on the Commodity Exchange Act of 1936 that such 
authority was not needed.  Rather, the CEA wanted to impose 
limits on the amount of trading that could be conducted by the 
large speculators, who at the time were the principal perpetra-
tors of market manipulations.114  Such authority was granted by 
Congress in the Commodity Exchange Act of 1936.115  The SEC 
had no comparable power.  Although the CEA changed its posi-
tion not long afterward and sought authority to control margins 
as well — after its position limits proved ineffective in curbing 
price rises in commodity markets — Congress refused to grant 
the CEA this power.116 Margins on futures were considered a 
  
 111. Id.  
 112. Id. at 225.    
 113. 15 U.S.C. § 78g (2000).  Margin requirements are set under Federal 
Reserve Board Rules, the most prominent of which is Regulation T.  Credit by 
Brokers and Dealers, 12 C.F.R. §§ 220.1–220.18 (2002).  The Federal Reserve 
Board changed margin requirements some twenty-five times after the adop-
tion of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 in order to squelch speculation in 
the case of increases or to ease access to the market during downturns.  To-
day, most actively traded stock is subject to a margin requirement of 50%.  23 
MARKHAM & HAZEN, supra note 35, §§ 3.01–3.02.  
 114. See Jerry W. Markham, Federal Regulation of Margin in the Commod-
ity Futures Industry — History and Theory , 64 TEMP. L. REV. 59, 69–71, 71 
n.60 (1991) [hereinafter Markham, Federal Regulation of Margin]. 
 115. See 7 U.S.C. § 6a(c) (2000) (authorizing position limits for speculators 
and exempting “bona fide” hedging from their application).  See also generally 
United States v. Cohen, 448 F.2d 1224 (2d Cir. 1971) (speculative limit viola-
tions); Kent v. Hardin, 425 F.2d 1346 (5th Cir. 1970); Goodman v. Benson, 286 
F.2d 896 (7th Cir. 1961).   
 116. Markham, Federal Regulation of Margin, supra note 114, at 71–80. 
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device to protect the exchanges and futures commission mer-
chants from customer defaults, rather than a credit allocation 
issue or a means to control speculation.117  Congress thought 
that the commodity exchanges were in a better position than 
the government to assure that margin levels were adequate for 
their protection.118 
Although both agencies had antifraud provisions to adminis-
ter, the Commodity Exchange Act provision was more narrowly 
focused and was never given the expansive interpretation ap-
plied to Section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934.119  
That section was the most broadly applied of the antifraud pro-
visions administered by the SEC; it was pursuant to that sec-
tion that the SEC adopted Rule 10b-5.120  The rule applies to all 
securities transactions, and the SEC has used this authority to 
create entire regulatory programs, the most famous being its 
insider trading prosecutions.121  Demonstrating the flexibility of 
Rule 10b-5, the SEC’s insider trading program was not begun 
until over a quarter of a century after the agency was created, 
and almost twenty years after the adoption of the rule.122  Al-
though sometimes likened to Section 10(b) of the Securities Ex-
change Act of 1934, Section 4b of the Commodity Exchange Act 
of 1936123 was limited to specific fraudulent practices made in 
  
 117. Id. 
 118. Id. at 76.  This did not stop the government from jawboning and 
threatening the commodity exchanges with more regulation if they did not 
increase margins during periods of major price increases.  Id. at 80.   
 119. 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (2000).  
 120. Employment of Manipulative and Deceptive Devices, 17 C.F.R. § 
240.10b-5 (2002). 
 121. 2 HAZEN TREATISE, supra note 51, § 12.3[2] (describing adoption and 
expansion of the application of Rule 10b-5).  The SEC has not been shy in 
creating substantive regulation through litigation in other areas, such as 
questionable payments to foreign government officials in order to obtain busi-
ness.  ROBERTA S. KARMEL, REGULATION BY PROSECUTION: THE SECURITIES AND 
EXCHANGE COMMISSION VS. CORPORATE AMERICA 153–159 (1982).  
 122. Rule 10b-5 was adopted in 1942.  Employment of Manipulative and 
Deceptive Devices, 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (2002).  The SEC did not prosecute 
insider trading under this rule until 1961.  See In the Matter of Cady, Roberts 
& Co., 40 S.E.C. 907 (1961).  Even then, Rule 10b-5 did not receive much at-
tention for insider trading purposes for another seven years, when it was 
given its most expansive interpretation in SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co. , 401 
F.2d 833 (2d Cir. 1968), cert. denied, sub nom., Coates v. SEC, 394 U.S. 976 
(1969). 
 123. 7 U.S.C. § 6b (2000). 
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connection with futures traded on contract markets.124 There 
was no interest by commodity regulators in creating an insider 
trading program in the futures industry.125      
Additional disparities existed in the two regulatory schemes.  
A cornerstone of  SEC broker-dealer regulation became the 
suitability requirement, i.e., a broker-dealer may not recom-
mend securities to a customer that are unsuitable in light of the 
customer’s own particular financial circumstances and objec-
tives126 — a doctrine that the SEC created out of whole cloth.127  
The CEA, on the other hand, invented no comparable regula-
tory concept.  The Commodity Exchange Act of 1936 prohibited 
over-the-counter dealings in commodity futures; the contract 
markets were given a monopoly on such transactions, at least 
  
 124. The Supreme Court has casually compared Section 4b in the Commod-
ity Exchange Act with Section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934.  
See Merrill Lynch, Pierce Fenner & Smith  Inc. v. Curran, 456 U.S. 353 
(1982).  But in fact, the language and application of Section 4b has been more 
narrowly focused, i.e., it applies only to commodity futures trading on contract 
markets.  See 13 JERRY W. MARKHAM, COMMODITIES REGULATION: FRAUD, 
MANIPULATION & OTHER CLAIMS §§ 1.01–1.08 (2001) [hereinafter MARKHAM, 
FRAUD, MANIPULATION & OTHER CLAIMS] (describing judicial decisions inter-
preting Section 4b).  The CFTC did adopt antifraud rules for other products 
such as commodity options (17 C.F.R. § 32.9 (2002)), foreign futures contracts, 
(17 C.F.R. § 30.9 (2002)), and leverage contracts, Fraud in Connection with 
Certain Transaction in Silver or Gold Bullion or Bulk Coins, or Other Com-
modities, 17 C.F.R. § 31.3 (2002).  The CFTC had tried to model its commodity 
options rule after SEC Rule 10b-5, but was forced to retreat in the face of in-
dustry opposition.  The CFTC did keep Rule 10b-5 language in its antifraud 
rule for leverage contracts.  13 MARKHAM, FRAUD, MANIPULATION & OTHER 
CLAIMS, supra, § 2.08.  
 125. See discussion infra notes 169–71 and accompanying text. 
 126. See generally Lewis D. Lowenfels & Alan R. Bromberg, Suitability in 
Securities Transactions, 54 BUS . LAW. 1557 (1999) (describing suitability doc-
trine).  
 127. The suitability doctrine was borrowed from the NYSE’s “know your 
customer” rule.  The exchange rule sought to protect member firms from un-
scrupulous “freeriding” customers that bought stock and paid only if the stock 
price increased.  The SEC turned that concept on its head and imposed the 
suitability obligation on broker-dealers as a customer protection measure.  
This was done under the SEC’s “shingle” theory, which posits that, in hanging 
out its shingle, a broker-dealer represents to the public that the broker-dealer 
is a professional and customers may rely on that expertise for suitable rec-
ommendations.  See generally 23A MARKHAM & HAZEN, supra note 35, § 9.01 
(describing basis of suitability doctrine).    
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for the “regulated” commodities.128  The SEC, in contrast, regu-
lated a broad-based over-the-counter market129 and imposed 
affirmative obligations on market makers and exchange special-
ists to make a “fair and orderly” market, i.e., a market that was 
not volatile.130  No such requirement was imposed on the floor 
traders on the commodity exchanges.  Instead, trading was con-
ducted in an auction-style open outcry system in which traders 
could participate, or not, as they chose.131 
SEC regulation was paternalistic in other ways.  It imposed a 
duty of supervision on broker-dealers that required them to af-
firmatively supervise their employees with a view toward pre-
venting violations.132 The CEA, in contrast, imposed no such 
obligation on futures commission merchants.133 However, the 
  
 128. 7 U.S.C. § 7 (2000).  See generally Jerry W. Markham, The Commodity 
Exchange Monopoly — Reform is Needed, 48 WASH. &  LEE L. REV. 977 (1991) 
[hereinafter Markham, The Commodity Exchange Monopoly] (describing ill 
effects of the commodity exchange trading requirement). 
 129. This is not to suggest that the SEC was without sin.  It allowed the 
NYSE to enforce a rule against its members that prohibited trading of listed 
stocks except through the exchange.  This gave rise to the “third” and “fourth” 
markets in listed stocks by non-members.  The SEC tried to hack away at the 
rule by prohibiting its application to trading on other exchanges and then to 
newly listed securities.  Finally, the NYSE capitulated and repealed the rule 
in 1999.  3 MARKHAM, A FINANCIAL HISTORY OF THE U.S., supra note 42, at 332. 
 130. 15 U.S.C. § 78k(b) (2000).  See Shultz v. SEC, 614 F.2d 561, 563–64 
(7th Cir. 1980) (describing market-making obligations).  The Nasdaq market 
uses competitive market makers, while the stock exchanges use the specialist, 
but both have affirmative market-stabilizing obligations.  23A MARKHAM & 
HAZEN, supra note 35, § 10.01 (describing market making obligations).    
 131. See Markham, Manipulation, supra note 93, at 363–76 (comparing 
market-making obligations on commodity and security exchanges).  Block 
positioning  was encouraged in the securities industry, but was prohibited in 
the futures markets.  Id. at 374. 
 132. See generally Lewis D. Lowenfels & Alan R. Bromberg, Broker-Dealer 
Supervision: A Troublesome Area, 25 SETON HALL L. REV. 527 (1994) (describ-
ing supervisory duty). 
 133. The Commodity Exchange Act of 1936 did impose liability on futures 
commission merchants for the acts of their agents.  7 U.S.C. § 2a (2000).  
There was no comparable provision in the federal securities laws, but the SEC 
claimed that such liability was appropriate even without authorizing legisla-
tion.  Compare Hollinger v. Titan Capital Corp., 914 F.2d 1564 (9th Cir. 1990) 
(overruling en banc an earlier decision that had rejected respondeat superior 
liability) and Myzel v. Fields, 386 F.2d 718 (8th Cir. 1967) (rejecting agency 
liability), with, e.g., Fey v. Walston & Co., 493 F.2d 1036 (7th Cir. 1974) (ap-
plying respondeat superior liability).  The SEC did have the authority to sanc-
tion controlling persons.  15 U.S.C. § 78t(a); 15 U.S.C. § 77o (2000).  That 
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CEA did have a large trader reporting system, a power that the 
SEC did not receive until 1990.134 The CEA required large trad-
ers to file a report disclosing the identity of the trader and any 
affiliates or entities under common control.  The size of the 
trader’s position was then monitored by the CEA to assure that 
the trader posed no danger to the market.135 
Though the securities and commodity futures regulatory 
schemes differed, no one really noticed before the 1970s.  The 
product mix of the two industries was such that, aside from 
some mobile speculators, there was little overlap between com-
modity and futures trading.136 The situation began to change 
dramatically as inflation heated the economy during the Viet-
nam War.137  The resulting price hikes turned investors’ atten-
tion toward inflation hedges such as gold and silver.  The re-
moval of restrictions on trading allowed these metals to be the 
subject of commodity futures trading.  Similarly, President 
Nixon’s removal of the U.S. from the gold standard and out of 
the International Monetary Fund’s fixed rate currency regime 
led to fluctuating exchange rates that provided a basis for cur-
rency trading.138 
  
power was not added to the Commodity Exchange Act until 1982.  7 U.S.C § 
13c(b) (2000).  
 134. This authority was given to the SEC by the Market Reform Act of 1990, 
§ 3, Pub. L. No. 101-432, 104 Stat. 963 (amending 15 U.S.C. § 78m(h)).  The 
SEC proposed a rule implementing this authority.  See Large Trader Report-
ing System, Exchange Act Release No. 34-33,608, 59 Fed. Reg. 7917 (Feb. 17, 
1994).  However, it has not been adopted. 
 135. See generally In the Matter of International Futures Corp., Comm. Fut. 
L. Rep. (CCH) ¶ 27,993 (C.F.T.C. 2000) describing prior violations of CEA 
large trader reporting requirements), aff’d, without opinion, Commodity Fu-
tures Trading Comm’n v. Hunt, 559 F.2d 1224 (7th Cir. 1977).   
 136. Broker-dealers engaging in securities activities often had separate 
departments that conducted commodity futures trading for customers.  This 
required dual registration under the Commodity Exchange Act of 1936 and 
the Securities Exchange Act of 1934.    
 137. The inflation that occurred in the 1970s led to many “hard” money 
investment programs that would inflate with the economy.  See 3 MARKHAM , A 
FINANCIAL HISTORY OF THE U.S., supra note 42, at 61 (describing these pro-
grams). 
 138. See generally LEO MELAMED & BOB TAMARKIN, ESCAPE TO THE FUTURES  
(1996) (describing creation of futures markets on currency). 
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Price volatility also led the commodity exchanges to consider 
commodity futures trading on interest rates and stock prices.139  
A committee of the Chicago Board of Trade began to explore 
whether commodity futures trading principles could be applied 
to stocks.  The result was the CBOE.140  Prior to the creation of 
the CBOE, stock options were sold only on a limited basis in the 
over-the-counter market.  The CBOE introduced a commodity 
futures concept of trading standardized options contracts on an 
exchange floor.  This standardization, along with the introduc-
tion of a clearing house, the Options Clearing Corporation 
(“OCC”), created a secondary market in options.  The CBOE 
trading floor borrowed from both the securities and commodity 
exchanges.  Instead of a specialist, competing market makers 
were used to create liquidity in an open outcry system like that 
on the commodity exchanges.141 
The SEC asserted regulatory control over the CBOE under 
the provisions of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934,142 and 
also became involved in the regulation of over-the-counter 
commodity options.  A loophole in the Commodity Exchange Act 
of 1936 allowed options trading on “unregulated” commodities, 
such as sugar, coffee, and silver.  Harold Goldstein, a twenty-six 
year old commodity trader discovered this and built one of the 
largest brokerage firms almost overnight through the sale of 
“naked” options, not backed by anything other than the dubious 
credit of Goldstein’s firm, Goldstein, Samuelson.  However, in-
creasing prices resulted in customer gains that Goldstein could 
not cover.  The SEC shut down his and similar options firms by 
claiming that these contracts were securities.143 State securities 
  
 139. For a description of these events, see 3 MARKHAM , A FINANCIAL HISTORY 
OF THE U.S., supra note 42, at 42–43. 
 140. Board of Trade of the City of Chicago v. SEC, 677 F.2d 1137, 1140 n.2 
(7th  Cir. 1982), vacated as moot , 459 U.S. 1026 (1982). 
 141. See Markham & Gilberg, supra note 43, at 743–45 (describing the 
CBOE trading system). 
 142. 15 U.S.C. § 78i(b) (2000).  A court later noted that, if the CFTC had 
been in existence when the CBOE was created, the CFTC, rather than the 
SEC, would have had jurisdiction.  Board of Trade of the City of Chicago, 677 
F.2d at 1140 n.2.    
 143. See, e.g., SEC v. Commodity Options Int’l, Inc., 553 F.2d 628 (9th Cir. 
1977); SEC v. American Commodity Options Exch., Inc., 546 F.2d 1361 (10th 
Cir. 1976). 
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administrators aided the SEC in these efforts, and Goldstein 
was finally jailed.144 
The Goldstein, Samuelson debacle caused concern in Con-
gress, as did the large jump in commodity prices during this 
period.145 Congressional hearings found fault with the CEA’s 
deference to the commodity exchanges,146 and Congress con-
cluded that new legislation was needed to close the regulatory 
gap in the Commodity Exchange Act that had allowed Gold-
stein, Samuelson to operate.  Congress thought that all com-
modity options and futures trading should be subject to regula-
tion,147  and thus the Commodity Futures Trading Commission 
Act of 1974 (“CFTCA”) created the CFTC148 and brought all 
commodity futures and options trading under a “single regula-
tory umbrella.”149  The CFTC was “patterned” after the SEC and 
was granted strengthened enforcement powers,150 including au-
thority to seek injunctive relief,151 a favorite weapon employed 
  
 144. See generally Robert C. Lower, The Regulation of Commodity Options, 
1978 DUKE L.J. 1095 (1978) (describing Goldstein’s operations and resulting 
regulation); Note, The Role of the Commodity Futures Trading Commission 
Under The Commodity Futures Trading Commission Act of 1974, 73 MICH. L.  
REV. 710, 721 n.8 (1975) (describing losses). 
 145. Soybean prices increased by over $8 per bushel in one five-month pe-
riod.  MARKHAM , HISTORY OF COMMODITY FUTURES TRADING, supra note 98, at 
56–57.  A large sale of grain to the Soviet Union caused a spike in wheat 
prices and led to claims that the Soviets and various grain companies had 
profited on those transactions by advance purchases on the futures markets 
— the “Great Grain Robbery.”  DAN MORGAN, MERCHANTS OF GRAIN 12–121 
(1979) (observing that the grain robbery was a world-changing economic 
event). 
 146. MARKHAM, HISTORY OF COMMODITY FUTURES TRADING, supra note 98, at 
60–65. 
 147. The Commodity Exchange Act of 1936 regulated futures trading only 
on specified commodities.  Additional commodities were added to that list over 
the years, but such ad hoc amendments could not keep pace with the contin-
ual expansion of futures trading to other commodities. 
 148. Commodity Futures Trading Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-463, 88 Stat. 
1389 (amending 7 U.S.C. §§ 2, 4). 
 149. H.R. REP. NO. 93-975 at 42 (1974).  
 150. 120 CONG. REC. 30467 (1974) (remarks of Sen. Taft). The CFTC was to 
be comparable to the SEC in its regulatory role.  See generally S. REP. NO. 93-
1131 (1974), reprinted in 1974 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5843; 120 CONG. REC. 10741 
(1974) (remarks of Rep. Adams). 
 151. Commodity Exchange Act, 7 U.S.C. § 13a-1 (2000).  The CEA had 
sought such authority in 1968, but the authorizing legislation was blocked in 
Congress by the commodity exchanges.  Jerry W. Markham, Injunctive Ac-
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by the SEC.152  Self-regulation by the commodity exchanges was 
also strengthened.153  The National Futures Association was 
later created to act as an analogue to the NASD.   
The CFTCA further gave the CFTC certain authority that the 
SEC did not possess: the CFTC could impose civil penalties of 
up to $100,000 per violation154 (a power that the SEC did not 
receive until 1984),155 bar violators from trading on contract 
markets156 (a power that the SEC was not given), and grant 
reparations to investors injured by violations committed by reg-
istered persons (again, this was not a power granted to the 
SEC).157 
There were other differences in regulation between the two 
agencies.  Congress passed the Securities Investor Protection 
Act (“SIPA”) in 1970,158 after the securities industry nearly col-
lapsed during the “paperwork crisis” at the end of the 1970s.159 
  
tions under the Commodity Exchange Act, Sec. Reg. & L. Rep. (BNA) No. 504, 
at B-1 (May 23, 1979).  
 152. See generally Harvey L. Pitt and Jerry W. Markham, SEC Civil Injunc-
tive Actions: A Reply, 6 REV. SEC. REG. 955 (1973) (describing importance of 
injunctive actions in SEC enforcement program). Professor Karmel has 
charged that the SEC has used its injunctive actions, which often end in con-
sent decrees, to create substantive regulation.  See generally KARMEL, supra 
note 121.  Interestingly, the CFTC rarely brings injunctive actions and in-
stead prefers to initiate administrative disciplinary proceedings. 
 153. Jerry W. Markham & John M. Schobel, Self-Regulation Under the 
Commodity Exchange Act — Can the CFTC Make It Work?, Sec. Reg. & L. 
Rep. (BNA) No. 368 (Special Supp. Sept. 1, 1976). 
 154. Commodity Exchange Act, 7 U.S.C. § 9 (2000). 
 155. The SEC was given the power to seek civil penalties for insider trading 
by the Insider Trading Sanctions Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-376, 98 Stat. 
1264 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 15 U.S.C.). 
 156. 7 U.S.C. § 9 (2000).  
 157. 7 U.S.C. § 18 (2000).  See generally William R. Schief & Jerry W. 
Markham, The Nation’s “Commodity Cops” — Efforts by the Commodity Fu-
tures Trading Commission to Enforce the Commodity Exchange Act, 34 BUS. 
LAW. 19 (1978) (describing CFTC enforcement powers and actions); Jerry W. 
Markham, The Seventh Amendment and CFTC Reparations Proceedings, 68 
IOWA L. REV. 87 (1982) (describing CFTC reparations proceedings). 
 158. Securities Investor Protection Act of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-598, 84 Stat. 
1636 (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 78o, 78aaa–78lll (2000)).  See also 
sources cited supra note 36; Securities Investor Protection Corp. v. Barbour, 
421 U.S. 412 (1975) (describing this statute). 
 159. NYSE firms were choking on daily trading volume averaging 16 million 
shares at the end of the 1960s.  2 MARKHAM, A FINANCIAL HISTORY OF THE U.S., 
supra note 15, at 361.  Today, the NYSE is able to handle daily volume of 2.8 
billion shares without a hiccup.  Adam Shell, Have Stocks Finally Hit Bot-
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The statute provided insurance to securities customers (now 
$500,000, of which up to $100,000 may be in cash) in the event 
of a broker-dealer insolvency.160 The CFTCA also directed the 
CFTC to consider whether such legislation was needed in the 
futures industry.161 The resulting CFTC study compared loss 
ratios of firms under government insurance programs with the 
loss ratios of commodity futures customers.  The loss ratios for 
futures commission merchant customers were found to be sub-
stantially lower than insured firms, leading the CFTC to con-
clude that insurance was unnecessary.162  
This is a marked difference in competing regulatory ap-
proaches.  Insurance creates a moral hazard that the firm being 
insured will attract funds at low cost from investors on the 
strength of the government’s credit and then use those funds for 
high return, high risk ventures.  The savings and loan debacle 
of the 1980s is a good example of a gluttonous feast on insured 
funds.163  The futures industry, in contrast, uses market disci-
pline to protect customers, which seems an unlikely undertak-
ing when the nature of futures trading is considered.  Commod-
ity futures contracts are highly leveraged.  The low margin re-
quirements set by the exchanges are only a very small percent 
of the notional amount at risk.164  Small moves mean large 
losses to at least half of the market participants.165  Futures 
  
tom?, USA TODAY, July 25, 2002, at 1B.  During the “paperwork crisis,” some 
160 NYSE firms failed, and the exchange exhausted the trust fund it had used 
to indemnify customers in failed firms.  SELIGMAN , supra note 32, at 452–53.   
 160. Securities Investor Protection Act of 1970, 15 U.S.C. § 78fff-3 (2000). 
 161. Commodity Futures Trading Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-463, 88 Stat. 
1389 (amending 7 U.S.C. §§ 2, 4). 
 162. Report to the Congress Concerning Commodity Futures Account Insur-
ance, Comm. Fut. L. Rep. (CCH) ¶ 20,235 (Nov. 1, 1976). 
 163. See generally BANKING SCANDALS: THE S & LS AND BCCI (Robert Emmet 
Long ed., 1993) (describing the looting that went on in the savings and loan 
industry); Spiegel v. Ryan, 946 F.2d 1435 (9th Cir. 1991), cert. denied, 503 
U.S. 970 (1992) (describing the looting that went on at Columbia Savings & 
Loan Association).   
 164. SEC v. Commodity Options Int’l, Inc., 553 F.2d 628, 629 (9th Cir. 
1977). 
 165. Futures trading is a zero-sum game.  For each buyer, there is a seller.  
A market move one way or the other will mean a gain to one side and a loss to 
the other.  Board of Trade v. CFTC, 724 F. Supp. 548, 555 n.11 (N.D. Ill. 
1989).  The loss may be offset by another risk, however, as in the case of a 
hedger.  See Merrill Lynch, Pierce Fenner & Smith Inc. v. Curran, 456 U.S. 
353, n.11 (1982) (describing hedging with commodity futures). 
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contracts are also selected on the basis of a high degree of price 
volatility, and speculation is encouraged.166  Yet, despite the 
leverage (and attendant risk) and the large element of specula-
tion present, there are fewer customer losses due to the bank-
ruptcy of a financial intermediary than in the insured indus-
tries that have less risk, volatility, and speculation.167 
The answer lies in the way margin trading is regulated in the 
futures industry.  The exchanges set margin for the protection 
of their clearing houses and positions are marked to market 
daily.  Losses must be recognized through variation margin 
payments that must be made before the firm can trade the next 
day.  Futures commission merchants are thus forced to recog-
nize customer losses each day.  Losses cannot be put off in the 
hope of a market recovery;168 nor can they accumulate.169 The 
  
 166. Speculation provides price information and liquidity for hedgers offset-
ting commercial risks through the futures markets.  Curran, 456 U.S. at 358–
60. 
 167. From 1970 to at least 1996, no failure of member of a major commodity 
futures exchange resulted in a loss of customer funds.  Jerry W. Markham, 
The CFTC Net Capital Rule — Should a More Risk-Based Approach be 
Adopted?, 71 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 1091, 1093 (1996) [hereinafter Markham, The 
CFTC Net Capital Rule]. 
 168. As noted by one exchange official: 
This unique feature is a primary factor which enables commodity 
markets to boast an incredibly good record in the area of insolvencies.  
Every firm must be monetarily “even” with the commodity prices of 
the previous day.  If a firm’s net commitment shows a net loss on the 
basis of the previous settlement prices, it pays the resultant amount 
to the exchange clearinghouse.  If a firm’s net commitment shows a 
profit, it collects the resultant amount from the clearinghouse.  This 
process is a daily procedure. 
Review of the Commodity Exchange Act and Discussion of Possible Changes: 
Hearings Before the House Comm. on Agriculture , 93d Cong. 192 (1973) 
(statement of Leo Melamed, Secretary of the Board, Chicago Mercantile Ex-
change). 
 169. This is not to say that there have been no failures of futures commis-
sion merchants.  Large customer losses have occurred as the result of looting 
of customer accounts to pay margins for accounts in deficit.  Three of the more 
highly publicized of those failures occurred in the early 1980s: Incomco, Inc.; 
Chicago Discount Commodity Brokers; and Volume Investors.  The latter fail-
ure led the CFTC staff to reconsider whether account insurance was needed, 
but no action was taken.  At the time, customer losses from bankrupt futures 
commission merchants were averaging only about $2 million per year.  23 
MARKHAM & HAZEN, supra note 35, § 4.08.  The tenth largest futures commis-
sion merchant failed in 1990.  See In re Stotler & Co., 144 B.R. 385, 386 (N.D 
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securities industry, on the other hand, had no comparable mar-
ket discipline.  Transactions were settled on a T+5 basis, i.e., 
settlement was not made until five days after the execution of 
the trade.  This left plenty of time for losses to mount or for cus-
tomers to engage in reckless conduct to make up for losses.  The 
SEC has since imposed a T+3 requirement on settlement, but 
this is still three days more than is required in the futures in-
dustry.170 
At the time the CFTC was created, the SEC was also in the 
midst of defending an expansive interpretation of its insider 
trading program under Rule 10b-5.  The CFTC later conducted 
a study to determine whether a similar rule was needed in the 
futures industry,171 but concluded it was not appropriate to im-
pose such a regulation on futures traders.172 Many participants 
in the futures markets had superior access to information and 
traders on exchange floors had time and place advantages for 
the use of information.  The CFTC believed that it was neither 
  
Ill. 1992) (describing size of bankruptcy).  That firm, Stotler & Co., was 
headed by the Chairman of the Chicago Board of Trade.  The parent company 
had moved several millions of dollars out of the futures commission merchant 
before it failed.  3 MARKHAM, A FINANCIAL HISTORY OF THE U.S., supra note 42, 
at 162–63.  Customer losses, however, appear to have been minimal.  See In re 
Stotler, 144 B.R. at 386.  
 170. See generally Report of the Backmann Task Force on Clearance and 
Settlement Reform in U.S. Securities Markets, Exchange Act Release No. 
30,802, 51 S.E.C. Docket 1,073 (June 15, 1992) (describing need for reducing 
settlement period); Securities Transactions Settlement, Exchange Act Release 
No. 34-33,023, 58 Fed. Reg. 52,891 (Oct. 13, 1993) (adopting T+3 require-
ment).  An SEC chairman subsequently suggested that T+1 or even same day 
settlement should be the securities industry goal.  SEC Chairman Arthur 
Levitt, Speeding Up Settlement; The Next Frontier, Address Before a Sympo-
sium on Risk Reduction and Payments, Clearance and Settlement Systems, 
New York, NY, Jan. 26, 1996.  
 171. CFTC, A Study of the Nature, Extent and Effects of Futures Trading by 
Persons Possessing Material Nonpublic Information, submitted to the House 
Committee on Agriculture and Senate Committee on Agriculture, Nutrition 
and Forestry Pursuant to Section 23(b) of the Commodity Exchange Act, as 
Amended (Sept. 1984) (on file with author) [hereinafter CFTC, Study of the 
Nature, Extent and Effects of Futures Trading].  
 172. Id.  The author leaves for others to resolve the debate whether insider 
trading in securities is good or bad.  See Henry G. Manne, Options? Nah. Try 
Insider Trading, WALL ST. J., Aug. 2, 2002, at A8 (advocating using inside 
information as a form of compensation and asserting that: “Currently, the 
SEC sees its job as regulating the entire market for information.  This is 
madness.”).   
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practical nor desirable to mandate that traders have equal ac-
cess to information, as required by the SEC.173 
The CFTC did seek to adopt some regulatory requirements 
that would have more closely conformed its regulatory structure 
to that of the SEC, largely due to the fact that several newly 
arrived staff members at the CFTC had formerly served on the 
SEC staff.174 One SEC-style proposal enacted was a net capital 
rule.175  The SEC had adopted its Uniform Net Capital Rule in 
the aftermath of the paperwork crisis.176  Since the stock ex-
changes had failed to enforce their capital rules during the pa-
perwork crisis,177 the SEC concluded that a more stringent fed-
eral rule was needed to protect customers and the SIPA insur-
  
 173. The CFTC viewed most information used for futures trading to be 
“market” information that, at least in theory, was accessible to everyone, even 
if not on an equal basis.  The CFTC did express concern regarding abuses of 
information obtained by the exchanges in confidence that could be traded for a 
profit.  The CFTC adopted a rule to guard against such abuses (17 C.F.R. § 
1.59 (2002)), and the Commodity Exchange Act was later amended to include 
such a prohibition.  See H.R. REP. NO. 102–978, at 23 (1992) (discussing the 
amendment).  The CFTC initially rejected the “misappropriation” theory that 
the SEC was pushing in the securities industry.  Compare, CFTC, Study of the 
Nature, Extent and Effects of Futures Trading, supra note 171, at 57, with, 
United States v. O’Hagan, 521 U.S. 642 (1997) (endorsing SEC misappropria-
tion theory).  The CFTC, however, later brought a case against two traders 
who were misappropriating information concerning the trading plans of a 
large firm that had market effect.  Commodity Futures Trading Comm’n v. 
Kelly, Comm. Fut. L. Rep. (CCH) ¶ 27,465 (S.D.N.Y. 1998).  
 174. See MARKHAM, THE HISTORY OF COMMODITY FUTURES TRADING, supra  
note 98, at 86 (describing staff members that drafted CFTC net capital rule).  
(The author must confess to being one of these staff members.) 
 175. Minimum Financial Requirements for Futures Commission Merchants 
and Introducing Brokers, 17 C.F.R. § 1.17 (2002). 
 176. Net Capital Requirements for Brokers and Dealers, 17 C.F.R. § 
240.15c3-1 (2002).  Government insurance programs inevitably lead to perva-
sive and intrusive, as well as very expensive and complex, regulation — all of 
which is justified as necessary to protect the insurance fund because market 
discipline has been removed. 
 177. The Chairman of the NYSE stated that another one hundred exchange 
member firms would have been put out of business if the exchange had 
strictly enforced its capital rule during the paperwork crisis.  2 MARKHAM , A 
FINANCIAL HISTORY OF THE U.S., supra note 15, at 364.  In contrast, the Chi-
cago Board of Trade suspended the firm of Hayden, Stone for failing to meet 
its capital requirements.  The NYSE then pressured the Board of Trade to 
remove the suspension in order to prevent a failure of the firm, which was also 
a member of the NYSE.  Hayden, Stone continued to encounter difficulties.  
Id. at 363.  
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ance fund.178  The futures industry had no paperwork crisis — 
its overnight settlement requirement and paperless trading as-
sured that result.179  Nevertheless, the newly arrived SEC staff 
members were fresh from their exposure to the SEC Uniform 
Net Capital Rule, and believed such a requirement was 
needed.180  Still, the CFTC net capital rule does not appear to 
have had much effect in preventing insolvencies by futures 
commission merchants.  If anything, the  traditionally low rate 
of failures actually increased.181  The CFTC net capital rule is 
also flawed and out of date in its risk measurement criteria,182 
but still remains on the books. 
The CFTC staff also tried to borrow wholesale from the SEC’s 
rulebook183 by proposing a set of customer protection rules.184 
  
 178. The SEC’s capital rule did not apply to exchange member firms until 
the adoption of its Uniform Net Capital Rule in 1975.  Under the old rule, 
stock exchange member firms were subject to capital requirements imposed 
by the exchanges.  23A MARKHAM & HAZEN, supra note 35, § 5.02.  For a de-
scription of the background and reasons for the adoption of the Uniform Net 
Capital Rule, see generally SEC, STUDY OF UNSAFE AND UNSOUND PRACTICES 
OF BROKER-DEALERS , H.R. DOC. NO. 92-231 (1971).   
 179. In 1968, Congress added the authority to adopt capital rules to the 
Commodity Exchange Act of 1936 due to concern that irresponsible firms were 
entering the business.  Commodities Exchange Act of 1936, amended by 82 
Stat. 26 (1968).  See generally S. REP. NO. 90-947 (1968), reprinted in 1968 
U.S.C.C.A.N. 1673.  
 180. See generally Proposed Financial Reporting Requirements for Futures 
Commission Merchants, Comm. Fut. L. Rep. (CCH) ¶ 20,220 (Oct. 15, 1976) 
(describing proposed CFTC net capital  rule). 
 181. See supra note 169 (describing failures by futures commission mer-
chants on the CFTC’s watch). 
 182. See Markham, The CFTC Net Capital Rule , supra note 167, at 1091 
(describing flaws in CFTC net capital rule). 
 183. Minimum Financial Requirements for Futures Commission Merchants 
and Introducing Brokers, 17 C.F.R. § 1.17 (2002).  There has been some cross-
fertilization from the CFTC to the SEC.  As another measure to protect the 
SIPA insurance fund, the SEC was directed by Congress to adopt rules for the 
protection of customer funds.  15 U.S.C. § 78o(c)(3)(A) (2000).  The SEC 
adopted its “Customer Protection Rule” in response.  17 C.F.R. § 240.15c3-3 
(2002).  This rule requires customer funds held by broker-dealers to be kept in 
special bank accounts held for the benefit of customers.  Box counts of cus-
tomer funds and securities are also required.  Id.  The rule was adopted in the 
wake of the paperwork crisis and after criticism was raised that customer free 
credit balances were being used to fund the operations of broker-dealers, effec-
tively an interest-free loan.  23A MARKHAM & HAZEN, supra note 35, § 4.03.  
The SEC Customer Protection Rule was directly analogous to the requirement 
in the Commodity Exchange Act of 1936 on segregation of customer funds and 
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Among other things, the proposals included a rule imposing a 
supervision requirement like that employed by the SEC.  The 
rule was adopted, albeit in a more simplified form.185 A proposal 
to adopt a suitability requirement did not fare as well186 — it set 
off a firestorm of controversy and the rule was never adopted.187  
Instead, the CFTC adopted a one-page risk disclosure state-
ment that advised customers of the risks of trading commodity 
futures, and recommended that customers should themselves 
consider whether commodity futures trading was suitable in 
light of their particular circumstances and financial re-
sources.188  Customers were required to sign the statement and 
  
securities into special bank accounts.   7 U.S.C. § 6d (2000).  See also Cus-
tomer Funds to be Segregated and Separately Accounted For, 17 C.F.R. § 1.20 
(2002) (regulation implementing segregation requirements).   
  The SEC stated that it was hopeful that its Customer Protection Rule 
would obviate the need for its net capital rule.  SECURITIES EXCHANGE 
COMMISSION, STUDY ON THE FINANCING AND REGULATORY CAPITAL NEEDS OF THE 
SECURITIES INDUSTRY 7 n.17 (Jan. 23, 1985) (on file with author).  Government 
being what it is, that never came to pass. 
 184. See generally Protection of Commodity Customers: Standards of Con-
duct for Commodity Trading Professionals, 42 Fed. Reg. 44,742 (1977). 
 185. 17 C.F.R. § 166.3 (2002).  See generally Adoption of Customer Protec-
tion Rules, 43 Fed. Reg. 31,886 (1978).  (As the result of much industry oppo-
sition, the proposed supervisory rule was simplified before adoption.) 
 186. Protection of Commodity Customers: Standards of Conduct for Com-
modity Trading Professionals, 42 Fed. Reg. 44,742, 44,743 (1977). 
 187. The CFTC asserted that such a requirement was implied in the Com-
modity Exchange Act of 1936, and, therefore, a rule was not needed.  Adoption 
of Customer Protection Rules, 43 Fed. Reg. 31,886, 31,889 (1978).  After some 
flip-flopping, the CFTC later held in its reparations proceedings that there is 
no suitability requirement in the act.  Phacelli v. Conticommodity Services, 
Inc., Comm. Fut. L. Rep. (CCH) ¶ 22,345 (C.F.T.C. 1984).  The courts agreed 
with that interpretation.  See, e.g., Schofield v. First Commodity Corp., 793 
F.2d 28 (1st Cir. 1986). 
  The CFTC had also proposed a churning rule that would have prohib-
ited brokers from excessively trading customer accounts they controlled.  Pro-
tection of Commodity Customers: Standards of Conduct for Commodity Trad-
ing Professionals, 42 Fed. Reg. 44,742, 44,745 (1977).  This proposal was also 
dropped.  Like the suitability proposal, the CFTC claimed that such a re-
quirement was already implied in the Commodity Exchange Act of 1936.  
Adoption of Customer Protection Rules, 43 Fed. Reg. 31,886, 31,889 (1978).  
Unlike the suitability rule, the CFTC later held that the CEA antifraud provi-
sion implied a churning prohibition.  See, e.g., In re Lincolnwood Commodi-
ties, Inc., Comm. Fut. L. Rep. (CCH) ¶ 21,986 (C.F.T.C. 1984).     
 188. Distribution of “Risk Disclosure Statement” by Futures Commission 
Merchants and Introducing Brokers, 17 C.F.R. § 1.55 (2002). 
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confirm that they had read and understood the risks.189  This 
was visibly different from the paternalistic approach of the SEC 
— the CFTC was requiring individuals to take responsibility for 
their own investment decisions.  Regulatory competition was 
indeed influencing the manner in which the two industries 
would be regulated.  This competition would also lead to much 
strife.  
IV. REGULATORY BATTLES BETWEEN CFTC AND SEC 
The SEC was not new to regulatory competition when the 
CFTC arrived, and had just recently engaged in an extended 
quarrel with the banking regulators over which it should have 
been given authority to regulate securities clearing and settle-
ment functions conducted by banks.190  That slanging match 
ended in a compromise whereby regulatory authority over 
banks engaging in clearing and settlement was given to the 
bank regulatory authorities, while the SEC regulated all oth-
ers.191  In another act of aggression, the SEC adopted a rule that 
would have subjected banks engaging in securities activities to 
registration as broker-dealers under the Securities Exchange 
Act of 1934.  However, a circuit court struck down the rule as 
being outside the SEC’s jurisdiction.192 Nonetheless, the SEC 
continued to seek to regulate banks through the back door of 
disclosure, i.e., most large banks are public companies that 
must report to the SEC.193 
The SEC soon found itself on the defensive as bank regulators 
took an increasingly liberal view of which activities banks could 
  
 189. Id. 
 190. The SEC claimed before Congress that it had greater enforcement 
powers than the bank regulators and thus should be given sole jurisdiction 
over all clearing and settlement activities, including those by banks.  The 
banks took umbrage and fought back in Congress with their own expansive 
claims of regulatory authority.  See 23A MARKHAM & HAZEN, supra note 35, § 
8.02.  
 191. Id.  A similar compromise was reached in 1985 over the regulation of 
dealers in government securities.  3 HAZEN TREATISE, supra note 51, § 14.7 
(describing Government Securities Act of 1986). 
 192. American Bankers Ass’n v. SEC, 804 F.2d 739 (D.C. Cir. 1986). 
 193. Raphael Soifer, U.S. Regulator Applies the Pressure, 151 BANKER, Issue 
No. 902, Apr. 1, 2001.  
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engage in under the Glass-Steagall Act.194  The securities indus-
try retaliated through the courts, with mixed success.  Fur-
thermore, competition between the CFTC and the SEC was an-
other challenge that began almost immediately after the adop-
tion of the CFTCA.  The decision of the CFTC to approve com-
modity futures trading on Government National Mortgage As-
sociation (“GNMA”) certificates set off an explosion at the SEC.  
The SEC contended that such contracts were the equivalent of 
“when issued” GNMAs that were already regulated by the SEC.  
This resulted in an exchange of acrimonious correspondence 
between the two agencies.  At the end of the day, the SEC lost 
the battle and GNMA futures continued to trade.195  Un-
daunted, the CFTC also approved a futures contract on treasury 
bills on the Chicago Mercantile Exchange in 1976.196  The SEC, 
however, had a long memory and, as will be seen, would retali-
ate against the CFTC.197  
In the meantime, the grant of exclusive jurisdiction to the 
CFTC over commodity options198 removed the regulatory con-
trols established by the SEC and state securities administrators 
over commodity option dealers.199  The results were a quick re-
turn of fly-by-night commodity option firms, numerous scan-
dals, and widespread fraud.  The situation was not alleviated 
until the CFTC suspended the trading of commodity options,200 
  
 194. See generally MICHAEL G. CAPATIDES, A GUIDE TO THE CAPITAL MARKETS 
ACTIVITIES OF BANKS AND BANK HOLDING COMPANIES (1993) (describing expan-
sion of bank activities). 
 195. See MARKHAM , HISTORY OF COMMODITY FUTURES TRADING, supra note 
98, at 81–83 (describing this dispute).  
 196. 3 MARKHAM, A FINANCIAL HISTORY OF THE U.S., supra note 42, at 81. 
 197. See infra note 208 and accompanying text. 
 198. Commodity Exchange Act, 7 U.S.C. § 2a(ii) (2000). 
 199. See John M. Schobel, Jr. & Jerry W. Markham, Commodity Options — 
A New Industry or Another Debacle?, Sec. Reg. & L. Rep. (BNA) 1–20 (Special 
Supp. Apr. 7, 1976) (describing return of fly-by-night commodity options 
firms). 
 200. 17 C.F.R. § 32.11 (1978).  Several of these firms grew quickly and were 
selling options on a national basis to unsophisticated customers; fraud was 
widespread.  The CFTC also discovered that one of the larger of these firms 
was owned and operated by a felon who had escaped from prison.  Kelley v. 
Carr, 567 F. Supp. 831 (W.D. Mich. 1983).  At the time it suspended options 
trading, the CFTC was devoting a large amount of its resources to options 
problems.  See Extend Commodity Exchange Act: Hearings on H.R.  10285 
Before the House Subcomm. On Conservation and Credit of the House Comm. 
on Agriculture, 95th Cong. 39 (1978) (statement of William Bagley, CFTC 
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but the SEC used the scandals as the basis for an unsuccessful 
attempt to wrest jurisdiction from the CFTC during the latter’s 
reauthorization hearings in 1978,201 seeking regulatory author-
ity on all instruments involving securities.  The Treasury De-
partment also desired a role where treasury securities were in-
volved.  Congress, however, refused to entertain these demands 
and merely directed the CFTC to consult with the SEC and the 
banking regulators where instruments they regulated were the 
subject of commodity futures or options trading.202  
Another threat to the SEC was the decision by the CFTC to 
approve futures trading on stock indexes.203 These contracts 
were almost immediately popular and spread to other commod-
ity exchanges.  The SEC retaliated by approving the trading of 
options on GNMA certificates on the CBOE.  The commodity 
exchanges challenged this action in court and won before the 
Seventh Circuit.204  By this point, the SEC realized that it was 
fighting a losing battle in trying to encroach on the CFTC’s ju-
  
Chairman, describing resources expended by CFTC on options problems).  The 
CFTC allowed some options trading to continue, including options entered 
into by commercial firms.  Exemptions, 17 C.F.R. § 32.4 (2002).  The CFTC 
also later allowed commodity options trading to be conducted on commodity 
exchanges, which provided a regulatory structure for excluding the fly-by-
night firms that led to the retail over-the-counter options suspension.  Regula-
tion of Domestic Exchange-Traded Commodity Options, 46 Fed. Reg. 54,500 
(1981). 
 201. See MARKHAM , HISTORY OF COMMODITY FUTURES TRADING, supra note 
98, at 99–100 (describing jurisdictional fight).  The SEC had regulatory prob-
lems of its own with respect to exchange traded stock options.  As the result of 
abuses, the SEC suspended further expansion of such trading and conducted 
an extended study of the stock options market.  After some reforms, the SEC 
allowed trading to continue.  See generally REPORT OF THE SPECIAL STUDY OF 
THE OPTIONS MARKETS TO THE SEC. AND EXCH. COMM’N, 96TH CONG. (Comm. 
Print 1978) (describing abuses).  
 202. MARKHAM, HISTORY OF COMMODITY FUTURES TRADING, supra note 98, at 
99–100 
 203. The Kansas City Board of Trade inaugurated the trading of index fu-
tures in 1982.  Chicago Board of Options Exch., Inc. v. Board of Trade, 459 
U.S. 1026 (1982); Board of Trade v. SEC, 677 F.2d 1137, 1171 n.11 (7th Cir.), 
vacated as moot sub. nom.  See also Standard & Poor’s Corp. v. Commodity 
Exch. Inc., 683 F.2d 704 (2d Cir. 1982) (describing stock index futures); Jerry 
W. Markham & David J. Gilberg, Washington Watch — Stock Index Futures, 6 
CORP. L. REV. 59 (1982) (same). 
 204. Chicago Board Options Exchange, Inc. v. Board of Trade, 459 U.S. 1026 
(1982); Board of Trade v. SEC, 677 F.2d 1137 (7th Cir.), vacated as moot sub. 
nom.  
File: Markham Base  Macro  Final.doc Created on: 3/20/2003 5:05 PM Last Printed: 4/28/2003 11:31 AM 
2003] FINANCIAL REG. IN U.S., U.K., & JAPAN 359 
risdiction; it had learned that it could not win a confrontation in 
Congress over this matter.  The futures industry lobby was 
simply too strong, and the agricultural committees were captive 
of those interests.  The natural result was to establish an ad-
ministrative  démarche: an agreement was hammered out be-
tween the Chairmen of the SEC and CFTC (the “Shad-Johnson 
Accords”), which allocated jurisdiction between their two agen-
cies.205 Thereafter, Congress enacted the Shad-Johnson Accords 
into law.206 In brief, the CFTC was given exclusive jurisdiction 
over all commodity futures trading on any instrument, except 
that single stock futures were prohibited, joining onions as the 
only commodity on which futures trading was banned.207 The 
SEC was given what amounted to a veto over commodity fu-
tures contracts on indexes,208 and retained jurisdiction over op-
tions trading on the stock exchanges, including options on in-
dexes.209 The SEC and CFTC shared jurisdiction over options 
trading on foreign currency.210 
  
 205. CFTC and SEC Jurisdictional Agreement: Proposed Legislation, 
Comm. Fut. L. Rep. (CCH) ¶ 21,332 (Feb. 2, 1982). 
 206. Futures Trading Act of 1982, Pub. L. No. 97-444, 96 Stat. 2294 (codified 
in scattered sections of 7 U.S.C.). 
 207. 7 U.S.C. § 2 (2000). 
 208. See generally Don L. Horwitz & Jerry W. Markham, Sunset on the 
Commodity Futures Trading Commission: Scene II, 39 BUS. LAW. 67, 73–74 
(1983) (describing scope of Shad-Johnson Accords and veto authority of SEC 
on indexes).  This veto authority led to another dispute with the CFTC that 
was temporarily resolved by another inter-agency agreement.  Edward J. 
Kane, Regulatory Structure in Futures Markets: Jurisdictional Competition 
Between the SEC, the CFTC, and Other Agencies, 4 J. FUT. MARKETS 367, 375 
(1984).  Several years later, the SEC approved options trading on two Dow 
Jones indexes and then used its veto power to deny trading of commodity fu-
tures on those same indexes.  The Seventh Circuit set that incredible bit of 
regulatory chutzpah aside.  Board of Trade v. SEC, 187 F.3d 713 (7th Cir. 
1999).  
 209. The CFTC could not approve options on stock indexes, but it was al-
lowed by the Shad-Johnson Accords to approve options on futures on indexes.  
Futures Trading Act of 1982, Pub. L. No. 97-444, 96 Stat. 2294 (codified in 
scattered sections of 7 U.S.C.). 
 210. The SEC had jurisdiction where options on currency were traded on 
the stock exchanges.  The CFTC had jurisdiction over options trading on 
commodity exchanges and the over-the-counter market.  Trading in the over-
the counter market in currency options would plague the CFTC over the next 
several years.  See 13A MARKHAM, FRAUD, MANIPULATION & OTHER CLAIMS, 
supra note 124, § 27:13 (describing cases brought by CFTC against over-the-
counter currency dealers). 
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This cooperative allocation of jurisdiction did not mask the 
fact that there were two very distinct regulatory cultures at the 
CFTC and SEC.  The CEA, the predecessor to the CFTC, was 
largely driven by economists; the agency had only one lawyer on 
staff.  The CFTC inherited the CEA’s personnel, and most of the 
former SEC staff members, who were recruited when the CFTC 
was first formed, quickly departed.  The economists at the 
CFTC, however, were willing to defer to the exchanges and had 
an antipathy towards a heavily rule-based regulatory structure.  
The occasional activist-lawyer chairman at the CFTC was un-
able to change that culture.  As a result, the futures industry 
was allowed to develop essentially on its own.211 In contrast, the 
SEC maintained an activist culture driven by lawyers who be-
lieved fervently in regulation.  The SEC was quite willing to 
direct the development of the market, having lost confidence in 
the industry to do so as a result of the paperwork crisis.212 The 
central market concept was apace with that view.213 The SEC 
was intrusive in its regulation of the exchanges and broker-
dealers, and was forever seeking to expand its jurisdiction.214  
When given the opportunity, traders often voted with their 
feet in assessing the relative efficiency of the commodity futures 
and stock exchanges.  Stock index futures fit neatly into the 
  
 211. The CFTC staff did believe strongly that the Commodity Exchange Act 
created a monopoly that required futures, and later options, to be traded on a 
contract market licensed by the CFTC.  See generally Markham, The Com-
modity Exchange Monopoly, supra note 128 (describing CFTC support for the 
exchange trading requirement). 
 212. See supra notes 159, 176–79 and accompanying text. 
 213. See supra note 44 and accompanying text. 
 214. In fairness to the SEC, it was deregulating some important aspects of 
the market, i.e., institutional investors, by exempting sales to “accredited 
investors” from the registration requirements of the Securities Act of 1933.  
Compare Jerry W. Markham, Protecting the Institutional Investor — Jungle 
Predator or Shorn Lamb?, 12 YALE J. ON REG. 345 (1995) (describing regula-
tory structure for institutional investors and urging even less regulation), 
with, Norman S. Poser, Liability of Broker-Dealers for Unsuitable Recommen-
dations to Institutional Investors, 2001 B.Y.U. L. REV. 1493 (seeking greater 
regulation to protect institutional investors).  Integrated disclosure and shelf 
registration were also useful in allowing capital raising to be carried out more 
efficiently.  See generally Donald C. Langevoort, Information Technology and 
the Structure of Securities Regulation, 98 HARV. L. REV. 747 (1985) (describing 
SEC disclosure system).  
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modern portfolio theory of a diversified portfolio.215 Program 
trading, dynamic hedging, and index arbitrage offered addi-
tional opportunities for the adroit trader.216  Futures trading on 
indexes and interest rate instruments soon outstripped volume 
on the more traditional agriculture futures contracts.217 Futures 
contracts were efficient and presented low costs to traders, who 
did not need to buy and sell the stock underlying the index in 
order to profit from, or hedge against, fluctuations.  This 
avoided the transaction costs associated with buying and selling 
the underlying securities.218 Low margins and liquidity also 
made stock futures extremely popular with institutional inves-
tors, while interest rate futures were of equal or greater inter-
est to portfolio managers with investments in fixed income se-
curities.  The stock markets and futures markets soon became 
intermingled and interdependent with this trading.  The danger 
  
 215. See generally ROBERT L.  HAGIN, THE DOW-JONES IRWIN GUIDE TO 
MODERN PORTFOLIO THEORY (1979); JONATHAN R. MACEY, AN INTRODUCTION TO 
MODERN FINANCIAL THEORY (2d ed. 1998) . 
 216. See generally Jerry W. Markham & Rita McCloy Stephanz, The Stock 
Market Crash of 1987 — The United States Looks at New Recommendations, 
76 GEO. L. J. 1993, 1999–2001 (1988) (describing these concepts).  
 217. Between 1983 and 1994, the volume in financial futures increased from 
40% of all futures contracts traded to 83%.  By 1994, financial futures ac-
counted for 97% of the trading volume on the Chicago Mercantile Exchange.  
Steven C. Livingston, Rift Grows Between Factions at CBOT, WALL ST. J., 
Sept. 26, 1994, at C1. 
 218. For example, assume that the manager of a portfolio that tracks the 
S&P 500 stock index believes that the market will be falling over the next 
three months.  The manager could sell out the portfolio and buy it back in 
when he anticipates recovery.  Alternatively, the manager could passively 
invest and do nothing, a popular strategy but one that assumes a market re-
covery before the portfolio funds are needed.  Alternatively, the manager could 
hedge by selling the S&P 500 futures contract.  The only cost is commissions, 
which can be negotiated to a minimal level.  This locks in the value of the 
portfolio in the event of a market decline.  Of course, the portfolio value is also 
locked in if the portfolio manager was wrong.  For those interested, and many 
were, stock baskets matching the S&P 500 and other indexes could be pur-
chased through the stock markets.  This, of course, required payment for the 
full value of the stocks in the basket or 50% margin, as compared to the 5% or 
less that had to be placed only as security for index futures trading.  See gen-
erally SEC DIVISION OF MARKET REGULATION, THE ROLE OF INDEX-RELATED 
TRADING IN THE MARKET DECLINE ON SEPTEMBER 11 AND 12, 1986 (1987) (de-
scribing use of stock index baskets to facilitate arbitrage trading). 
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of this interdependence was brought dramatically home in the 
stock market crash of 1987.219 
The stock and commodity markets experienced a near melt-
down during the stock market crash that occurred in October 
1987.  The decline was the largest ever experienced to that date, 
exceeding even the 1929 crash.220 Numerous regulatory reports 
resulted from that event.221  A Presidential commission headed 
by later Secretary of the Treasury Nicholas Brady (the “Brady 
Commission”) concluded that the securities and commodity fu-
tures markets had become intertwined and that a lack of coor-
dinated regulation between the SEC and CFTC was endanger-
ing the markets.222 The Brady Commission recommended a 
regulatory restructuring whereby a single agency would be au-
thorized to regulate such matters as margin and credit and in-
formation systems.223 
The Brady Commission recommendations and the fallout 
from the stock market crash of 1987 set off another turf war 
between the CFTC and the SEC.  Even so, the SEC’s report on 
the market crash made some startling admissions, including a 
concession that the futures markets were popular because they 
were more efficient than the securities markets and were even 
  
 219. Even before the crash, the NYSE was warning of a danger of a “melt-
down” in the stock markets caused by futures trading in indexes.  Martin 
Mayer, Some Watchdog! How the SEC Helped Set the Stage for Black Monday, 
BARRON’S, Dec. 27, 1987, at 18. 
 220. Comparisons were drawn between the stock market crashes in 1929 
and 1987, suggesting the possibility of another depression.  Randall Smith, 
Market Seers Fret over Analogies to ’29-’30, Despite Economic Vigor, WALL ST. 
J., Mar. 31, 1988, at 25.  Fortunately, that did not occur.  The market also 
faced even larger drops in subsequent years.  See, e.g., Gloomy Return: U.S. 
Stocks Plummet As Trading Resumes Without Major Hitch, WALL ST. J., Sept. 
18, 2001, at A1 (describing record drop after trading resumed following Sep-
tember 11, 2001 terrorist attacks on the World Trade Center and the Penta-
gon). 
 221. See Markham & Stephanz, supra note 216, at 2006–21 (describing 
these reports).  
 222. REPORT OF THE PRESIDENTIAL TASK FORCE ON MARKET MECHANISMS, 
reprinted in Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) Special Report No. 1267 (Jan. 12, 1988) 
(report by the Brady Commission).  
 223. The Brady Commission recommended the Federal Reserve Board as 
the agency to serve as a super regulator.  Id. at 42.  
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leading the stock exchanges in setting prices.224 The SEC was 
concerned, however, that market volatility had increased sig-
nificantly as a result of futures trading on securities due to low 
margins in the futures industry.225  This reflected another cul-
tural regulatory difference between the SEC and CFTC.  Vola-
tility is an accepted, indeed required, part of the futures mar-
kets.  Futures are not needed for commodities with stable 
prices.  Such commodities do not need the benefits of hedging, 
and speculators are uninterested because there is no profit to be 
made from a stable price. 
In contrast, the SEC has a constituency of small investors 
that are content with stable prices — they invest in dividend 
stocks in such cases — and love for prices to go higher.  These 
small investors do, however, loathe a drop in prices.  When that 
happens, the small investors’ capital is reduced, which they find 
intolerable.  Complaints are made to the SEC and to Congress, 
demanding protection from such events — a drop in prices or a 
loss on an investment requires a bogeyman; someone must be 
punished.  The SEC’s regulations reflect this bias, as evidenced 
by its “tick test” for short sales.226  (There is no such test for long 
traders.)  In contrast, the CFTC has no tick test; rather, the 
commodity futures exchanges use price limits — now called 
“circuit breakers” — to halt trading when prices move up or 
down in specified amounts.  This gives traders an opportunity 
to assess market conditions and obtain margin funds.227  There 
is no long or short bias in these limits.  
The Brady Commission believed that margin requirements 
should be harmonized across markets, a recommendation that 
the SEC joined.228 They were undercut somewhat by an earlier 
  
 224. The tail was indeed wagging the dog.  See SEC DIVISION OF MARKET 
REGULATION, THE OCTOBER 1987 MARKET BREAK 3-6 (1988) (finding that com-
modity futures exchanges were leading the stock exchanges in pricing). 
 225. See id. at 3-7 to 3-8 (describing how the futures markets have increased 
stock market volatility).  
 226. Short Sales, 17 C.F.R. § 240.10a-1 (2002).  See generally David C. 
Worley, The Regulation of Short Sales: The Long and Short of It, 55 BROOK. L.  
REV. 1255 (1990).  
 227. See Markham & Stephanz, supra note 216, at 2034–35 (describing 
price limits and noting that they were first used by the commodity exchanges 
before World War I). 
 228. See Markham, Federal Regulation of Margin , supra note 114, at 118 
(describing SEC and Brady Commission advocacy of higher margins). 
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Federal Reserve Board study, which had concluded that even 
margin requirements on stocks were no longer serving the pur-
poses originally intended by Congress.229 The SEC again lost the 
battle,230 and the only substantive regulation to emerge from 
the stock market crash of 1987 was the introduction of circuit 
breakers that halted trading when large market moves oc-
curred.  Even this regulation was mostly abandoned in later 
years because traders did not like these restraints.231      
But another game had arrived for the CFTC and SEC to 
scrimmage over.  Financial engineering had become an accepted 
science with the development of numerous new instruments 
having characteristics of both futures and options.232 The swap 
contract was one such product; its popularity was almost in-
stantaneous and it soon became a substantive part of corporate 
  
 229. A REVIEW AND EVALUATION OF FEDERAL MARGIN REGULATIONS : A STUDY 
BY THE BOARD OF GOVERNORS OF THE FEDERAL RESERVE SYSTEM (Dec. 1984) (on 
file with author).  The Fed later adopted margin requirements based on good 
faith loan value for many non-equity securities, which essentially meant that 
credit could be extended to the purchaser in amount equal to what the lender 
thought the securities were worth to secure the loan.  63 Fed. Reg. 2806, 
2811–13 (Jan. 16, 1998).  The Fed at one point did express a desire to have 
uniform margins for futures and options, but believed the purpose of such 
margins should be clearing house protection and not to regulate speculation.  
See Markham, Federal Regulation of Margin, supra note 114, at 110, 112, 122 
(describing Fed’s views on margin). 
 230. See Markham, Federal Regulation of Margin, supra note 114, at 119–
24 (describing margin fight led by SEC in the Working Group on Financial 
Markets created by President Reagan to address the concerns raised by the 
Brady Commission report).  In a bit of silliness, Congress did grant the power 
to set margins on stock indexes to the Futures Trading Practices Act of 1992, 
Pub. L. No. 102-546, 106 Stat. 3590, 3629 (codified in scattered sections of 15 
U.S.C.).  The Fed ceded that authority to the CFTC, which in turn relin-
quished it to the commodity exchanges — precisely where the authority had 
started.  See Markham, The CFTC Net Capital Rule, supra note 167, at 1093 
n.12 (describing delegation of this authority). 
 231. See Andrew Hill & John Labate, Assault on American Finance, FIN. 
TIMES (London), Sept. 17, 2001, at 5 (describing history of circuit breakers and 
their widening). 
 232. The Seventh Circuit held that the SEC had improperly approved the 
trading of so-called “index participation” contracts (“IPs”) on the CBOE and 
that these contracts fell within the exclusive jurisdiction of the CFTC.  Chi-
cago Mercantile Exchange v. SEC, 883 F.2d 537 (7th Cir. 1989), cert. denied 
sub nom., Investment Company Institute v. SEC, 496 U.S. 936 (1990).  
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finance.233 The CFTC awakened only slowly to this threat, but 
eventually responded by seeking to curb the growth of over-the-
counter commodity-related instruments.234 It adopted regula-
tions that created an inscrutable formula for determining 
whether particular instruments would be required to trade only 
on a commodity exchange.235 This effort proved to be less than 
successful, and the CFTC was left to struggle with a growing 
list of derivative instruments that were being introduced in the 
market. 
In the early 1990s significant losses were encountered by a 
number of large institutions — Gibson Greeting and Procter & 
Gamble suffered tremendously; Orange County in California 
and the Barings Bank went bankrupt, to name just a few.236  
These losses touched off another round of handwringing at the 
SEC and more studies.237 Still, nothing was done, except that 
the SEC brought a case claiming that certain of these instru-
ments were securities,238 and the CFTC brought another case 
claiming that other instruments were futures that had to be 
traded on a contract market.239 A furor ensued, and both agen-
cies’ rulings were undercut by court decisions.240 The SEC then 
  
 233. See generally Adam R. Waldman, OTC Derivatives & Systemic Risk: 
Innovative Finance or the Dance Into the Abyss?, 43 AM. U. L. REV. 1023 (1994) 
(describing swaps). 
 234. See generally Jerry W. Markham, Regulation of Hybrid Instruments 
Under the Commodity Exchange  Act — Alternatives Are Needed, 1990 COLUM. 
BUS. L. REV. 1 (1990) (describing the development of over-the-counter deriva-
tives). 
 235. Under these rules, unless otherwise regulated, if the instrument’s 
commodity futures or options element outweighed its securities characteris-
tics, it had to be traded on a commodity futures exchange.  Regulation of Hy-
brid Instruments, 17 C.F.R. §§ 34.1–34.3 (2002). 
 236. See Jerry W. Markham, “Confederate Bonds,” “General Custer,” and the 
Regulation of Derivative Financial Instruments, 25 SETON HALL L. REV. 1, 28–
31 (1994) (cataloguing losses).  
 237. Id. at 32–40 (describing the reports). 
 238. In re BT Securities, 52 S.E.C. 109, 113–15 (1994) (consent order).  
 239. In re BT Securities, CFTC Doc. No. 95-3, at 95-4 (C.F.T.C. 1994) (con-
sent order).  See also In re M.G. Refining & Marketing, Inc., CFTC Doc. No. 
95-14 (C.F.T.C. 1995) (illegal over-the-counter trading in a futures product). 
 240. Thereafter, the SEC exempted dealers from registration as broker-
dealers if they engaged in such activities.  To the extent government securities 
were involved, they were exempt securities.  23A MARKHAM & HAZEN, supra 
note 35, § 14.9.  A district court also held that contracts similar to those 
claimed to be securities by the SEC were not such.  Procter & Gamble Co. v. 
Bankers Trust Co., 925 F. Supp. 1270, 1274 (S.D. Ohio 1996).  But see Caiola 
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proceeded to create a safe harbor from onerous regulation 
through so-called “Broker-Dealer Lite” registration.241 The 
CFTC viewed this as a threat to its jurisdiction and announced 
a plan to conduct an investigation of over-the-counter deriva-
tives to determine whether they should be regulated, though 
the industry viewed this as no more than a cover to lay the 
groundwork for such regulation.  The SEC, the Treasury De-
partment, and the Federal Reserve Board all weighed in 
against such a jurisdictional grab.  In the end, Congress re-
sponded with legislation that stopped the CFTC.242 Yet all of 
this commotion was for naught — as of the beginning of 2000, 
only one firm had registered as a Broker-Dealer Lite.243 
V. MARKET STRUCTURE CHANGES 
The financial services sectors were undergoing sweeping 
changes while the SEC and CFTC competed with each other in 
their regulatory programs.  Banks were increasing their pene-
tration of the securities industry through “Section 20” subsidi-
aries that could engage in limited dealing in securities.244 The 
  
v. Citibank, N.A., 295 F.3d 312 (2d Cir. 2002) (disagreeing with analysis of the 
court in Procter & Gamble). 
  The CFTC had to back off its expansive ruling.  C.F.T.C. Says Ruling 
Didn’t Expand Scope, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 23, 1996, at D4.  See also In re MG 
Ref. & Mktg. Litig., Comm. Fut. L. Rep. (CCH) ¶ 26,956 (S.D.N.Y. 1997) 
(CFTC consent decree was not binding as collateral estoppel).  See generally 
Alton B. Harris, The CFTC and Derivative Products; Purposeful Ambiguity 
and Jurisdictional Reach, 71 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 117 (1996) (describing the 
CFTC and SEC cases against BT Securities). 
 241. 17 C.F.R. § 240.3b-13 (2002).  Broker-Dealer Lite is a regulatory struc-
ture created by the SEC in 1998.  It gives securities firms the option to estab-
lish OTC dealer affiliates (“OTC Derivatives Dealers”) that operate under 
lower net capital requirements and less stringent margin rules than are ap-
plicable to other broker-dealers.  See generally OTC Derivatives Dealers, Re-
lease No. 34-40,594, 63 Fed. Reg. 59, 362 (Nov. 3, 1998). 
 242. See 23 MARKHAM &  HAZEN, supra note 35, § 2.09 (describing this regu-
latory dust-up). 
 243. Id. § 2.10. 
 244. Banks were allowed to acquire discount brokers.  See Sec. Indus. Ass’n 
v. Bd. of Governors of the Fed. Sys., 468 U.S. 207 (1984).  The Fed also al-
lowed bank subsidiaries to engage up to 5% of their business in otherwise 
ineligible securities under the Glass-Steagall Act.  See Sec. Indus. Ass’n v. Bd. 
of Governors of the Fed. Sys., 839 F.2d 47 (2d Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 486 U.S. 
1059 (1989).  The limitation was subsequently increased first to 10%, and 
later to 25%, which was sufficient to allow banks to own large full service 
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bank regulators continued to drop barriers to bank entry into 
the commodity futures and options business,245 and insurance 
became a popular bank product.246 Finally, the GLBA freed the 
banks of most of the remaining Glass-Steagall restrictions on 
their financial services activities.247  
In the meantime, the world of derivatives and securities trad-
ing had changed.  Over-the-counter instruments, such as swaps, 
caps, collars and floors, were an increasingly popular alterna-
tive to exchange-traded commodity futures and options.  Com-
petition from abroad was also posing a major threat to the 
dominance of the American futures and options markets.  The 
commodity exchanges in America had long ruled the futures 
markets, but the largest futures exchange in the world at the 
end of the twentieth century was Eurex, a German exchange.248  
How did this come to pass?  Foreign exchanges had undercut 
the American markets mostly through electronic trading.  The 
monopoly given to the contract markets by the Commodity Ex-
change Act of 1936 had created an industry tied to the trading 
floors.  The floor members controlled the exchanges and were 
loathe to give up the time and place advantage on the floor to 
an electronic forum where everyone has equal access.249 Mem-
bers’ capital was at risk, so they would cling to this franchise as 
  
broker-dealers.  Revenue Limit on Bank-ineligible Activities of Subsidiaries of 
Bank Holding Companies Engaged in Underwriting and Dealing in Securities, 
61 Fed. Reg. 68,750, 68, 751 (Dec. 30, 1996).   
 245. The leading derivatives dealers in 1993 were mostly banks.  Markham, 
Banking Regulation: Its History and Future, supra note 4, at 259. 
 246. Broome & Markham, supra note 19, at 763–64. 
 247. Financial Services Modernization Act of 1999, Pub. L. No. 106-102, 113 
Stat. 1338 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 12 U.S.C.). 
 248. Adding to the embarrassment from this loss of position was the fact 
that Germany had barred futures trading until the end of the 1980s.  William 
P. Rogers & Jerry W. Markham, The Application of West German Statutes to 
United States Commodity Futures Contracts: An Unnecessary Clash of Poli-
cies, 19 L. & POL’Y INT’L BUS. 273 (1987).  Volume is still high on American 
exchanges, but Eurex is the leader.  Christopher Bowe, Survey — World Stock 
and Derivative Exchanges, FIN. TIMES (London), June 6, 2002, at 4.  Commod-
ity exchanges in the U.S. were conducting only 40% of futures trading world-
wide in 1997, down from 78% in 1988.  Fred Vogelstein, Futures Marts in the 
U.S. Run Scared, WALL ST. J., June 10, 1996, at C1.     
 249. See generally Bowe, supra note 248, at 4 (describing how the Chicago 
Board of Trade clings to its open outcry trading system and falls from first to 
third place in exchange trading volume).  
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long as possible.250  Market share gradually slipped away to the 
over-the-counter derivative markets and to the electronic ex-
changes abroad.  Like the American car manufacturers in the 
1970s, the exchanges and their members saw their volume be-
ing eroded by more nimble competitors, but refused to compete, 
preferring shelter in their dwindling market share to the risks 
of competition.   
The commodity exchanges in America were unable to push 
through regulations that would stop the over-the-counter trad-
ing.  Swaps and other such derivatives had slipped past the lob-
byists for the exchanges and were now too big to stop.  Fur-
thermore, the CFTC was cut off from regulating over-the-
counter derivatives by Congress after the Broker-Dealer Lite 
fiasco.  The exchanges then decided to seek entry to over-the-
counter trading.251  The CFTC adopted rules to deregulate over-
the-counter derivatives.252  This proposal was enacted into law 
by the Commodity Futures Modernization Act of 2000 
(“CFMA”).253  Among other things, the legislation, through what 
in part is sometimes called the “Enron amendment,” exempted 
most over-the-counter derivatives from regulation as long as the 
parties were large institutions or wealthy individuals.254  The 
commodity exchanges were allowed to keep their contract mar-
ket monopoly over markets in which small traders were allowed 
to participate.  The CFMA also allowed trading in single stock 
futures under a strange formula in which the CFTC and SEC 
  
 250. See generally Markham, The Commodity Exchange Monopoly, supra  
note 128, at 1014–15 (describing franchise concerns of floor members).  Demu-
tualization, however, offers a way for the exchange members to recapture 
their capital investment and seek to become more competitive.  See generally 
Caroline Bradley, Demutualization of Financial Exchanges: Business as 
Usual?, 21 NW. J. INT ’L L. & BUS. 657 (2001) [hereinafter Bradley, Demutuali-
zation].  
 251. See John M. Broder, Wide Open Once Again? Chicago Exchanges Seek 
to Loosen Yoke of Regulation , N.Y. TIMES, June 4, 1997, at D1. 
 252. See A New Regulatory Framework for Trading Facilities, Intermediar-
ies and Clearing Organizations, 66 Fed. Reg. 42,256 (Aug. 10, 2001). 
 253. Commodity Futures Modernization Act of 2000, Pub. L. No. 106-554, 
114 Stat. 2763 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 7 U.S.C.).  
 254. The amendment received this informal reference as a result of the fact 
that the Enron Corporation, a large trader in over-the-counter energy deriva-
tives, was its principal sponsor before the company went bankrupt.   
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shared jurisdiction.255  Commodity markets conducting trading 
in single stock futures were required to adopt rules equivalent 
to those in the securities industry, including insider trading 
prohibitions.256  Margin requirements also had to match those 
in the securities industry.  The level for stock margins was 
therefore applied, a level several magnitudes greater than for 
futures trading.257  This was one of the few instances where 
Congress rejected competitive regulation and mandated that 
the CFTC adopt SEC requirements.  
Although the SEC won this regulatory encomium from Con-
gress, it was facing other challenges.  The securities markets 
  
 255. The Shad-Johnson Accords had prohibited such single stock futures.  
See note 206 and accompanying text.  For the CFTC’s notice rules for securi-
ties exchanges to become designated contract markets in securities products, 
see Designated Contract Markets in Security Futures Products: Notice-
Designation Requirements, Continuing Obligations, Applications for Exemp-
tive Orders, and Exempt Provisions, 66 Fed. Reg. 44,960 (Aug. 27, 2001).  
 256. The National Futures Association (“NFA”) was required to conform its 
customer protection rules to those of the SEC, thereby introducing insider 
trading prohibitions into the futures markets.  See Self Regulatory Organiza-
tion; Notice of Filing and Immediate Effectiveness of Proposed Rule Change 
by National Futures Association Relating to Security Futures Products, Ex-
change Act Release No. 34-44,823, 66 Fed. Reg. 49,439 (Sept. 27, 2001) (NFA 
conforming its rules).  Customers trading on the futures markets will not re-
ceive SIPC insurance, but customers trading such instruments on securities 
markets will be insured.  Applicability of CFTC and SEC Customer Protec-
tion, Record Keeping, Reporting and Bankruptcy Rules, Comm. Fut. L. Rep. 
(CCH) ¶ 28,641 (C.F.T.C. & S.E.C. 2001). 
 257. The Commodity Futures Modernization Act of 2000 (“CFMA”) amended 
Section 7(c) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 to provide the Federal 
Reserve Board with authority to set margin requirements for futures on indi-
vidual securities and narrow based indexes.  The Federal Reserve Board dele-
gated this rule- making authority jointly to the CFTC and the SEC.  Customer 
Margin Rules Relating to Securities Futures, Exchange Act Release No. 34-
44,853, 66 Fed. Reg. 50,720 (Sept. 26, 2001).  The CFMA required margin for 
single stock futures to be no lower than the lowest level of margin required for 
comparable options contract traded on national securities exchanges.  Rules 
proposed by the CFTC and SEC established a minimal initial and mainte-
nance margin level of 20% of the current market value of the position.  This 
20% level is far in excess of the normal margin requirements for futures con-
tracts in the commodity futures industry, where margins are often less than 
5% of the value of the contract.  Customer Margin Rules Relating to Securities 
Futures; Applicability of CFTC and SEC Customer Protection, Recordkeeping, 
Reporting, and Bankruptcy Rules, Exchange Act Release No. 34-44,996, 76 
S.E.C. Docket 383 (Oct. 29, 2001); Customer Margin Rules Relating to Securi-
ties Futures, Exchange Act Release No. 34-44,853, 66 Fed. Reg. 50,720 (Sept. 
26, 2001). 
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were trending up during most of the 1990s, volume was increas-
ing, and more investors were being drawn into the markets.  
Despite all of these positive aspects, the securities markets, like 
the futures markets, faced many challenges due to new com-
puter technology.  The computer allowed the creation of “SOES 
Bandits,”258 and these traders soon became “day traders.”  The 
computer thus allowed even small traders to trade like profes-
sionals, creating a new set of regulatory problems for the 
SEC.259  In addition, the Internet permitted small investors to 
  
 258. SOES Bandits is a reference to traders who used the automated 
Nasdaq Small Order Execution System (“SOES”) to pick off market maker 
quotes before they could be changed where an event with market effect occurs.  
The Nasdaq market makers were subject to stiff withdrawal restrictions after 
they exited the market en masse during the stock market crash of 1987.  See 
Timpinaro v. SEC, 2 F.3d 453 (D.C. Cir. 1993) (describing SOES Bandits).  To 
avoid the SOES Bandits, the Nasdaq market makers engaged in several collu-
sive practices that became the subject of an SEC investigation and caused the 
reorganization of the NASD.  See In re Certain Market Making Activities on 
NASDAQ, Exchange Act Release No. 34-40,900, 68 S.E.C. 2693 (Jan. 11, 1998) 
(order describing these collusive practices).  
 259. See generally Caroline Bradley, Disorderly Conduct: Day Traders and 
the Ideology of “Fair and Orderly Markets,” 26 J. CORP. L. 63 (2000) (describ-
ing problems caused by, and regulation of, day traders).  The day trader en-
tered orders through computerized systems operated by discount brokers at 
low commission rates.  The system allowed day traders to “scalp” by quick in-
and-out trades that sought short term profits.  However, most day traders in 
fact lost money.  3 MARKHAM , A FINANCIAL HISTORY OF THE U.S., supra note 42, 
at 333–34 (survey finds that 90% of day traders lost money).  These traders 
raised the concern that their trading was adding volatility to the market.  See 
Edward Watt & David Barboza, Internet Stocks Falter, Causing Wider Wor-
ries, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 23, 1999, at A1.  Day traders were often avoiding or 
evading margin requirements by having their broker-dealer arrange loans 
among customers and by closing out positions before the end of the trading 
day.  See generally Ruth Simon, Day-Trading Firms’ Moves that Skirt Margin-
Lending Rules are Being Probed, WALL ST. J., June 23, 1999, at C1.  The 
NYSE and NASD imposed special margin restrictions on day traders to curb 
these practices.  Order Approving Proposed Rule Changes Relating to Margin 
Requirements for Day Trading, Exchange Act Release No. 34-44,009, 74 
S.E.C. Docket 1000 (Feb. 27, 2001).  For more on day trading margin require-
ments, see id.  Short sale tick test restrictions were also being avoided by 
these traders.  3 MARKHAM, A FINANCIAL HISTORY OF THE U.S., supra note 42, 
at 333.  The SEC, the CFTC, and the FTC (still another layer of regulation) 
conducted a coordinated sweep operation that resulted in fourteen firms being 
charged with fraud in promoting their day trading programs.  Ronald Taylor, 
14 Firms Snagged in Coordinated Move as Day Trading Promoters Cited for 
Fraud, Sec. Reg. & L. Rep. (BNA) 586 (May 8, 2000).  There were also some 
tragedies.  Mark (the “Rocket”), a failed day trader, attacked his brokerage 
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trade online.260  This medium was also used to evade the gate-
keeper status of analysts, so that “pump and dump” schemes 
became common.261 
More threatening to the status quo in the securities industry 
were the electronic communication networks (“ECNs”), which 
were no more than order matching services that had no market 
makers.262  ECNs were popular with institutions because they 
removed intermediaries, such as the exchange specialist, from 
the transaction, thereby saving costs.263  The SEC ruled initially 
that ECNs were not exchanges because they did not make a 
continuous market in securities,264 thus freeing the ECNs from 
the onerous regulation imposed by the SEC on the exchanges.  
The popularity of ECNs distressed Nasdaq and the stock ex-
changes, since they were losing large amounts of vo lume to 
  
firm and killed twelve people.  Another failed day trader threw his wife off a 
balcony in order to obtain the proceeds from her life insurance policy.  3 
MARKHAM, A FINANCIAL HISTORY OF THE U.S., supra note 42, at 334. 
 260. Online trading was a boon for the discount brokers and posed a threat 
to the large full service brokers.  Charles Schwab, the largest online broker, 
saw its stock capitalization value exceed that of Merrill Lynch (but dropping 
to less than half of that of Merrill Lynch after the market downturn that be-
gan in 2000).  Merrill Lynch resisted the introduction of online trading, but 
was finally forced by competition to offer this product.  See 3 MARKHAM , A 
FINANCIAL HISTORY OF THE U.S., supra note 42, at 295–97, 353. 
 261. HAZEN TREATISE, supra note 51, § 14.18, at 292 (describing pump and 
dump schemes).  These operations involved such colorful characters as Tokyo 
Joe’s S.A. and various students, causing the SEC to set up an Office of Inter-
net Enforcement and a “cyberforce” to which 200 lawyers were assigned.  3 
MARKHAM, A FINANCIAL HISTORY OF THE U.S., supra note 42, at 293, 344–45. 
 262. Instinet was the pioneer in this field.  See Rebecca Buckman, Plan by 
Chicago Exchanges to Offer Extended Trading is Sign of the Times , WALL ST. 
J., Aug. 23, 1999, at C11.  Island ECN has also been a popular electronic trad-
ing platform.  It was seeking to become an exchange.  Greg Ip, Trading Places: 
The Stock Exchanges, Long Static, Suddenly are Roiled by Change, WALL ST. 
J., July 27, 1999, at A1. 
 263. See generally Greg Ip et al., Market Structure Debate Embroils Street, 
WALL ST. J., Feb. 22, 2000, at C19 (describing growth of ECNs). 
 264. See, e.g., Self-Regulatory Organizations; Delta Government Options 
Corp.; Order Granting Temporary Registration as a Clearing Agency, Ex-
change Act Release No. 34-27611, 55 Fed. Reg. 1890 (Jan. 19, 1990) (describ-
ing “exchange” as one that maintains a continuous market); Self-Regulatory 
Organizations; Delta Government Options Corp.; Order Granting Temporary 
Registration as a Clearing Agency, Exchange Act Release No. 34-27,611, 55 
Fed. Reg. 1890 (Jan. 12, 1990) (same).  Nasdaq could itself be defined as an 
ECN except that it makes a continuous market in securities. 
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those operations.265  The large brokerage firms heightened the 
exchanges’ fear with a proposal for a centralized electronic trad-
ing system with a central limit order book (“CLOB”).266  Defend-
ers of the exchanges claimed that the ECNs were becoming a 
cover for the large broker-dealers to internalize their order flow 
upstairs and away from the exchanges.  Critics claimed that 
CLOB would fragment the market, making it less transparent 
and, therefore, less efficient.267  The SEC was sympathetic to 
the exchanges and raised its long-dead central market concept 
to suggest an alternative centralization of electronic trading 
that would prevent fragmentation and preclude the internaliza-
tion of order flows by broker-dealers.268  It might seem odd to 
think of the government defending cartels like the stock ex-
changes from competition.269  In the end, the SEC retreated 
from its proposal, but eventually adopted a regulation designed 
to make the ECNs more transparent.270  
Like the commodity exchanges, the stock markets were an 
endangered species.271 Despite the regulatory competition be-
  
 265. Nasdaq is retaining only 28% of the volume in the stocks it trades.  
ECNs were accounting for 42.5% of the volume in Nasdaq stocks in the second 
quarter of 2002.  Jeremy Adams, Nasdaq Losing Ground to ECNs, 
EFINANCIALNEWS, Aug. 5, 2002, available at LEXIS, Financial News Group.  
For a description of the proliferation of ECNs, see 23A MARKHAM & HAZEN, 
supra note 35, § 13.02. 
 266. Michael Schroeder & Randall Smith, Sweeping Change in Market 
Structure Sought, WALL ST. J., Feb. 29, 2000, at C1.  
 267. Holman W. Jenkins, Jr., Wall Street Fuddy Duddies CLOBber the Fu-
ture, WALL ST. J., Mar. 8, 2000, at A23.  See also Matthew Andersen, Don’t 
CLOBber ECN’s, WALL ST. J., Mar. 27, 2000, at A48 (discussing effect of a 
CLOB requirement on ECNs). 
 268. Gretchen Morgenson, SEC Chief Wants One Site for Posting All Stock 
Prices, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 24, 1999, at A1.   
 269. See Randall Smith, Will NYSE Get Bowled Over by Rivals?, WALL ST. 
J., Jan. 19, 2000, at C1. 
 270. Regulation ATS (Alternate Trading Systems), 17 C.F.R. § 242.300 
(2002). 
 271. Although the ECNs have not aggressively targeted the NYSE, that 
exchange had lost a large amount of market share to Nasdaq.  The Chicago 
Stock Exchange was attacking both the NYSE and Nasdaq by trading through 
the Internet.  It became the second largest stock exchange in the U.S., ousting 
Amex, which is owned by Nasdaq, from that position.  Joel Seligman, Rethink-
ing Securities Markets: The SEC Advisory Committee on Market Information 
and the Future of the National Market System, 57 BUS. LAW . 637, 672 n.148 
(2002).  The ECNs have focused on Nasdaq stocks.  John Labate, High — Tech 
Systems Jolt Old Markets into Action, FIN. TIMES (London), June 6, 2002, at 4.  
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tween the CFTC and SEC, both markets had been undercut by 
their clinging to the franchises given to them under, respec-
tively, the Commodity Exchange Act of 1936 and the Securities 
Exchange Act of 1934.  Both commodity and stock exchanges 
were undermined by trading in non-conventional (and less regu-
lated) markets.  The over-the-counter derivatives threatened 
the commodity exchanges, and the ECNs were wreaking similar 
havoc in the stock markets.   
VI. FINANCIAL SERVICES AUTHORITY OF THE U.K. 
The regulatory structure for financial services in the U.K. has 
its own history.  The Bank of England, which was founded in 
1694 as a private institution, provided much of that regulation 
until the latter part of the twentieth century.272  Its regulatory 
role was, however, executed principally through “raised eye-
  
Nasdaq responded to this threat by creating its own electronic trading plat-
form — SuperMontage.  Kate Kelly, SEC Clears New Nasdaq Trading Plat-
form, WALL ST. J., Aug. 29, 2002, at C1.  Nasdaq also sought to mimic the 
European exchanges by demutualizing and selling its own stock to raise capi-
tal.  Susan Harrigan, Nasdaq Trading in Old System, NEWSDAY , July 10, 
2002, at A41.  See also Bradley, supra note 250 (discussing demutualization 
plans of stock and commodity exchanges around the world and implications of 
that phenomenon).  Nasdaq was also seeking linkages with foreign exchanges.  
Terzah Ewing, NASD Presents Details of its Plan for Nasdaq Europe, WALL 
ST. J., Nov. 5, 1999, at C12.  It did not have much success with that effort.  
David Ibson & Mariko Sanchanta, Nasdaq Japan Faces Up to Uncertain Fu-
ture, FIN. TIMES (London), Aug. 15, 2002, at 29 (describing how the Nasdaq 
plan to globally link America, Japan, and Germany ran into difficulty in Ja-
pan, and Nasdaq decided to withdraw from that market).  See also generally 
Phred Dvorak & Craig Karmin, Saga of Series of Poor Moves, WALL ST. J., 
Aug. 19, 2002, at C1 (describing reasons for failure); Isabelle Clary, Nasdaq 
Turns to Germany in Bid to Expand Globally, SEC. INDUSTRY NEWS, June 24, 
2002, available at 2002 WL 8195226 (Nasdaq seeks new alliances in Europe to 
expand its trading).   
  The commodity exchanges were having similar problems.  A linkage 
between Eurex and the Chicago Board of Trade (“CBOT”) fell apart in 2002, 
but the CBOT announced it would be trading electronically side-by-side with 
its trading floor.  David Greising, On Bickering Street, Sounds of Conciliation, 
CHICAGO TRIBUNE , Aug. 2, 2002, at B1.  The CBOT was also seeking to demu-
tualize.  Jeremy Grant, CBOT Near Demutualization, FIN. TIMES (London), 
Aug. 12, 2002, at 15.     
 272. The Bank of England was nationalized in 1946, but given operational 
independence in 1997.  Bank of England, About the Bank: Did You Know . . . 
Historical Trivia, at http://www.bankofengland.co.uk/didyouknow.htm (last 
visited Jan. 29, 2003).  
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brows,” a form of regulation lent force by the knowledge that 
disapproval by the Bank of England could exclude a firm from 
the financial markets.273  The Bank was also the U.K.’s central 
bank and lender of last resort.274  A more formal bank regula-
tory system was introduced in the Banking Act 1979, 275 which 
was in turn replaced by a strengthened Banking Act 1987.276 
Lloyd’s of London, a financial club that self-regulated the 
City’s insurance industry, was shaken by scandals in the 1970s.  
An investigation was conducted by Sir Henry Fisher at the be-
hest of the government and a new reform law was enacted in 
1982.277  This legislation, however, carried forward Lloyd’s self-
regulation, and did not prevent further scandals or the losses 
that came from a series of disasters in the 1980s.278  The securi-
ties and commodity markets in the U.K. also operated in a club- 
like fashion for much of their history.279  Though the London 
Stock Exchange was the primary regulator of morals, the Bank 
of England and government agencies played a loose role during 
times of crisis.  A Prevention of Fraud Act was adopted in 1958, 
  
 273. See Jane Martinson, Nine Finance Watchdogs Must Squeeze Into One 
Skin, FIN. TIMES (London), Oct. 9, 1997, at 9 (referencing “raised eyebrow” 
approach to regulation by the Bank of England).  
 274. George Peabody & Co. was saved by a loan of £800,000 during the 
Panic of 1857.  His firm would evolve into J.P. Morgan & Co., now JP Morgan 
Chase.  1 JERRY W. M ARKHAM, A FINANCIAL HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES: 
FROM CHRISTOPHER COLUMBUS TO THE ROBBER BARONS (1492–1900), at 357 
(2002) [hereinafter 1 MARKHAM, A FINANCIAL HISTORY OF THE U.S.].  The Bank 
of England would also rescue the Barings banking firm in 1890 during the 
Baring Panic of that year.  Id. at 308.  The Bank of England declined a further 
rescue of the Barings bank in 1995, after the firm lost over $1 billion from the 
unauthorized futures trading of a twenty-eight year old employee, Nicholas 
Leeson.  JUDITH H. RAWNSLEY, TOTAL RISK: NICK LEESON AND THE FALL OF 
BARINGS BANK (1995).        
 275. See Heidi Mandanis Schooner & Michael Taylor, Convergence and 
Competition: The Case of Bank Regulation in Britain and the United States, 
20 MICH. J. INT’L L. 595, 629–35 (1999) (describing bank regulation in the U.K. 
and the background of the Banking Act 1979 and its revision by the Banking 
Act 1987).  
 276. Philip N. Hablutzel, A Legal Sampler: British Banks’ Role in U.K. 
Capital Markets Since the Big Bang, 68 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 365, 373 (1992). 
 277. Lloyd’s Act, 1982, c. 14 (Eng.). 
 278. Ian Kelley, Note, Regulatory Crisis at Lloyd’s of London: Reform from 
Within, 18 FORDHAM INT ’L L.J. 1924, 1924–25 (1995).  
 279. For an extensive description of the London financial markets, see 1–4 
DAVID KYNASTON, THE CITY OF LONDON (1994). 
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but it did little to impose affirmative regulation.280  This regula-
tory approach was questioned after a series of scandals that 
began in the 1970s in the securities markets.281  A collapse of 
the tin market in 1985 raised additional concerns with regula-
tion.  The fiasco cost members of the London Metals Exchange 
£600 million, as well as threatened the exchange’s existence.282 
In the midst of these events, Professor Jim Gower prepared a 
white paper for the Department of Trade and Industry283 on 
steps needed for investor protection.284  This led to corrective 
legislation in the form of the Financial Services Act, which im-
plemented what became known as the “Big Bang” in 1986.  The 
legislation drew heavily from the SEC regulatory model in the 
U.S., and, among other things, eliminated fixed commissions.285  
Furthermore, the separation of “stock jobbers,” (i.e., dealers and 
brokers), was removed in favor of competing market makers.286 
The Big Bang legislation also created a Securities and In-
vestment Board (“SIB”) that reported to the Department of 
Trade and Industry.  This was a variation on the SEC model — 
the members of SIB included government officials as well as 
private individuals, and the SIB had no enforcement powers.287  
Financial firms were required to register with an SRO or with 
the SIB.  The SROs were in turn required to regulate the con-
  
 280. Richard Northedge, Scandals Led to New Legislation for London Fi-
nancial District, SUNDAY BUS. (London), Nov. 20, 2001.   
 281. Henry Laurence, The Rule of Law in the Era of Globalization, 6 IND. J. 
GLOBAL LEGAL STUD. 647, 660–61 (1999). 
 282. Kenneth Gooding, Metals Business Booms, FIN. TIMES (London), May 5, 
1994, at 14. 
 283. This ministry was the successor to the Board of Trade that regulated 
the colonies and corporations that owned America before their charters were 
revoked by the Crown.  1 MARKHAM, A FINANCIAL HISTORY OF THE U.S., supra 
note 274, at 29–35 (2001).  
 284. LAURENCE CECIL BARTLETT GOWER, REVIEW OF INVESTOR PROTECTION 
(1985). 
 285. Fixed commissions had been eliminated in the U.S. on “May Day” in 
1975 as the result of an SEC mandate.  H.R. REP. NO. 94-123, at 46 (1975). 
 286. See Patrick M. Creaven, Note, Inside Outside Leave Me Alone: Domestic 
and EC-Motivated Reform in the UK Securities Industry, 60 FORDHAM L.  REV. 
S285, S287–89 (1992) (describing Big Bang legislation).  See generally Norman 
S. Poser, Big Bang and the Financial Services Act Seen Through American 
Eyes, 14 BROOK. J. INT’L L. 317, 318 (1988) (describing Big Bang); NORMAN S. 
POSER, INTERNATIONAL SECURITIES REGULATION: LONDON ’S “BIG BANG” AND THE 
EUROPEAN SECURITIES MARKETS 27–31 (1991).   
 287. Laurence, supra note 281, at 662.  
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duct of their members and could impose fines, censures, and 
bans.288  One of the more important of the SROs was the Secur i-
ties and Futures Authority,289 which combined the regulation of 
futures and securities, an approach not followed in the U.S.  
Although this concept appears to be a mixture of the Municipal 
Securities Rule Making Board (“MSRB”) and the SEC in the 
U.S.,290 the SIB was actually a compromise designed to preserve 
the culture of the City of London’s club-like regulation.  
The SIB proved to be a reluctant and ineffective regulator, 
and another series of scandals led to calls for further reform.291  
The scandals included the “Blue Arrow” rights affair, Robert 
Maxwell’s defalcations, the BCCI debacle, and several insider 
trading cases.292  The crisis at Barings plc.,293 then precipitated 
  
 288. Member firms were required to second employees in order to provide a 
staff for the SROs.  Id. at 662.  
 289. Helen Nugent, Taking Grief Out of Grievances, INDEP. (London) Sept. 
20, 1998, at 20. 
 290. The MSRB is a self-regulatory body composed of members representing 
securities firms, bank representatives, and the public.  It is a hybrid body that 
was given the responsibility of enacting rules for the registration and regula-
tion of bank and non-bank municipal securities dealers.  Its authority is lim-
ited to proposing and adopting rules to regulate transactions in municipal 
securities.  Those rules must  be approved by the SEC before they are effec-
tive.  Enforcement of MSRB rules is left to the SEC, the NASD, and the bank 
regulatory agencies.  HAZEN TREATISE, supra note 51, § 10.5, at 539–45. 
 291. Richard Northedge, Scandals Led to New Legislation for London Fi-
nancial District, SUNDAY BUS. (London), Nov. 20, 2001, available at LEXIS, 
News Group File.  
 292. See generally TOM BOWER, MAXWELL THE OUTSIDER (1992); PETER 
TRUELL & LARRY GURWIN, FALSE PROFITS: THE INSIDE STORY OF BCCI,  THE 
WORLD ’S MOST CORRUPT FINANCIAL EMPIRE (1992); Betty M. Ho, Rethinking 
the System of Sanctions in the Corporate and Securities Law of Hong Kong, 42 
MCGILL L.J. 603, 629 (1997) (describing the “Blue Arrow” affair); Barry A.K. 
Rider, The Control of Insider Trading — Smoke And Mirrors, 19 DICK. J. INT ’L 
L. 1 (2000) (discussing lack of enforcement against insider trading). 
  Pensioners had also been the subject of sales schemes in which, under 
a new law designed to encourage the privatizing of pensions, they were “mis-
sold” on the drawbacks of investing on their own rather than in a public or 
company pension scheme.  Simon Robinson, Follow the Money, TIME (Int’l ed.), 
July 27, 1998, at 36.  See generally Richard Nobles & Julia Black, The Privati-
zation Process: Pensions Mis-Selling — The Lessons for Regulating Privatized 
Social Security, 64 BROOK. L. REV. 933 (1998); Steve Stecklow & Sara Calian, 
Financial Flop: Social Security Switch in U.K. is Disastrous; A Caution to the 
U.S.?, WALL ST. J., Aug. 10, 1998, at A1.  
 293. See supra note 274.   
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more legislation, which created the FSA-UK in 1997.294  The 
FSA-UK is an “independent non-governmental body which ex-
ercises statutory powers . . . .”295  The agency was to assume the 
duties of nine regulatory entities,296 abandoning the clubby use 
of SROs.297  In 1998 the FSA-UK was even given the authority 
to oversee the banks, taking that power away from the Bank of 
England.298  
The FSA-UK became a monolithic super regulator that was 
firmly in the hands of the government, and was to be “the single 
governing entity of the entire financial services spectrum, from 
securities and futures trading to funeral planning.”299  The 
agency was given responsibility to regulate virtually every as-
pect of finance, assuming the same roles played in the U.S. by 
the SEC, the CFTC, federal bank regulators, and state banking, 
insurance and securities commissions, as well as the SROs.300  
It was also provided with expanded enforcement powers that 
included the right to bring actions against violators and impose 
sanctions.301  The FSA-UK, however, started with only 2,000 
employees for the regulation of 10,000 companies.302  Even so, 
  
 294. Thomas Sims, Single Regulators Are Catching on in Europe, WALL ST. 
J. (International), Mar. 6, 2001, at A14.  
 295. FSA, INTRODUCTION TO THE FINANCIAL SERVICES AUTHORITY 4 (2001) 
[hereinafter INTRO. TO THE FSA].  The agency is funded by the industry and is 
accountable to Treasury Ministers.  Id.  
 296. See FSA, Further Integration of Financial Regulatory Services at the 
FSA, (Feb. 2, 2001), at http://www.fsa.gov.uk/pubs/press/2001/017.html (list-
ing the integrated regulators); Nine into One Does Go, REINSURANCE MAG., 
June 8, 1998, at 28, available at http://www.insurancewindow.net/story.asp?l 
sectioncode=00&arch=true&storycode=14043 (same). 
 297. There were to be no industry representatives on the FSA-UK.  Helen 
Liddell Interview: New Tricks for Old Watchdogs, INVESTORS CHRONICLE , Oct. 
31, 1997, at 21. 
 298. André Scheerer, Credit Derivatives: An Overview of Regulatory Initia-
tives in the U.S. and Europe, 5 FORDHAM J. CORP. & FIN. L. 149, 198 (2000).  
The Bank of England retained the right to set interest rates under the Bank 
of England Act 1998.  See Bank of England Act, 1998, c. 11, § 7, sched. 2; Bank 
of England, About the Bank: Core Purposes, at http://www.bankofengland.co. 
uk/corepurposes.htm (last visited Feb. 2, 2003).  
 299. The Risk Business, LAWYER, Sept. 10, 2001, at 21. 
 300. Silvia Ascarelli, Britain’s Fiscal Watchdog to Bite as Well as Bark , 
WALL ST. J., Nov. 30, 2001, at A13. 
 301. The Seamless Web of Financial Regulation, COMPLIANCE MONITOR, Oct. 
2001, at 1. 
 302. Ascarelli, supra note 300.  The agency also admitted that many of these 
employees were inexperienced in regulation.  Suzy Jagger, Death of Capital-
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immediate concern was raised that the new agency would be-
come bureaucratic and intrusive and seek to implement a rule-
based regulatory system like the one in the U.S.303     
The FSA-UK took several steps to unify regulation.  First, a 
single ombudsman was to be created by the agency to handle 
complaints by customers in all sectors of public finance,304 as 
opposed to the various hotlines for federal and state agencies in 
the U.S., the numerous arbitration tribunals of the SROs, and 
the singular reparations procedure at the CFTC in the U.S.  
The FSA-UK further replaced the six separate insurance funds 
with a single Financial Services Compensation Scheme 
(“FSCS”), which provided customers with compensation in the 
event of the insolvency of a financial service firm.305  This 
sharply contrasts with the U.S. system that spreads responsi-
bility among the FDIC, the Bank Insurance Fund, the Savings 
Association Insurance Fund, the SIPA Corporation (“SIPC”), 
the Pension Benefit Guaranty Corporation, and the funds cre-
ated by states for insurance companies. 
The FSA-UK is also seeking publication of comparative in-
formation disclosures for a range of financial instruments that 
would allow more informed investment decisions.306  The FSA-
UK assigned one office to develop policy on prudential issues 
across all financial sectors, so as to develop a common approach 
  
ism, THE MIRROR (London), June 29, 2002, at 14.  See also Jeffrey L. Hiday, 
Hot Properties: U.K. Regulators Vie for Compliance Staffers in Tight Market, 
WALL ST. J., Nov. 3, 1997, at A17 (expressing concern with whether the agency 
would be able to keep even these employees).  The 1999 budget for the FSA-
UK was £154 million.  George Graham, Banking Watchdog Budgets for Re-
duced Costs, FIN. TIMES (London), Feb. 17, 1998, at 11.  In the U.S., the SEC’s 
budget alone was twice that amount and has recently been increased to $ 776 
million.  Alec Klein & Dan Eggen, U.S. Opens Criminal AOL Probe: Justice 
Dept. to Focus on Unusual Accounting, WASH. POST , Aug. 1, 2002, at AO1. 
 303. Silvia Ascarelli, Deals & Deal Makers: New U.K. Financial Regulator 
Draws Fire, WALL ST. J., May 30, 2001, at C16.  
 304. Nugent, supra note 289.  The FSA-UK appoints the board of this Fi-
nancial Ombudsman Service (“FOS”) and promulgates its rules, but the FOS 
is operationally independent of the FSA-UK.  See INTRO. TO THE FSA, supra 
note 295, at 18.   
 305. Id.  The FSA-UK appoints the board of the FSCS and promulgates its 
rules, but the FSCS is operationally independent of the FSA-UK.  See id.   
 306. Howard Davies, The Coming of the Single Financial Regulator, FIN. 
TIMES (London), July 16, 2001, at 2. 
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to risk and capital requirements.307  There has been no compa-
rable effort in the U.S., where there are separate capital re-
quirements for insurance companies, banks, broker-dealers, and 
futures commission merchants.  As a lawyer for the FSA-UK 
notes: “[o]ur advantage is that we can look at the market as a 
whole . . . .  We can see what’s falling between the cracks.”308  
The agency also announced that it was streamlining the exist-
ing fourteen rulebooks for financial services into one.309  The 
FSA-UK has been focusing its regulatory attention on high-risk 
firms, while requiring other firms to report and to comply with 
conduct standards set out in its rulebook.310  By contrast, the 
FSA-UK specified several governing principles involving 
management responsibility and internal control systems, as 
well as financial requirements.311  The agency, like the SEC, 
placed heavy emphasis on supervisory responsibilities of man-
agers.312  Of course, the FSA-UK did not stop financial problems 
in the U.K., and, in fact, it encountered criticism for its 
handling of the Equitable Life closure.313  Thereafter, the 
agency became more aggressive in the regulation of the 
insurance sector, but still depended on company managers to 
prevent wrongdoing.314  The FSA-UK also began a program of 
  
 307. Andrea Felsted, Financial Consolidation Held Back by Inconsistent 
Regulation, FIN. TIMES (London), July, 13, 2000, at 2; Equitable Life: FSA 
Response to Baird Report, Oct. 17, 2001, HERMES Database.  This was a 
change from the previous sector-by-sector analysis used before the creation of 
the FSA-UK by the various regulatory bodies in London.  Outcome of Consul-
tation on Prudential Regulation Endorses “Single” Regulator, May 10, 2000, 
HERMES Database.  
 308. The Risk Business, LAWYER, Sept. 10, 2001, at 21. 
 309. The agency stated that its single rulebook would still differentiate for 
different types of businesses and customers.  FSA Plan & Budget for 
1999/2000, Feb. 3, 1999, HERMES Database.  As an interim measure, the old 
rulebooks were incorporated into a single sourcebook.  George Walker, Regu-
latory Review 2001, FIN. REG. INT’L (London), Feb. 2002, available at LEXIS, 
England & Wales, Journals. 
 310. Davies, supra note 306. 
 311. Walker, supra note 309. 
 312. Maeve Bromwich, The Watchdog Needs a Firm Hand, LAWYER, Dec. 2, 
1997, at 13. 
 313. James Mackintosh, Regulator Faces Rising Tide of Trouble, FI N. TIMES  
(London), Oct. 20, 2001, at 16. 
 314. Change Ongoing as FSA Gets to Grips with Its UK Financial Markets 
Role, INS . DAY, June 26, 2002.  
File: Markham Base  Macro  Final.doc Created on:  3/20/2003 5:05 PM Last Printed: 4/28/2003 11:31 AM 
380 BROOK. J. INT’L L. [Vol. 28:2 
The FSA-UK also began a program of enforcement actions, im-
posing fines and banning wrongdoers from trading in London.315  
Like markets in the U.S., the London markets were affected 
by the new competition.  The London International Financial 
Futures and Options Exchange (“LIFFE”) had become the sec-
ond largest commodity exchange in the world, behind the Chi-
cago Board of Trade.316  Nevertheless, market share was fleeing 
rapidly to the electronic trading systems on Eurex in Germany.  
In 1998 LIFFE closed its trading floor, abandoning its open out-
cry system in favor of electronic trading.317  But it was too late 
for LIFFE to regain its position, and the exchange was later 
acquired by Euronext, the continental exchange that had al-
ready combined exchanges in Paris, Brussels, Amsterdam, and 
Lisbon.318 
  
 315. One enforcement action involved the manipulation of stock prices on 
the Swedish Stock Exchange by the “Flaming Ferraris,” a group of traders 
working at Credit Suisse First Boston in London.  James Archer, the son of 
Lord Archer (who was himself in prison for perjury), was a member of this 
group, which was named after their favorite cocktail.  James Archer was 
banned for life from working in the City by the FSA-UK.  Sanctions were also 
imposed on other members of the group.  James Mackintosh, James Archer 
Banned from City Trading for Shares Deception, FIN. TIMES (London), July 28, 
2001, at 3.  Another enforcement case resulted in a $500,000 fine imposed on 
PaineWebber International for failing to have adequate anti-money launder-
ing procedures in place.  Ernest Beck, PaineWebber Receives Fine by U.K. 
Agency, WALL ST. J., Aug. 23, 2001, at C18.   
 316. Futures Exchanges: Everlasting LIFFE, ECONOMIST , July 5, 1997, at 73. 
 317. Alan Cowell, London Futures Exchange to Reorganize, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 
3, 1998, at C4; London Exchange Begins Electronic Trading System, WALL ST. 
J., Dec. 1, 1998, at C17. As one source notes: 
CBOT was once the dominant global futures market, but Eurex now 
occupies that position. . . . [T]he Swiss-German market managed in 
the first seven months of 2002 to expand on its global leadership posi-
tion.  During this period, it managed a total of 445 million contracts, 
up 20% on the first seven months of 2001.  Its main European rival, 
the Euronext/Liffe axis, managed 419 million contracts; Chicago Mer-
cantile Exchange 319 million contracts; and CBOT 186 million con-
tracts. 
Eurex Aims to Open Up U.S. Market, HANDELSBLATT  (Eng. version), Aug. 19, 
2002, available at LEXIS, Global News Wire. 
 318. LIFFE was acquired by Euronext in 2001.  Alex Skorecki, Exchanges 
Take First Steps to Alliance, FI N. TIMES (London), Sept. 5, 2002, at 28. 
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The London Stock Exchange (“LSE”), Europe’s largest, was 
also dealing with this new competition.319  The exchange was 
involved in a major calamity in trying to upgrade its computer-
ized systems and create a paperless settlement system.  The 
unsuccessful project, called “Taurus,” caused losses totaling 
hundreds of millions of dollars.320  The LSE then created an 
electronic, order-driven trading system321 and decided to 
demutualize and become a commercial company.  As a result, 
the LSE’s listing authority was transferred to the FSA-UK.322  
Thereafter, the LSE announced that it was planning to merge 
with the Deutsche Börse in Frankfurt.  The merged company 
was to be known as iX-International Exchange and was to be 
linked with the Nasdaq market in the U.S.323  The proposal was 
widely criticized and set off a competing takeover effort by the 
OM Gruppen AB (“OM”), the owner of the Stockholm Stock Ex-
change.324 The LSE survived, but was forced to reorganize itself 
and drop the proposal to merge with the Deutsche Börse.325    
VII. FINANCIAL SERVICES AGENCY OF JAPAN 
Like the U.S. and the U.K., the form of Japan’s present regu-
latory structure is best explained by its history.326  After World 
War II, General Douglas MacArthur’s Supreme Command re-
  
 319. See generally Bradley, supra note 250, at 662–64 (describing the LSE 
and its history). 
 320. Glenn Whitney, Giant London Bourse Seeks New Identity and Focus 
After Costly Project Fails, WALL ST. J., April 22, 1993, at A11. 
 321. Sara Calian & Sylvia Ascarelli, London Launches Big Bang II for 
Share Trading, WALL ST. J., Oct. 20, 1997, at A20. 
 322. FSA, THE TRANSFER OF THE LISTING AUTHORITY TO THE FSA 3 (Dec. 
1999), available at http://www.fsa.gov.uk/pubs/cp/cp37.pdf. 
 323. Erik Portanger, Swedish Concern OM Launches Hostile Bid Valued at 
$1.19 Billion, WALL ST. J., Aug. 30, 2000, at A18. 
 324. OM also supplied support services for other exchanges and trading 
platforms, including the California Power Exchange.  Silvia Ascarelli, Swedes 
Set Formal Bid for the LSE, WALL ST. J., Sept. 12, 2000, at A21.  
 325. See generally Bradley, supra note 250, at 697–98 (describing the take-
over battle). 
 326. Japan has been credited with creating the world’s first futures ex-
change.  Mark D. West, Private Ordering in Japan, Private Ordering at the 
World’s First Futures Exchange, 98 MICH. L. REV. 2574 (2000).  Stock markets 
were organized in 1874 under an ordinance that was based on the rules of the 
London Stock Exchange.  Andrew M. Pardieck, The Formation and Transfor-
mation of Securities Law in Japan: From the Bubble to the Big Bang, 19 
UCLA PAC. BASIN L.J. 1, 7 (2001). 
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quired the adoption of provisions from U.S. laws regulating fi-
nance, including the securities laws and the Glass-Steagall 
Act.327  This new legislation established a Securities Commis-
sion for the Supervision of Securities Business based on the 
American SEC.328  Japan did not permit bank holding compa-
nies, but banks became members of the keiretsu, i.e., large com-
panies joining in cooperative units with cross-shareholding, 
which became the dominant force within the Japanese economy 
after World War II.329  The Bank of Japan acted as the country’s 
central bank, setting monetary policy, while the Ministry of Fi-
nance (“MoF”) was responsible for financial policy.330 
The MoF became a monolithic component of Japanese fi-
nance331 and managed the economy on both a micro and macro 
level, leaving only a limited central banking role to the Bank of 
Japan.  To secure its position, the MoF abolished the Securities 
Commission for the Supervision of Securities Business in 1952 
and replaced it with its own Securities Bureau.332  Other aspects 
of the U.S.-style regulatory system were also abandoned in later 
years.333  The MoF then assumed a dual role of regulator and 
  
 327. The provisions for securities and banking regulation were set forth in 
Article 65 of the Japanese Securities and Exchange Law.  Hideki Kanda, Se-
curitization in Japan, 8 DUKE J. COMP. & INT ’L L. 359, 367 (1998). 
 328. Laurence, supra note 281, at 669. 
 329. See Corinne A. Franzen, Increasing the Competitiveness of U.S. Corpo-
rations: Is Bank Monitoring the Answer, 2 MINN. J. GLOBAL TRADE 271, 292 
(1993) (describing the cross-shareholding of the keiretsu).  The American oc-
cupying authorities tried to break up the zaibatsu, or cartels, which had con-
trolled Japan’s economy before World War II.  Gregory D. Ruback, Comment, 
Master of Puppets: How Japan’s Ministry of Finance Orchestrates Its Own 
Reformation, 22 FORDHAM INT’L L.J. 185, 189–90 (1998).  They were simply 
replaced by the keiretsu.  For a description of the rebuilding of Japan after 
World War II, see JOHN W. DOWER, EMBRACING DEFEAT : JAPAN IN THE WAKE OF 
WORLD WAR II (1999). 
 330. See generally Dafei Chen, Acute Symptoms of Chronic Problems: Ja-
pan’s Procrastination in Solving Its Bank Crisis, the Current Situation and a 
Future Perspective, 9 MINN. J. GLOBAL TRADE 269, 274 (2000).  
 331. The MoF assumed control of much of Japanese banking during the 
1930s.  Ruback, supra note 329, at 189.  During World War II, a Japanese 
Securities Exchange was created by the government, replacing nine private 
exchanges.  Pardieck, supra note 326, at 7.   
 332. The MoF also created a Banking Bureau and an Insurance Bureau to 
regulate these industries.  An International Finance Bureau conducted over-
sight of foreign financial activities of private firms.  Chen, supra note 330, at 
274.  
 333. Laurence, supra note 281, at 669. 
File: Markham Base  Macro  Final.doc Created on: 3/20/2003 5:05 PM Last Printed: 4/28/2003 11:31 AM 
2003] FINANCIAL REG. IN U.S., U.K., & JAPAN 383 
business promoter.334  Though it was the sole governmental fi-
nancial regulator, SROs, including the exchanges and the 
Japanese Securities Dealers Association, also provided some 
minimal regulatory functions.335 
The Japanese economy prospered, experiencing growth rates 
of 10% a year between 1950 and 1970.336  The period of growth 
continued into the 1980s.  The Japanese economy was viewed as 
an “economic miracle,” and its manufacturing processes (e.g., 
“just-in-time”) were widely copied.  Moreover, the Japanese 
worker was well disciplined.  The average Japanese household 
had savings of $100,000,337 much of which was held in postal 
savings accounts.338  The high-quality goods produced in Japan 
penetrated markets everywhere.  The U.S. was an especially 
attractive market, providing easy access, even though Japan’s 
restrictive trade practices were excluding American goods from 
the Japanese market. 
In the 1980s, however, a “bubble economy” developed in Ja-
pan.  The stock market boomed, and real estate prices more 
than doubled between 1986 and 1990.  Scandals soon unfolded.  
In the “Recruit Cosmos” affair, Prime Minister Noboru Take-
shita resigned after it was discovered that some 160 influential 
politicians had been given Recruit Cosmos stock at bargain 
  
 334. Pardieck, supra note 326, at 8.  The MoF often placed its senior officials 
as executives at financial institutions.  These institutions also maintained 
offices at the MoF to further communications.  Ruback, supra note 329, at 
199–200.  
 335. Pardieck, supra note 326, at 24–27.   
 336. 2 MARKHAM, A FINANCIAL HISTORY OF THE U.S., supra note 15, at 278.  
The recovery of the Japanese economy was aided by grants and loans from the 
U.S., as well as a defense umbrella.  Id.   
 337. Chen, supra note 330, at 277.  
 338. A unique part of the Japanese financial system has been the provision 
of postal savings accounts by the government.  These accounts received high 
interest rates and were tax sheltered.  In 2000, some 20% of all Japanese per-
sonal assets were held in postal savings accounts.  BROOME & MARKHAM, su-
pra note 11, at 958.  In 2002, $25 trillion was held in Japanese postal savings 
accounts.  James K. Glassman, A Growth Season for Japanese Stocks?, WASH. 
POST, Apr. 28, 2002, at HO1.  The Japanese government used the monies in 
these accounts to fund its own operations.  The postal savings accounts were 
placed under the supervision of the Ministry of Posts and Telecommunica-
tions, rather than the MoF.  Richard E. Nohe, A Different Time, A Different 
Place: Breaking Up Telephone Companies in the United States and Japan, 48 
FED. COMM. L. J. 307, 314 (1996).    
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prices in 1986, just before the company went public.339  In an-
other scandal, the Hanshin Sogo Bank sold a large amount of 
stock it held in the Tateho Chemical Company the day before 
the company announced large losses.  No wrongdoing was 
found, to the consternation of many.340  Nui Onoue, the “Bubble 
Lady,” became famous for borrowing billions of dollars on her 
restaurants in order to invest in the stock market.  The 
amounts she borrowed were greater than the value of those 
properties.  She had also used forged certificates of deposit for 
her trading activities.  Eventually, the Bubble Lady, who used 
séances to pick stocks, was sentenced to twelve years in 
prison.341  
The bursting of the Japanese economic bubble at the begin-
ning of the 1990s sent the economy into a deep recession that 
the country is still struggling with today342 — massive deflation 
was experienced; the Nikkei 225 index dropped from 39,000 to 
11,000; land prices in large cities dropped eleven years in a row; 
government debt grew to 150% of GDP, as compared with 33% 
in the U.S.;343 and bad debt held by Japanese banks grew to 
some 30% of GDP.344  The Hokkaido Takushoku Bank failed, the 
first to do so in Japan since World War II.345  Nineteen of Ja-
pan’s largest banks had capital shortages that threatened their 
ability to meet the Basel Committees guidelines for interna-
tional banks.346  Yamaichi Securities, the fourth largest securi-
ties firm in Japan,347 also failed.  Yamaichi had hid its losses in 
  
 339. Ex-NTT Chief Found Guilty in Recruit Scandal, L.A. TIMES, Oct. 9, 
1990, at 3. 
 340. Laurence, supra note 281, at 670. 
 341. Stefan Wagstyl, Bank Chief in Japan’s Turbulent Years, FI N. TIMES  
(London), Jan. 6, 2000, at 12; Robert Thomson, Institutions in Dock Beside 
Bubble Lady, FIN. TIMES (London), Oct. 6, 1992, at 6. 
 342. The Bank of Japan introduced a zero interest rate policy as a way of 
putting the economy back on its feet.  Ken Belson, World Business Briefing 
Asia: Japan: Monetary Policy Unchanged, N.Y. TIMES, June 13, 2002, at W1.  
 343. Glassman, supra note 338. 
 344. Time to Wake Up, ECONOMIST, Sept. 26, 1998, at 21.  
 345. Eric C. Sibbitt, A Brave New World for M&A of Financial Institutions 
in Japan: Big Bang Financial Deregulation and the New Environment for 
Corporate Combinations of Financial Institutions, 19 U. PA. J. INT’L ECON . L. 
965, 967 (1998). 
 346. 3 MARKHAM, A FINANCIAL HISTORY OF THE U.S., supra note 42, at 269. 
 347. The Bank of Japan bailed out the Yamaichi firm in 1965 by agreeing to 
provide an unlimited amount of loans.  2 MARKHAM , A FINANCIAL HISTORY OF 
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off-book accounts, apparently with the knowledge of at least one 
MoF official.348  In the early 1990s there were a series of “loss 
compensation” scandals, in which it was discovered that the 
country’s four largest brokerage firms were covering the trading 
losses of important clients and politicians.349  In 1997, the na-
tion’s largest securities firm, Nomura, became mired in scandal, 
after it was discovered that the firm had covered the trading 
losses of a gangster and engaged in widespread abusive sales 
practices.350   
The Japanese government took several steps to deal with this 
deteriorating situation.  The Japanese Diet passed the Finan-
cial Reform Act of 1992, which allowed the MoF to establish 
capital requirements for banks and allowed banks to own secu-
rities affiliates.  The act also aimed to further competition 
among financial institutions. Furthermore, a Securities Ex-
change and Surveillance Commission (“SESC”) was created in 
1992 to police the securities markets.351  This legislation osten-
sibly reduced the MoF’s role as the director agency for the 
placement of financial resources.352  In application, however, the 
MoF remained firmly in control of financial services firms and 
the SESC.353  Greater reform was attempted in 1996 by means 
of a “Japanese Big Bang” that sought to emulate the one in the 
U.K. and deregulate Japan’s financial services.  The Japanese 
Big Bang tried to ease market entry and remove non-
  
THE U.S., supra note 15, at 343.  When the firm failed in 1997, it owed the 
Bank of Japan $3.95 billion.  Three executives were arrested by Japanese 
authorities.  Merrill Lynch bought the Yamaichi securities operations, but lost 
several hundred millions in dollars over the next few years from that invest-
ment.  3 MARKHAM , A FINANCIAL HISTORY OF THE U.S., supra note 42, at 268.  
Merrill Lynch ended up closing most of those operations.  David Ibison, Japan 
Refuses to Offer Up Easy Money For Foreign Banks, FIN. TIMES (London), July 
2, 2002, at 31. 
 348. Michiyo Nakamoto, Prosecutors Raid Industrial Bank of Japan, FIN. 
TIMES (London), Feb. 10, 1998, at 6. 
 349. See generally Masahisa Ikeda, The Legality of Compensating Investors 
in Japanese Securities Market, 33 HARV. INT’L L.J. 592 (1992) (describing 
these scandals). 
 350. David Ibison, A Banking Star is Brought to Earth, FIN. TIMES (London), 
Aug. 8, 2002, at 15. 
 351. Pardieck, supra note 326, at 9.   
 352. Sibbitt, supra note 345, at 987–89. 
 353. Chen, supra note 330, at 276.  
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competitive practices.354  Commissions were unfixed.  The plan 
was formulated by a Financial System Research Council to al-
low banks, insurance companies, and brokerage firms to com-
pete with each other without the prior restrictions that had 
kept these sectors separate.355  The government also announced 
a “Total Plan” to deal with the mass of non-performing debt in 
the economy and to dissolve bankrupt companies.356  Although 
public funds were used to shore up shaky banks, Japan’s banks 
still maintain some $1.3 trillion in bad debts.357 
Another scandal arose after the Tokyo Prosecutor’s Office 
staged a large-scale raid involving 100 investigators on the MoF 
offices in 1998.358  The Prosecutor was seeking information on 
bribes in the form of lavish entertainment and discount loans 
allegedly paid to MoF bank examiners by those being exam-
ined.359  Two examiners were arrested and a third committed 
suicide.360  More legislation followed in the form of a Financial 
Reconstruction Law for failed financial institutions and a Fi-
nancial Early Strengthening Law that allowed public funds to 
be used to shore up weak or failing banks.  These laws were to 
  
 354. Ruback, supra note 329, at 217. 
 355. Jessica C. Wiley, Note, Will the “Bang” Mean “Big” Changes to Japa-
nese Financial Laws, 22 HASTINGS INT’L & COMP. L. REV. 379, 380, 394 (1999).  
Under existing regulations, strict separation of securities and banking was 
required — even separate entrances were required for a firm with banking 
and securities operations in the same building.  Despite the Big Bang goal of 
removing such restrictions, they were apparently still in place in July 2002.  
Mizuho to Open One-Stop Money Shop, ASAHI SHIMBUN , July 17, 2002.  See 
also Yanagisawa Panel Call for Promotion of Market Functioning, JAPAN 
WKLY. MONITOR, July 8, 2002, available at LEXIS, IACNWS 88685779 (advo-
cating fewer regulatory distinctions among securities, banking, and insur-
ance). 
 356. Chen, supra note 330, at 278.  
 357. Hampered, ECONOMIST, July 13, 2002 (Finance & Economics) [hereinaf-
ter Hampered].  
 358. Andrew Chin, Spoiling the Surprise: Constraints Facing Random Regu-
latory Inspections in Japan and the United States, 20 NW. J. INT’L L. & BUS. 
99, 99–101 (1999)  
 359. Japan’s Mighty Ministry Trembles, FIN. TIMES (London), Jan. 27, 1998, 
at 4. 
 360. Ruback, supra note 329, at 211.  Eventually, 112 MoF officials were 
sanctioned, along with six of Japan’s largest banks.  Chin, supra note 358, at 
100. 
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be administered by a five -member governmental body called the 
Financial Reconstruction Commission.361  
The SESC was transferred out of the MoF in 1998, along with 
an independent Financial Supervisory Agency, which was suc-
ceeded by the Financial Services Agency (“FSA-Japan”) in 
2000.362  The FSA-Japan was also given the power, previously 
held by the MoF, to set securities policy and to regulate securi-
ties and banking.  The SESC continued its operations under 
authority from the FSA-Japan, which in turn was supervised by 
the Financial Reconstruction Commission.363  More reform legis-
lation was adopted: the ban on holding companies was re-
moved,364 and consumer protection was enhanced through the 
Law Concerning the Sale of Financial Products.365 
Some have expressed concern that all of these reforms may 
not have accomplished very much.  The SESC lacked strong 
enforcement mechanisms366 — it is only an investigative agency.  
  
 361. Japan’s Financial Sector Reform: Progress and Challenges, Hakuo 
Yanagisawa, Minister for Financial Services Japan, Address before the Finan-
cial Services Authority (Sept. 3, 2001), available at http://www.fsa.go.jp/ 
gaiyou/gaiyoue/presen/20010903.html. 
 362. Securities & Exchange Surveillance Commission, History and Func-
tions, at http://www.fsa.go.jp/sesc/english/news/others/20010723.htm (last 
visited Nov. 18, 2002).  The Financial Supervisory agency was merged with 
the MoF Financial System Planning Bureau to form FSA-Japan.  Masaharu 
Hino, On the Establishment of the Financial Services Agency, Address Before 
the Bank of England (Sept. 2000), available at http://www.fsa.go.jp/gaiyou/ 
gaiyoue/presen/p2000913.html [hereinafter Hino Address] 
 363. The Financial Reconstruction Commission quickly encountered scan-
dal, and critics charged that it was maintaining the insular and clubby ap-
proach of the MoF.  A Loss of Appetite, ECONOMIST, Sept. 16, 2000 (Japanese 
Financial Regulation) [hereinafter A Loss of Appetite].  The FSA’s organiza-
tion and role in the government is a somewhat confusing one.  See FSA, About 
the Financial Services Agency, Organization (Jan. 2002), at http://www.fsa. 
go.jp/info/infoe.html.  
 364. Sibbitt, supra note 345, at 993–94. 
 365. Adopted in 2000, this statute required greater disclosures to customers 
purchasing financial products.  Pardieck, supra note 326, at 69–70.  A Con-
sumer Contract Act that was also passed in 2000 allowed customers to rescind 
contracts if they were misinformed about the nature of the transaction and 
precluded broad disclaimers of liability.  Id. at 74–78.   
 366. The SESC chairman promised to “Kick out Rogue Broker-Dealers” and 
“show up our presence” through enforcement actions.  Takeo Takahashi, New 
Chairman, Inaugural Address (July 23, 2001), at http://www.fsa.go.jp/sesc/ 
english/news/others/20010723.htm.  The SESC was investigating the manipu-
lation of stock prices by derivative firms trying to avoid paying a bonus cou-
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The SESC has no authority to impose sanctions, but may refer 
matters for sanctions.  In practice, however, few referrals have 
been made to date.367  In 2001, the SESC had a relatively small 
staff, at least in comparison to the SEC in the U.S.,368 and most 
of them had been transferred from the MoF.369  To be sure, the 
MoF does appear to retain some policy control.370  FSA-Japan 
also experienced a faltering start.  When FSA-Japan did try to 
take aggressive action by urging vast bad debt write-offs, many 
small and medium-sized companies went bankrupt.371  FSA-
Japan then eased off, pressuring the banks and using public 
funds to save the Daiei supermarket chain and Koizumi, a con-
struction company, both of which had massive amounts of bad 
debt.  However, there were no bailouts for small companies.372  
The government nationalized the Long-Term Credit Bank of 
Japan and the Nippon Credit Bank, after these institutions 
could no longer be kept afloat.373  Public funds were also in-
jected into all but one major bank.374 
  
pon on Reverse Convertible Bonds.  Press Release, SESC, An Annual An-
nouncement of Activity (Sept. 3, 2001), available at http://www.fsa.go.jp/sesc/ 
english/news/others/20010903.htm.  In 2000, the SESC filed only five cases 
with the prosecutor’s office and made thirty-four recommendations for disci-
plinary actions to FSA-Japan.  Id.  Between 1992 to June 2001, the SESC 
made 188 recommendations to FSA-Japan for disciplinary actions.  SESC, 
What We Do ¶ 5, at http://www.fsa.go.jp/sesc/english/actions/actions_menu. 
htm (last visited Jan. 30, 2003).  
 367. Pardieck, supra note 326, at 9–14.   
 368. The SESC staff is about one tenth the size of the SEC.  Phred Dvorak, 
Walking Wounded, One Reason Stocks in Japan Stay Low: Zombie Companies, 
WALL ST. J., Aug. 28, 2002, at A1; Pardieck, supra note 326, at 86; Ruback, 
supra note 329, at 226.  The SESC has disputed this contention, noting that it 
has a much smaller universe to regulate than the SEC in the U.S..  Laurence, 
supra note 281, at 677–78.  The SESC is composed of a three member commis-
sion and has eleven regional offices.  SESC, ORGANIZATION, available at  
http://www.fsa.go.jp/sesc/english/aboutsesc/aboutsesc02.pdf (last visited Mar. 
20, 2003). 
 369. Chen, supra note 330, at 269, 285. 
 370. Ruback, supra note 329, at 223–24. 
 371. Review, ASAHI SHIMBUN , July 17, 2002.  
 372. Hampered, supra note 357; Review, ASAHI SHIMBUN, July 17, 2002.  
 373. The remaining assets of these banks were sold.  Former management 
of both banks were being prosecuted.  Several financial institutions were also 
put into bankruptcy, a rarity in Japan.  Hino Address, supra note 362. 
 374. Hakuo Yanagisawa, Japan’s Financial Sector Reform: Progress and 
Challenges, Address Before the Financial Services Authority, London (Sept. 3, 
2001), at http://www.fsa.go.jp/gaiyou/gaiyoue/presen/p20010903.html.  
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FSA-Japan announced that it was undertaking inspections of 
large troubled banks in order to address their bad debt prob-
lems.375 The project was supposed to be a “Japanese sword” for 
dealing with the problem, but the result was largely to shore up 
some troubled banks.376 Critics claimed that FSA-Japan was 
“whitewashing” the bad debt problem in Japan.377 After down-
grading Japan’s debt, a credit rating agency claimed that FSA-
Japan was engaging in regulatory forbearance as a way to aid 
the economy “in the hope that something will turn up.”378 The 
agency was waffling on reform in other areas.  Japan dropped 
its insurance guaranty for customer funds held in time deposit 
accounts, limiting claims to about $83,000.  This was intended 
to assure more market discipline, but it instead raised concerns 
that funds would be pulled out of already unstable institutions, 
weakening them further.379 When a similar proposal limiting 
deposit insurance on ordinary deposit accounts met political 
opposition FSA-Japan started backtracking.380  It then extended 
government insurance on some deposits, a breach of its promise 
to eliminate unlimited guarantees.381    
FSA-Japan seemed to be retreating from promised reform 
measures in the insurance industry and was stalling on allow-
ing commercial banks, such as the one sought by Sony, to be 
licensed.382  The Japanese government continued the old MoF 
role of trying to manage the economy in other ways.  Most re-
  
 375. FSA-Japan seems to place heavy regulatory emphasis on inspections, a 
costly and time-consuming form of regulation requiring considerable man-
power.  FSA, Financial Services Agency Program Year 2001 Basic Guidelines 
and Basic Plan for Inspections (July 30, 2001), at www.fsa.go.jp/news/newse/ 
e20010730-1.html. 
 376. Tomomi Miyazaki, ASAHI SHIMBUN , May 1, 2002. 
 377. Japan — Can Japan’s Banks Clean Up?, THE BANKER, May 1, 2002. 
 378. David Ibison, Bank Regulator Criticized for Lack of Action , FI N. TIMES 
(London), June 6, 2002, at 10.   
 379. David Pilling, Regulator Drafts Plan for Japanese Bank Mergers, FIN. 
TIMES (London), July 11, 2002, at 9; David Pilling, Japan May Move to Hasten 
Banking Shake-Up, FIN. TIMES (London), July 8, 2002, at 7 [hereinafter Pill-
ing, Japan May Move]. 
 380. Another Tokyo Setback, WALL ST. J., Aug. 28, 2002, at A14. 
 381. Japan Set to Break Deposits Pledge, FIN. TIMES (London), Sept. 5, 2002, 
at 1. 
 382. A Loss of Appetite, supra note 363.  The U.S. also rejected the operation 
of commercial banks such as one proposed by Wal-Mart and Sony in the U.S. 
when the GLBA was adopted in 1999.  Markham, Banking Regulation: Its 
History and Future, supra note 4, at 264, 278 n.347. 
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cently, despite FSA-Japan’s push for a market solution, the 
government suggested that more banks should merge and that 
it would offer a higher government guarantee to encourage such 
actions.383  In fact, several of Japan’s largest banks did merge to 
form colossal enterprises, the largest being Mizuho Holdings, 
Inc, composed of Daiichi Bank, Fuji Bank, and the Industrial 
Bank of Japan.384 
FSA-Japan was accused of trying to manipulate the Nikkei 
225 index through short sale restrictions, which were modeled 
after those of the SEC in the U.S.385  Like the MoF, FSA-Japan 
has often been lenient, at least on Japanese banks.  For exam-
ple, FSA-Japan merely issued a warning to a Japanese bank 
that hid key information from inspectors.386  FSA-Japan has 
shown that it does know how to play tough, at least where for-
eigners are involved.  FSA-Japan accused two American firms 
of improper short sales, in another attempt to support the mar-
ket.387  In 1999, the Tokyo branch of Credit Suisse was excluded 
from engaging in the derivatives business in Japan after sev-
eral abuses.388  FSA-Japan denied the consequent claims that it 
was discriminating against foreign firms.389 
  
 383. Pilling, Japan May Move, supra note 379, at 7. 
 384. Alexandra Nusbaum, Investment Trust Hopes Lift Tokyo, FIN. TIMES  
(London), Jan. 29, 2000, at 24. 
 385. Some Securities Dealers Have Already Been Punished for Breaking 
Body, ASAHI SHIMBUN, Mar. 19, 2002. 
 386. Mizuho Given Warning in May for Misleading FSA, ASAHI SHIMBUN , 
June 19, 2002. 
 387. David Ibison, Nikkei Was Manipulated by Japan, Say Banks, FIN. 
TIMES (London), June 13, 2002, at 1.   
 388. Michael S. Bennett & Michael J. Marin, The Casablanca Paradigm: 
Regulatory Risk in the Asian Financial Derivatives Markets, 5 STAN. J. L. BUS. 
& FIN. 1, 26 (1999).  A criminal indictment was brought by Japanese prosecu-
tors against the firm for concealing documents.  Phred Dvorak & Erik Portan-
ger, London Division of Credit Suisse is Indicted in Tokyo, WALL ST. J., Dec. 9, 
1999, at A23. 
 389. Takeshi Uera, Policies of Japan’s FSA Misunderstood, FIN. TIMES  
(London), June 18, 2002, at 14.  Disciplinary action was also taken against JP 
Morgan by FSA Japan and against Nikko Salomon.  Bayan Rahman, JP Mor-
gan Japan Arm Ban, FIN. TIMES (London), Mar. 1–2, 2003, at 8; Jason Singer, 
Japanese Regulators Penalize Nikko Salomon, WALL ST. J., Mar. 19, 2003, at 
B10.  American regulators have not been unwilling to employ a heavy hand in 
disciplining Japanese firms.  See United States v. Iguchi, 1997 WL 593018 (2d 
Cir. 1997) (unpublished opinion)  A Japanese rogue trader, who lost $1 billion 
in unauthorized trading, was jailed, and Daiwa Bank, the victim of this em-
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The Nikkei 225 Index remains 74% below its high in 1989.390  
An advisory committee to FSA-Japan has recommended that 
stocks be sold at post offices as a means of shifting corporate 
financing away from bank loans and towards the equity mar-
kets in order to inflate the stock market.391  The committee also 
supported a continuing role for the government in bailing out 
troubled banks.392  The Bank of Japan followed up that proposal 
with an announcement that it would be buying the stock of 
companies held by banks.393  This was said to be a “shocking” 
manipulation of the stock market designed for the benefit of the 
banks.394  The Bank of Japan, FSA-Japan, and the MoF were 
said to be at an impasse over policy disputes.395  On the positive 
side, the agency was seeking greater public disclosures from 
firms in precarious financial circumstances.396  It raised its 
bank capital adequacy threshold for intervention and correc-
tion, but capital levels at Japanese banks were still well below 
the Basel minimum international standard.397  FSA-Japan al-
lowed banks to sell life and other insurance and announced that 
  
ployee, was fined $340 million for failing to report the losses promptly to U.S. 
regulatory authorities.  That was then the largest criminal fine in history.  Id. 
 390. Phred Dvorak, Walking Wounded, One Reason Stocks in Japan Stay 
Low: Zombie Companies, WALL ST. J., Aug. 28, 2002, at A1. 
 391. A proposal to reform the postal service was “emasculated.”  Another 
Tokyo Setback, WALL ST. J., Aug. 28, 2002, at A14.  Japanese savings habits 
remain a matter of continuing concern.  “The Japanese have a mammoth $122 
trillion in household savings but invest just 4.4% of their financial assets in 
stocks, compared with about 18% for Americans.”  Dvorak, supra note 390, at 
A1. 
 392. Panel Calls for Shift to Direct Financing, JAPAN WKLY. MONITOR, July 
15, 2002, available at LEXIS, IACNWS 89070940. 
 393. David Pilling, Dramatic Action by BoJ to Shore Up Banks, FIN. TIMES 
(London), Sept. 19, 2002, at 10; Phred Dvorak, Japan’s Central Bank Will Buy 
Stocks Held by Troubled Lenders, WALL ST. J., Sept. 19, 2002, at A1.  This led 
to a loss of confidence in the government’s bond issues.  Ken Belson, Not 
Enough Bidders for Bond Auction, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 21, 2002, at C1.  
 394. Japanese Central Bank Plans to Buy Stocks, NEWS & OBSERVER (Ra-
leigh), Sept. 19, 2003, at 3D.  
 395. Ken Belson, Not Enough Bidders for Bond Auction, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 
21, 2002, at C1.  
 396. FSA Wants Companies to Disclose Vulnerability, YOMIURI SHIMBUN 
DAILY YOMIURI , July 5, 2002, at 1.  
 397. Watchdog Raises Bank Scrutiny, ASAHI SHIMBUN , June 27, 2002.  Large 
Japanese banks had capital of about one-fourth of that required by the Basel 
standard.  Hampered, supra note 357. 
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it was allowing bank affiliated brokers to do so as well.398  After 
some well publicized insurance firm failures, FSA-Japan in-
creased regulatory controls over the industry, requiring, among 
other things, marked-to-market accounting and increasing sol-
vency margins.399  At the same time barriers to entry were being 
lowered, allowing some foreign competition.400 
VIII. WHICH IS BETTER?  
From a distance at least, the regulatory model developed by 
the U.K. has a great deal of theoretical appeal.401  The different 
areas of the financial services industry have been gradually in-
termingling over the last quarter of a century.  The American 
model of regulating each facet of finance is based on the histori-
cal separation of financial services and not on their current 
status.  As Howard Davies, the Chairman of the FSA-UK, noted 
in answering his own rhetorical question of why his country 
should move to a super regulator:  
  
 398. FSA to Allow Bank’s Securities Units to Sell Life Insurance, JAPAN 
WKLY. MONITOR, June 24, 2002,  available at LEXIS, IACNWS 87698011.  The 
Asahi Shimbun and Wire Reports, ASAHI SHIMBUN, June 21, 2002; Banking on 
Deregulation, INS. DAY, May 3, 2001, at 4. 
 399. Japan’s FSA Tightens Up Sector Regulation, INS. DAY, Apr. 26, 2001, at 
5.  A self-assessment system was implemented for setting reserve require-
ments.  Hino Address, supra note 362, ¶ 16.  Japanese insurance companies 
continued to experience a loss in profitability as a result of the disinflation in 
the economy.  Insurers Must Abandon Herd Mentality, YOMIURI SHIMBUN 
DAILY YOMIURI , June 11, 2002, at 1, 1–2.  The industry was consolidating.  See 
Outlook on Japan life Insurers Remains Negative, PR NEWSWIRE , June 7, 2002, 
available at http://www.prnewswire.com/cgi-bin/stories.pl?ACCT=105& 
STORY=/www/stroy/06-06-2002/0001742568; Life Insurers Plan Pension Fund 
Management Alliance, BESTWIRE , Apr. 10, 2001.  FSA-Japan has allowed 
mergers of life and non-life insurers, aiding the trend toward consolidation.  
Bayan Rahman, Dai-Ichi and Yasuda Moot 316 Billion Dollar Link, FIN. 
TIMES (London), Aug. 28, 2000, at 20; One Result of Japan’s Big Bang. . . ., 
INS . DAY, Oct. 2, 2001, at 9.  
 400. Charles Garnsworthy, Life Crisis Prompts Change, REINSURANCE MAG., 
May 1, 2002, at 26; A Growing Influence on the Japanese Scene, INS. DAY, Dec. 
6, 2000, at 7. 
 401. The super regulator is becoming an increasingly popular model.  Ger-
many only recently created a single regulator — the Federal Agency for Fi-
nancial Services Supervision.  G. Thomas Sims, Germany Wants New Regula-
tor to Boost Confidence, WALL ST. J., May 2, 2002, at A13.  South Korea also 
created a Financial Supervisory System as a unified regulator.  Andrew Ward, 
UBS and Merrill Punished for Leaks, FI N. TIMES (London), Aug. 14, 2002, at 
17.   
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Because financial markets move on, the sectoral system put in 
place in the late 1980s is no longer fit for the purpose at the 
beginning of the 21st century.  The old divisions between 
banks, insurance companies, securities firms, investment 
managers, and the rest, do not reflect the way the financial 
sector is now organized.  Banks own insurance companies, and 
vice versa.  Insurance companies own fund managers.  The 
most rapidly growing mortgage bank is owned by a mutual life 
insurer.  Lloyds TSB now incorporates Scottish Widows.  What 
do you call Citigroup, which includes Citibank, Travellers, 
Salomon Smith Barney and, now, Schroders?402 
Nowhere is this trend more evident than in the U.S..  It is 
best exemplified by the Chairman’s reference to Citigroup,403 a 
modern financial services firm that sells products across all 
business lines.404  There are few, if any, remaining conventional 
banks that only take deposits and make loans, surviving on the 
spread.405  Merrill Lynch is, for example, not just a broker-
  
 402. Howard Davies, Scrutiny has Sharpened Resolve of City Watchdog, 
TIMES (London), May 2, 2000, at 26.   
 403. International financial behemoths such as Citigroup raise other con-
cerns: 
Who regulates Citigroup, the world’s largest and most diverse finan-
cial institution? With its operations in over 100 countries, selling just 
about every financial product that has ever been invented, probably 
every financial regulator in the world feels that Citi is, to some de-
gree, his problem. . . .  Yet in a sense nobody truly regulates Citi: it is 
a global firm in a world of national and sometimes sector watchdogs.  
The same is true of AIG, General Electric, UBS, Deutsche Bank and 
many more. 
The Regulator Who Isn’t There, ECONOMIST, May 18, 2002.   
 404. Banks now sell 40% of the annuities sold in the U.S..  Jeff D. Opdyke, A 
Risk-Free Way to Beat the Dow?, WALL ST. J., Aug. 28, 2002, at D1.  
 405. As a 1995 U.S. Treasury memorandum also noted with respect to the 
traditional banking business: 
The share of total private financial assets held by insured depository 
institutions has declined sharply, from about 60 percent in 1970 to 
less than 35 percent today. 
Only 15 percent of all financial assets held by households and the 
non-profit sector in 1994 was accounted for by insured deposits. 
Recent data show that, of the 20 largest financial firms in the United 
States.  Only 5 are commercial banks.  Moreover, a number of diversi-
fied financial services firms own non-bank, thrift institutions, or in-
dustrial loan companies.  
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dealer.  It sells insurance, provides bank services, manages 
portfolios, and engages in a wide range of financial services that 
compete with those of the large banks.406    
The single regulator approach provides FSA-UK with the 
ability to approach financial regulation from a larger perspec-
tive.  The agency is able to focus on those objectives and to de-
cide how they can be met in the most rational fashion, rather 
than through competition with other regulators.407  As a single 
regulator, the FSA-UK can be refreshingly candid about what it 
  
The differences between the products of banks and non-bank finan-
cial firms have been increasingly blurred.  The emergence of similar 
products by different firms operating under different regulatory re-
gimes results in complicated competitive and regulatory issues. 
A number of commercial banks engage in little or no traditional 
banking — funding commercial loans with deposits.  Rather, they 
specialize in trading activities, consumer finance, or fee-based ser-
vices. 
Capital markets have become increasingly globalized, and financial 
markets in different countries have become more interdependent. 
Technological innovations such as remote banking and digital cash 
daily redefine the nature and delivery of financial services and the 
respective roles played by bank and non-bank firms.  For example, 
the date processing firm EDS is the second largest owner/operator of 
ATMs in the U.S. 
DEPARTMENT OF THE TREASURY, MEMORANDUM FOR MEMBERS OF THE 
SECRETARY’S  ADVISORY COMMISSION ON FINANCIAL SERVICES FROM JOAN 
AFFLECK-SMITH , DIRECTOR, OFFICE OF FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS POLICY (Oct. 23, 
1995) [hereinafter DOT, MEMO ON FINANCIAL SERVICES]. 
 406. As Merrill Lynch notes: 
The financial services industry continues to be affected by an intensi-
fying competitive environment, as demonstrated by consolidation 
through mergers and acquisitions, competition from new and estab-
lished competitors using the Internet or other technology, and dimin-
ishing margins in many mature products and services.  The trend of 
consolidation of commercial and investment banks made possible by 
the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act has also increased the competition for 
investment banking business through the use of lending activities in 
conjunction with investment banking activities.  
MERRILL LYNCH, 2001 ANNUAL REPORT 17, available at 
http://www.ml.com/annualmeetingmaterials/annrep2001/ar/discussion.html. 
 407. The FSA-UK has taken this ability seriously and has thoughtfully ad-
dressed its statutory objectives and how they can be met.  FINANCIAL SERVICES 
AUTHORITY, 2002 A NEW REGULATOR FOR A NEW MILLENIUM  (Jan. 2000), avail-
able at http://www.fsa.gov.uk/pubs/index-chrono-2000.html. 
File: Markham Base  Macro  Final.doc Created on: 3/20/2003 5:05 PM Last Printed: 4/28/2003 11:31 AM 
2003] FINANCIAL REG. IN U.S., U.K., & JAPAN 395 
is able to accomplish, advising the public that it “does not aim 
to prevent all failure” and that it “recognizes the proper respon-
sibilities of consumers themselves and of firms own manage-
ment and the impossibility and undesirability of removing all 
risk and failure from the financial system . . . .”408  There is, 
however, an important factor present in the U.K. that is not 
found in Japan, the other super regulator country considered in 
this Article.  There is a long and well developed culture in the 
U.K. of avoiding governmental interference in business.409  The 
FSA-UK, while reflecting a political demand for more regula-
tion, is still a non-governmental body that remains an extension 
of the City’s cultural abhorrence to intrusive regulation.  Lon-
don has learned from long experience that, while there will al-
ways be scandals and failures, each should be viewed as sui 
generis and dealt with accordingly.   
Japan, in contrast, has a regulatory culture of intervention 
and economic management.  The MoF managed the economy 
with some success in its early stages; Japan even threatened 
the U.S. competitively.410  That MoF model, while  successful 
during the growth period of the Japanese economy, failed as the 
economy became more complex.411  The insular nature of Ja-
pan’s financial structure crumbled in the face of global competi-
tion that the country could no longer avoid.  Mounting scandals, 
which were unearthed as the economy declined, required that 
the MoF be removed at least from the front door of regulation.  
The creation of FSA-Japan gave lip service to finding market 
  
 408. INTRO. TO THE FSA, supra note 295, at 7. 
 409. See Schooner & Taylor, supra note 275, at 613 (describing the reasons 
for this hands-off culture). 
 410. See generally DAVID HALBERSTAM , THE RECKONING (1986) (describing 
the competitive threat to American automobile manufacturers from Japan).  
 411. This is a point best left to the economists, but it seems that managed 
and command economies may do well in their early growth stages and then 
collapse as the economy becomes too complex for such management.  The most 
extreme example is the former Soviet Union.  The country’s economy recov-
ered to its pre-World War II levels within five years of the conclusion of that 
conflict despite the damage wreaked by the Germans.  Its economy continued 
to expand for a time before falling apart.  At the end, eighteen million bureau-
crats were trying to substitute for a market.  The result was shortages in 234 
out of 277 basic consumer goods.  Alexander Belozertsev & Jerry W. Mark-
ham, Commodity Exchanges and the Privatization of the Agricultural Sector in 
the Commonwealth of Independent States — Needed Steps in Creating a Mar-
ket Economy, 55 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 119, 128–31 (1992).   
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solutions to the economic malaise in Japan, but that agency still 
seems to cling to the culture of managing the economy by sup-
porting large banks and resisting foreign competition.  Conse-
quently, the Japanese super regulator model does not seem to 
be a desirable one to mimic.  A developed economy is simply too 
complex to be managed by bureaucrats, no matter how brilliant.  
This brings us to the American competitive regulatory model.  
The GLBA enshrined the concept of “functional” regulation, 
which means that a diversified financial services firm that has 
a bank in its holding company structure will have a plethora of 
regulators with substantively different and sometimes conflict-
ing regulatory requirements.  Such a firm will face regulation 
from several bank regulators, including the Federal Reserve 
Board, the FDIC, and either the Comptroller of the Currency or 
a state bank regulator.  The firm will also be regulated by the 
CFTC and the SEC, plus one hundred or more state securities 
and insurance commissions.412  The firm will further be subject 
to regulation by various self-regulatory organizations, including 
NASDR, probably the NYSE, various options exchanges, the 
National Futures Association, and possibly various contract 
markets such as the Chicago Board of Trade.  If that were not 
enough, such entities must also undergo the scrutiny of an ever-
increasing list of “gatekeepers,” including accountants, lawyers, 
analysts, NRSROS, and outside directors.  The Federal Trade 
Commission is using its cold calling and false advertising regu-
latory powers to appear in joint “sweeps” with the SEC and 
CFTC.413  There are also state attorney general wolf packs and 
an increasingly aggressive Justice Department that will happily 
destroy a large firm and devastate its employees’ careers be-
cause of the wrongdoing of a few.414  What exactly is functional 
about this morass?   
The American regulatory culture is an aggressive one, reflect-
ing a strong anti-business bias.415  In the context of the SEC and 
  
 412. The District of Columbia must also be counted. 
 413. See supra note 259. The FTC was also seeking a $215 million fine from 
Citigroup, perhaps the most regulated firm in the world, for predatory lending 
practices.  Citigroup to Settle Lending Case, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 20, 2002, at 
C12; What’s News, WALL ST. J., Sept. 6, 2002, at A1. 
 414. See infra notes 424–25, 433 and accompanying text.  
 415. The author has tried to catalogue this cultural bias elsewhere.  It can 
be traced at least to Thomas Jefferson’s antipathy to the northern merchants, 
and was fueled by Andrew Jackson’s destruction of the Bank of the U.S. and 
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CFTC, there are numerous instances of this aggressiveness.  
Insider trading prosecutions are a prime example.  Such 
charges have not been vigorously pursued in Tokyo or Lon-
don.416  The Sumitomo copper case also makes an interesting 
case study.  Sumitomo Corp., a large Japanese trading com-
pany, was the victim of a rogue trader who was manipulating 
the world copper market, mostly through trading conducted in 
the London markets.  The unauthorized activities of this trader, 
Yasuo Hamanaka, cost Sumitomo $2.6 billion in trading losses, 
a rather severe punishment in and of itself.  Despite the fact 
that Hamanaka’s trading had only a tangential relationship to 
the U.S., the CFTC brought a case against Sumitomo and fined 
  
the excesses of the Robber Barons.  The harsh competition practiced by the 
trusts also gave it strength.  The “populists,” the “muckrakers,” and the 
“money trust hunt” laid the groundwork for the New Deal financial legislation 
that was anti-business in its thrust and which is popularly viewed, without 
any apparent justification, to have saved America during the Great Depres-
sion.  The questionable payment scandals of the 1970s and the insider trading 
scandals of the 1980s caused a rebirth of the anti-business movement in 
American culture.  See 1–3 MARKHAM, A FINANCIAL HISTORY OF THE U.S., supra 
notes 15, 42, 274.  Now Enron has freed these demons once again. 
 416. An FSA-UK official stated that he could “count the number of U.K. 
insider-trading cases on the fingers of one hand, ‘and still have a few to play 
with.’”  Anita Ragahaven et al., Europe’s Police Are Out of Luck on Insider 
Cases, WALL ST. J., Aug. 17, 2000, at C1.  Japan was even more of an “insider’s 
paradise.”  Laurence, supra note 281, at 670.  Japan has been prodded into 
being more vigorous against insider traders.  Between 1992 to June 2001, the 
SESC filed thirty-six cases with the prosecutor, thirteen of which involved 
insider trading.  Securities and Exchange Surveillance Commission, What We 
Do, at http://www.fsa.go.jp/sesc/english/actions/actions.htm (last visited Jan. 
30, 2003).  These regulators have also responded to other SEC initiatives.  The 
FSA-UK adopted the SEC view on selective disclosure to analysts.  See, e.g., 
Silvia Ascarelli, U.K. to Bolster Rules That Bar Select Briefings with Analysts, 
WALL ST. J., Oct. 26, 2000, at A21 (describing the FSA-UK’s views).  In doing 
so, however, the FSA-UK allowed its firms to take corrective actions and 
noted that market forces were requiring the change in any event.  Randall 
Smith & Aaron Luchetti, How Spitzer Will Affect Wall Street, WALL ST. J., 
May 22, 2002, at C1.  The FSA-UK has also been more gingerly than the SEC 
in its approach to the regulation of electronic communications networks.  Sil-
via Ascarelli, U.K. Regulators Seek Advice on Ways to Oversee Electronic Trad-
ing, WALL ST. J., Jan. 24, 2000, at C22; Mark Atherton, FSA Reviews Share 
Deal Rules, TIMES (London), Apr. 26, 2001, at 28.  Both Japan and the U.K. 
have expressed concern that the Sarbanes-Oxley legislation has gone too far 
and could adversely affect their companies.  See, e.g., Edward Alden, Japan 
Joins Chorus of Disapproval on New U.S. Corporate Rules, FIN. TIMES (Lon-
don), Aug. 1, 2002, at 6.    
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the company a record amount of $150 million.  Japan and the 
U.K. only piggybacked onto this action.  Japan prosecuted the 
rogue trader.  Most of the trading at issue took place in London, 
but the FSA-UK asked only for its costs in investigating the 
matter, some $8 million.417      
The Enron affair and subsequent accounting scandals under-
score the weakness and instability of this competitive regula-
tory culture, particularly when politics intervene.418  Competi-
tive regulation did not stop any of these massive accounting 
frauds.419  The hysteria attending the Enron affair in Congres-
sional hearings was another appalling chapter in our financial 
history.420  Berating and badgering witnesses, demanding only 
  
 417. Aaron Lucchetti, CFTC Fines Sumitomo a Record $150 Million, WALL 
ST. J., May 12, 1998, at C19.  See also In the Matter of Sumitomo Corp., 
[1996–1998 Transfer Binder] Commodity Futures L. Rep. (CCH) ¶ 27,327 
(C.F.T.C. 1998) (CFTC consent decision). 
 418. These scandals turned on various schemes to manage or falsify earn-
ings, a concern that has been around for decades.  George Getschow, Paper 
Profits, Slick Accounting Ploys Help Many Companies Improve Their Income, 
WALL ST. J., June 20, 1980, at 1.  In 1999 — before Enron — the SEC had 
been investigating managed earnings.  Thomas S. Mulligan, New Wave of 
Accounting Probes Deepens Fear, L.A. TIMES, Apr. 4, 2002, at C1.  Concern 
with accounting practices is also an old issue.  SEC Chief Urges Accountants 
to Improve Self-Regulation or Risk U.S. Intervention, WALL ST. J., Jan. 4, 
1980, at 11.  See also Charles Stabler, Accountants’ Self-Regulatory Efforts Get 
SEC Praise, But Further Steps Are Urged, WALL ST. J., July 6, 1978, at 4 (SEC 
submits massive 1,300 page report on accounting profession to Congress).    
 419. See, e.g., Anita Raghavan et al., Full Speed Ahead: How Enron Bosses 
Created a Culture of Pushing Limits, WALL ST. J., Aug. 26, 2002, at A1 (de-
scribing guilty plea by an Enron financial officer); Sheila McNulty & Peter 
Spiegel, Former Enron Executive Pleads Guilty to Fraud Charges, FI N. TIMES 
(London), Aug. 22, 2002, at 23 (same).  See also Elizabeth Douglas et al., The 
Nation, Former Phone Execs Arrested, L.A. TIMES, Aug. 2, 2002, at A1 (de-
scribing the WorldCom fraud). 
 420. The newspapers joined this lynch mob with enthusiasm.  See, e.g., 
Raghavan et al., supra note 419 (describing Enron executives as bad boys who 
went to strip bars, drove fast cars, and paid $500 per month for a parking 
spot).  Of a kin was an English author’s supercilious suggestion that Enron 
and other accounting scandals might evidence that Karl Marx was correct in 
claiming that capitalism was victimizing society.  Niall Ferguson, Marx, Niall 
Ferguson Says Capital’s Author was Right about the Class Struggle, FIN. 
TIMES (London), Aug. 17, 2002, at 1.  The low was reached in the “Women of 
Enron” photo spread in the August 2002 issue of Playboy.  See Women of En-
ron, PLAYBOY, Aug. 2002, at 118.  At that point, all that was lacking was an 
article in the National Enquirer claiming that the Enron executives were chil-
dren of aliens from outer space.  The gap was filled when the scandal over 
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yes or no answers to convoluted and complex questions, mock-
ing witnesses and cutting off their answers when it was not fa-
vorable to the Congressional inquisitor, and requiring witnesses 
to take the Fifth Amendment in front of cameras had all the 
trappings and foulness of a McCarthy era hearing.421 The SEC 
  
whether Martha Stewart, the guru of domestic living, had engaged in insider 
trading in ImClone Stock.  The mob positively howled.  See, e.g., Holman Jen-
kins Jr., Business World:  An Autumnal Resolution: Give Martha a Break, 
WALL ST. J., Sept. 4, 2002, at A23 (describing the allegations).  The scandal 
over Jack Welch’s retirement benefits set off another feeding frenzy.  Despite 
the fact that he had added billions of dollars of value to General Electric, the 
press was claiming he had acted improperly after it was revealed in a divorce 
case that he was given perquisites valued at about $2.5 million per year.  
Those perks included such things as tickets to sporting events, and the opera, 
a small consulting fee, an apartment, office, and use of a corporate jet, all of 
which had been negotiated with outside directors and disclosed.  See, e.g., 
Matt Murray et al., GE Pact With Welch Raises Eyebrows, WALL ST. J., Sept. 
9, 2002, at B4; Jack Welch, My Dilemma and How I Resolved It, WALL ST. J., 
Sept. 16, 2002, at A14.  These two celebrities were not the only targets of the 
press.  One of the more silly charges claimed that a Merrill Lynch analyst was 
somehow corrupted by an exchange of wine and champagne with the CEO of 
Tyco, who was later indicted for tax evasion and looting Tyco.  See, e.g., Pat-
rick McGeehan, Lawyer Says Ex-Merrill Analyst Traded Gifts with Tyco Chief, 
N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 14, 2002, at C1.    
 421. The fact that a great many people seem surprised that a severe market 
downturn would expose abuses is beyond comprehension, particularly after an 
unprecedented ten-year bull market that predictably covered up a multitude 
of sins.  The dismay expressed for the 5,000 or so laid-off Enron employees 
and even Enron shareholders also seems somewhat affected, when one consid-
ers the fact that Motorola, Nortel, Corning, Lucent, and Procter & Gamble 
have each laid off tens of thousands of employees in the last few years.  There 
were no cries of outrage when those employees were left without a job.  These 
companies’ shares, many of which were held in employee 401(k) accounts, 
sustained major losses, but there were few cries to lynch the executives.  See, 
e.g., Richard Waters , Nortel Spasm Causes Pain for Sector Rivals, FIN. TIMES 
(London), Aug. 29, 2002, at 1 (describing the continuing problems in the tele-
com industry).  The difference in the case of Enron was the result of several 
factors that went beyond a concern for fraudulent accounting practices, as 
serious as they may be.  The stock market was falling in 2001, and the Enron 
collapse was a signal to find a scapegoat for that downturn.  This was also a 
political opportunity.  The Democrats could not attack President Bush over 
the “War on Terror,” so they turned to the economy and Enron.  The Republi-
cans could not let the Democrats out-Enron them since the coming elections 
would decide control of Congress by one party or the other.  The Republicans 
became as strident as the Democrats as this quickly turned into an election 
issue.  See, e.g., John Harwood & Shailagh Murray, Guns and Butter: For Fall 
Campaigns, a Tension between Economy and Security, WALL ST. J., Aug. 30, 
2002, at A1; Jeff Zeleny, Democrat Hopefuls Dig in on Economy; Moderates 
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joined the witch-hunt, requiring the CEOs of America, guilty or 
not, to take a loyalty oath to full disclosure by swearing to the 
accuracy of their company’s financial statements.422 Hastily 
drafted legislation led to an incredible increase in the SEC’s 
budget and more redundant layers of regulation were added.423  
Competitive regulation, at least in a crisis, results in bad 
judgment of an extreme character.  Exhibit A is the Justice De-
partment’s indictment and trial of Arthur Andersen, LLP.424 
Tens of thousands Arthur Andersen employees worldwide, far 
outnumbering the affected Enron employees, were forced to find 
new jobs even though they did not participate in the alleged 
wrongdoing of the one individual found responsible for the con-
viction of the firm.425 The conviction also badly damaged Enron 
  
Warn Attacks on Business Could Backfire, CHICAGO TRIBUNE , July 9, 2002, at 
N9.  
  Corporate accountability even became an issue in gubernatorial con-
tests, as if the governors could do anything about SEC accounting issues.  See, 
e.g., Randal Archibold, Cuomo is Saving His Firepower For End of Race, Ad-
visers Say, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 22, 2002, at B6 (New York race); Mark Z. Bara-
bak, Bush Steps Carefully Into State, L.A TIMES, Aug. 23, 2002, at A1 (Cali-
fornia race).  Of course, corporate accountability is not a new issue, having 
arisen in the questionable payment scandals of the 1970s.  See, e.g., Stan 
Crock, Manager’s Journal, WALL ST. J., Mar. 13, 1978.  
 422. See Andrew Hill, Wall Street’s Next Focus is ‘Oath’ Deadline , FIN. TIMES 
(London), Aug. 5, 2002, at 19.  In the end, only sixteen of the 691 reporting 
companies required to take this oath were unable to certify their financial 
statements.  Krissah Williams, 16 of 691 Firms Missed Deadline; SEC is Un-
decided on Consequences, WASH. POST, Aug. 22, 2002, at EO3. 
 423. See supra notes 71–80 and accompanying text. 
 424. Arthur Andersen, LLP was Enron’s auditor.  The accounting firm was 
indicted and later convicted of obstructing justice by trying to cover up certain 
improper accounting practices.  See generally ENRON CORP., REPORT OF 
INVESTIGATION BY THE SPECIAL INVESTIGATIVE COMMITTEE OF THE BOARD OF 
DIRECTORS OF ENRON CORP . (2002).  Arthur Andersen had also been found 
liable in some earlier accounting scandals, and the company was effectively 
destroyed after its conviction.  See, e.g., Flynn McRoberts, Verdict No Boon for 
Enron Plaintiffs, CHI. TRIB., June 18, 2002, at 1 (describing effects of verdict).  
 425. The verdict in the Andersen case was extremely bizarre.  The Justice 
Department had charged Arthur Andersen with obstruction of justice based 
on document shredding by an accountant in the Houston office, who had pled 
guilty to wrongdoing.  The jury, however, convicted the firm on the basis of a 
memorandum written by an Andersen attorney on another issue.  See, e.g., 
Kurt Eichenwald, Andersen Team Weighs Asking Judge to Undo Guilty Ver-
dict, N.Y. TIMES, June 19, 2002, at C1.  The Andersen attorney had testified at 
length before Congress concerning the memorandum in question.  The issue 
was again raised during the Andersen trial, after the government’s star wit-
 
File: Markham Base  Macro  Final.doc Created on: 3/20/2003 5:05 PM Last Printed: 4/28/2003 11:31 AM 
2003] FINANCIAL REG. IN U.S., U.K., & JAPAN 401 
investors.  A settlement proposal by Arthur Andersen of $750 
million, to be paid substantially out of future revenues, was 
presumably only an opening bid and was rejected by class ac-
tion plaintiffs; it was reduced to $375 million as the govern-
ment’s indictment approached.  That too was taken off the table 
after the conviction, and plaintiffs are now negotiating a $60 
million settlement from the parent company of Arthur Ander-
sen, LLP.426 Further recoveries from the convicted auditing firm 
are problematic, since it is forfeiting its right to practice, cut-
ting off future revenues that could have been used to compen-
sate investors and Enron employees.427  
The disclosure of other accounting frauds witnessed Gestapo-
like dawn raids on the homes of corporate executives.  Busi-
nessmen, whose only violent act in their entire lives was per-
haps an attack on a tennis ball, were manacled and frog-
marched before news cameras during their “perp walk.”428  This 
was a particularly sordid adjunct to this whole affair.429  The 
  
ness turned out to be favorable to the defense.  The Andersen attorney, how-
ever, was kept off the stand and could not testify in Andersen’s defense be-
cause the Justice Department had sent her a target letter.  See, e.g., Greg 
Burns, Who is Nancy Temple?, NEWSDAY, June 30, 2002, at FO1. 
 426. Forty million dollars of this amount was for Enron investors and the 
rest is for creditors.  Peter Spiegel, Andersen Worldwide in $60 Million Set-
tlement over Enron, FIN. TIMES (London), Aug. 28, 2002, at 17.  
 427. Mitchell Pacelle & Cassell Bryan-Low, Andersen Worldwide Sets Likely 
Deal, WALL ST. J., Aug. 28, 2002, at C1.  The frenzy over the corporate scan-
dals arising from the Enron debacle cost the American economy an estimated 
$35 billion, an amount equal to a rise in oil of $10 per barrel of oil.  World, 
FIN. TIMES (London), Sept. 5, 2002, at 1. 
 428. WorldCom and Adelphia executives were among those given the “perp 
walk” treatment.  See, e.g., Joshua Chaffin et al., Ex-WorldCom Chiefs Ar-
rested, FI N. TIMES (London), Aug. 2, 2002, at 1.  The manacling and parading 
of the seventy-eight year old non-violent founder of Adelphia before the as-
sembled press and cameras was particularly obscene, drawing a protest from 
the New York Civil Liberties Union.  See, e.g., Fred O. Williams, Adelphia 
Creditors Object to Rigas Loans, BUFFALO NEWS, Aug. 14, 2002, at B5.  See 
also Lauro v. Charles, 219 F.3d 202 (2d Cir. 2000) (staged “perp walk” violated 
Fourth Amendment). 
 429. See Those CEO Perp Walks, WALL ST. J., Aug. 20, 2002, at A18 (object-
ing to this practice); Herbert J. Hoelter, The Corporate Scandals, NEWSDAY, 
Aug. 25, 2002, at BO4 (same).  In contrast to the treatment given these execu-
tives, a federal judge has held the New York City government in contempt for 
not providing hearings to inmates previously found with weapons before 
handcuffing them for transportation.  Such inmates must be given an oppor-
tunity to show they are not violent before they are shackled and must be al-
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pillory was an ancient punishment that has been long banned 
for all crimes, except, it now appears, for financial ones.430 A 
conviction is not even required before this punishment is ap-
plied to corporate executives.  If this were not enough, New 
York Attorney General Eliot Spitzer showed up to conduct his 
own sideshow,431demanding a $100 million fine from Merrill 
Lynch before turning to others in an effort to create a regula-
  
lowed to establish whether the shackling is harmful to their health.  Fines 
imposed on the city for violating those requirements are to be credited to the 
inmates’ own accounts.  See, e.g., Cerisse Anderson, Correction Department 
Found in Contempt Over Handcuffing, N.Y. L.J., Sept. 27, 2002, at 1. 
 430. The pillory was a popular punishment meted out by the Star Chamber 
in England for economic crimes.  For example, in 1630, an individual found 
guilty of forestalling, (i.e., holding goods off the market in hopes of creating a 
shortage and causing prices to rise), was required to stand in the pillory at 
New Gate Market with a sign affixed to his hat identifying his crime.  
REPORTS OF CASES IN THE COURTS OF STAR CHAMBER AND HIGH COMMISSION 42–
43 (Samuel Rawson Gardiner ed., 1965).  The long abolished  medieval crimes 
of engrossing, regrating, and forestalling have also been brought back to pun-
ish corporations.  See, e.g., Sheila McNulty, FERC Judge Says El Paso United 
Acted Illegally in Energy Crisis, FIN. TIMES (London), Sept. 24, 2002, at 1 
(Administrative Law Judge at Federal Energy Regulatory Commission finds 
company withheld supplies from market in order to obtain higher price).     
 431. There is some precedent for Attorney General Spitzer’s crusades.  In-
deed, lest you think that the Enron scandal and other recent business contre-
temps are unique, the American Ice Company scandal at the beginning of the 
twentieth century had all the elements of those episodes and a pardon scandal 
to boot.  Like Enron, the American Ice Company made large amounts of con-
tributions to politicians and engaged in questionable accounting practices.  
Like Enron, it was one of the largest companies in the U.S. before it was con-
sumed in scandal.  Its monopoly over a vital consumer product at the begin-
ning of the twentieth century was so complete that, at least in comparison, 
Microsoft might be likened to a benevolent society for the protection of com-
petitors.  Like Merrill Lynch, the American Ice Company was the target of a 
crusading New York attorney general.  A presidential pardon of the American 
Ice Company’s president was as controversial as Bill Clinton’s pardon of Marc 
Rich.  See DAVID HEMENWAY, PRICES & CHOICES, MICROECONOMIC V IGNETTES 
189 (3d ed.1993) (describing the American Ice Company scandal).  See also Ice 
Trust Declared to be Unlawful, N.Y. TIMES, May 25, 1900, at 1 (describing 
attorney general’s action against the American Ice Company); Robert C. Ken-
nedy, Hunting the Octopus, N.Y. TIMES, May 27, 2002, at 
http://www.nytimes.com/learning/general/onthisday/harp/1006.html (last vis-
ited Mar. 20, 2003) (describing the political fight over the Ice Trust Case); 
Antitrust Prosecutions, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 7, 1912, at 32, 32–33 (survey of anti-
trust actions by state attorney generals). 
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tory empire on Wall Street over stock analysts.432 This led to 
another campaign by a newly formed wolf pack composed of 
forty state regulators.433  
Competitive regulation inevitably means more regulation.  
For some reason, there are never quite enough regulatory tools 
in the drawer.  Each scandal results in a claim by the regulator 
  
 432. Attorney General Spitzer continued his quest, focusing on Jack Grub-
man, an analyst at Salomon Smith Barney.  Spitzer was investigating a prac-
tice called “spinning,” i.e., allocating shares in a hot IPO to officers of other 
clients in order to gain underwriting business.  See generally Randall Smith & 
Susan Pulliam, Buddy System: How a Technology-Banking Star Doled Out 
Shares of Hot IPOs, WALL ST. J., Sept. 23, 2002, at A1.  Such practices had 
been the subject of regulatory concern since at least 1997, but there were no 
headlines in it for the attorney general to intervene while the market was 
trending upward.  Michael Siconolfi, NASD Warns on “Spinning” IPO Shares, 
WALL ST. J., Nov. 24, 1997, at C1; The Motley Fool Column, ST. LOUIS POST 
DISPATCH, Apr. 20, 1998, at BU6.  Not to be outdone by Spitzer, Congress an-
nounced its own hearings.  Tom Hamburger et al., Salomon IPO Deals Pro-
voke Congress, WALL ST. J., Aug. 29, 2002, at C1.  But Spitzer was already on 
to bigger game — Citigroup — giving rise to speculation that he may even be 
after Sandy Weill, the head of Citigroup.  Charles Gasparino, Inquiry Into 
Salomon Widens to Include Possible Weill Role, WALL ST. J., Aug. 23, 2002, at 
A1; Joshua Chaffin & Gary Silverman, Spitzer Subpoena for AT&T Files, FIN. 
TIMES (London), Aug. 24, 2002, at 10.   
  Spinning was not new to Wall Street.  The preferred lists of J.P. Mor-
gan & Co. had been condemned at length in the hearings that led to the en-
actment of the federal securities laws.  2 M ARKHAM, A FINANCIAL HISTORY OF 
THE U.S., supra note 15, at 145–46.  Does this mean all of this regulation has 
been for nothing?  In another remarkable episode, the Financial Times of 
London announced that executives made $3.3 billion before the failure of their 
companies, which included Enron, WorldCom, and Global Crossings.  Len 
Cheng, 3.3 Billion Dollars for  Executives of Failed Companies, FIN. TIMES 
(London), July 31, 2002, at 1.  Spitzer then announced that he would be inves-
tigating those executives for receiving that compensation.  Lionel Barber & 
Gary Silverman, NY State Attorney Probes Awards to Heads of Bankrupt 
Groups, FIN. TIMES (London), Aug. 1, 2002, at 1. 
 433. The SEC sought to compete by launching its own investigations.  See 
Michael Schroeder, States’ Wall Street Probe Bogs Down, WALL ST. J., Sept. 
13, 2001, at C5.  The analysts’ investigations resulted in a spectacular $1.4 
billion joint settlement between several large investment banks and state and 
federal securities regulators.  See generally Charles Gasparino, Analyst Pact is 
Held Up by Words, WALL ST. J., Jan. 16, 2003, at C1.  Citigroup alone paid 
$450 million in that settlement.  Randall Smith, Regulators Set Pact, But 
Some Issues Still Remain, WALL ST. J., Dec. 23, 2002.   
  The state attorney generals were also using their new found power to 
press businessmen for campaign contributions.  Tom Hamburger & Michael 
Schroeder, The Economy: Spitzer Heads Bill at Campaign Event for Attorney 
Generals, WALL ST. J., Oct. 4, 2002, at A2. 
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involved that it needs more regulatory power and additional 
rules are adopted, even though library shelves are already filled 
with statutes and regulations so complex that some law school 
professors spend their entire careers studying those promul-
gated by just one agency.  A further layer of regulation is al-
ways needed after each scandal, even though a simple fraud 
prohibition would cover nearly every misdeed of concern.  But 
competing agencies have a vested interest in scandals.  Scan-
dals allow the regulators to claim they need more resources; 
they allow the agencies to grow, expand, and compete more 
forcefully with other agencies. 
Of course, we must be careful of what we wish for in life.  A 
single regulator may also seek to expand its powers after a 
scandal.  A single regulator will also undoubtedly use bad 
judgment in times of crisis.  A single regulator could also stifle 
competition, over-regulate, and cause a loss of competitive posi-
tion in international markets.434 It could even try to become a 
Japanese MoF that seeks to manage the economy by bureau-
cratic fiat.  There would be no competition to prove which regu-
lator can be the most aggressive.  There would be no pressure 
for more resources in order to best a competing regulator.435 
It may also be argued that competition leads to less restric-
tive regulation, at least for some market participants.  A case in 
point is the CFTC and SEC.  The futures industry has enjoyed 
low margins, no suitability requirement, little insider trading 
restrictions, etc.  If a monolithic agency with an SEC viewpoint 
had been in place, such regulatory burdens would probably not 
have been avoided.  Of course, if the single regulator had a 
CFTC viewpoint, the securities industry’s burdens might have 
been eased.  Another argument is that the regulatory wars be-
tween the CFTC and SEC diverted the attention of these agen-
cies and allowed the over-the-counter derivatives industry to 
develop.  While this may be true, that development was still 
  
 434. These concerns are described at greater length in Markham, Banking 
Regulation: Its History and Future, supra note 4, at 272–85. 
 435. A Task Group on Regulation of Financial Services chaired by Vice-
President George H. Bush in 1984 cautioned that “[t]hroughout American 
history, no single government authority has ever been entrusted with regula-
tory authority over all American banks.”  BLUEPRINT FOR REFORM , supra note 
1, at 8. 
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impeded by the CFTC’s defense of the contract market monop-
oly, which led to much derivatives business moving abroad.   
The federal securities laws and the Commodity Exchange Act 
need to be revisited and revised from the ground up.  The regu-
latory structure imposed in the 1930s was directed at a market 
far different from the one that exists today.436  There has been a 
massive transformation of the financial markets437 — history 
has simply outstripped regulation.  Financial service firms now 
cross all product lines.  As the Treasury Department has noted: 
“[I]n light of the changing market shares, the emergence of new 
financial products and technology, and the disintegration of 
traditional industry and product lines . . . there needs to be a 
fundamental reassessment of why and how we regulate finan-
cial firms.”438  
Traditional broker-dealers and futures commission mer-
chants are nearly extinct.  Broker-dealers are selling insurance, 
making loans, and looking very much like banks.439  Broker-
dealers, as well as banks, are also selling insurance.  Insurance 
companies are reinventing themselves and becoming diversified 
financial services firms.440 Financial engineering has melded 
commercial and investment banking together, a fact now recog-
nized by GLBA.  The futures commission merchant business 
has evolved into an over-the-counter derivatives dealer.  De-
rivatives and securities products are being blended.  Moreover, 
financial services are becoming a global business, in which 
American firms must compete with large international firms 
that cross-sell financial products and are subject to much 
  
 436. The regulatory burdens imposed on financial firms are the result of 
accumulated abuses over the years.  The incongruity of many of those regula-
tions is obvious.  The non-violators must bear the regulatory burdens for the 
conduct of the miscreants.  The innocent are punished long after the guilty 
have left the scene. 
 437. See Arthur E. Wilmarth, Jr., The Transformation of the U.S. Financial 
Services Industry, 1975–2000: Competition, Consolidation, and Increased 
Risks, 2002 U. ILL. L. REV. 215. 
 438. DOT, MEMO ON FINANCIAL SERVICES, supra note 405 (italics omitted). 
 439. The Merrill Lynch Cash Management Account provides all the benefits 
of a bank account, as well as those of a brokerage account.  See Paine, Webber, 
Jackson & Curtis, Inc. v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 564 F. 
Supp. 1358, 1361–62 (D. Del. 1983). 
 440. 3 MARKHAM, A FINANCIAL HISTORY OF THE U.S., supra note 42, at 235–
36.     
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lighter regulation than that found in the U.S.441  Electronic 
trading offers further challenges.  Another concern is the 
internationalization of financial services.  The confusion, 
complexity, and costs associated with multiple regulators will 
certainly place U.S. financial institutions at a severe 
competitive disadvantage with European and even Japanese 
firms that operate under a single regulatory umbrella.   
Technology is removing much of the structure on which our 
current functional regulatory system is based.  Technology pro-
vides a means to bypass traditional intermediaries such as the 
exchanges, banks, and broker-dealers.  Institutional investors 
may use Instinet or other ECNs to avoid paying the spread on a 
NASDAQ or a NYSE listed security; securities customers need 
not pay a large commission to a broker-dealer to execute an or-
der.  Rather, it can be done online relatively cheaply.  Insurance 
agents are being circumvented through online purchases.  
  
 441. A single regulator would also facilitate coordination among regulators 
on an international level, a need underscored by the BCCI debacle.  The Basel 
Committee and the International Organization of Securities Commissions 
(“IOSCO”) are currently coordinating such regulation, but their roles are sim-
ply placed on top of the mass of regulators in the U.S.  The growth of interna-
tional exchange linkages and electronic trading is also raising the stakes for 
those regulators.  Conflicts are also occurring at the international level.  See, 
e.g., Compliment, European Companies With UD Listing Fail to Escape Sar-
banes-Oxley Act, at http:/www.compliment.com/securities-uk/dailynews/ (last 
visited Aug. 30, 2002) (describing objection by European Union to requirement 
that Europeans swear to the accuracy of their financial statements before a 
U.S. agency); Lydia Adetunji, SEC Votes to Include Foreign Company Chiefs, 
FIN. TIMES (London), Aug. 28, 2002, at 7 (describing SEC indifference to those 
concerns).  The European Union is also posing regulatory challenges through 
its financial directives that seek a single European market in financial ser-
vices.  See generally Jennifer Manvell Jeannot, Comment, An International 
Perspective on Domestic Banking Reform: Could the European Union’s Second 
Banking Directive Revolutionize the Way the United States Regulates Its Own 
Financial Services Industry, 14 AM. U. INT’L L. REV. 1715, 1732–33, 1738 
(1999) (noting that the European Union seeks harmonized regulation as a way 
to improve the competitive position of banks in member countries); James 
Mackintosh, Regulator to Warn Against Brussels Boardroom Plans, FI N. TIMES 
(London), July 30, 2002, at 14 (expressing concern that European Union fi-
nancial directive could weaken corporate governance standards, which are 
claimed to be higher than those in the U.S.); Erik Portanger, Politics and 
Pride Slow Drive for Pan-European Securities Regulator, WALL ST. J., Aug. 17, 
2000, at C7 (discussing need for a pan-European regulator in light of the 
merger of several European stock exchanges and political obstacles to such 
regulation). 
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Loans and other commercial bank services are also being mar-
keted outside traditional bank channels.   
There are serious political roadblocks to such an amalgama-
tion.  Each current regulatory agency has its own constituency 
in the industries that have developed competitive positions 
based on regulatory restrictions.442 The regulatory agencies 
themselves will fight fiercely to protect their territory, as dem-
onstrated by the CFTC and SEC conflicts.  Congressional com-
mittees also have their own jurisdictions to guard.  Neverthe-
less, the functional system of regulation now existing in Amer-
ica needs to be abandoned.  In its place, regulatory attention 
needs to be directed as to who needs regulation and who does 
not.443   
For example, regulatory protections of the insurance fund 
should be uniform and limited.  The current excuse for intrusive 
regulation as being necessary to protect the insurance fund 
should also be reexamined.  Brokerage firms already obtain in-
surance from the private sector in excess of that provided by 
SIPC without such intrusive regulation.444  The concern with 
systemic risk from large failures of financial institutions could 
be addressed across sector lines.  Value At Risk programs could 
replace the labyrinth adopted by the SEC and CFTC in their 
net capital programs.  With respect to fraud, the SEC and 
CFTC already recognize that sophisticated “accredited” inves-
tors do not need the same regulatory protections as the prover-
bial widows and orphans.445  This approach should be applied to 
  
 442. There have been efforts to combine regulatory responsibilities.  For 
example, the Chicago Mercantile Exchange (“CME”) has unsuccessfully pro-
posed the creation of a single department for financial services regulation.  
CHICAGO MERCANTILE EXCHANGE , FINANCIAL REGULATION FOR THE 21ST 
CENTURY (1995).  The CME proposal was not a particularly radical one, since 
it would have continued functional regulation in bureaus within the depart-
ment.  Id.  
 443. This proposal is discussed at greater length in Broome & Markham, 
supra note 19, at 776–84. 
 444. See Markham, Banking Regulation: Its History and Future, supra note 
4, at 284 (discussing private insurance alternatives). 
 445. “It was understood, even before the enactment of the Securities Act of 
1933, that institutional investors did not need the mandatory disclosure sys-
tem of that Act to protect themselves when acquiring securities.  These inves-
tors could ‘fend for themselves.’”  Joel Seligman, The Obsolescence of Wall 
Street: A Contextual Approach to the Evolving Structure of Federal Securities 
Regulation, 93 MICH. L. REV. 649, 659 (1995).  See also, e.g., Regulations and 
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all financial services.  Regulation should be directed at protect-
ing small investors from overreaching and fraud.446  Accredited 
investors can take care of themselves in addressing those 
risks.447  
  
Terms Used in Regulation D, 17 C.F.R. § 230.501 (2002) (exempting securities 
from registration that are sold to accredited investors); CFTC Regulation 17 
C.F.R § 4.7 (exempting institutions and wealthy individuals from certain dis-
closure requirements).  The Commodity Futures Modernization Act of 2000 
(“CFMA”), Pub. L. No. 106-554, 114 Stat. 2763, is another example where 
regulatory distinctions are made between large and small firms.  Access to 
derivative transaction facilities (“DTFs”) is limited to large institutions, except 
that a DTF may allow non-institutional access if introduced through an in-
termediary registered with the CFTC as a futures commission merchant.  
Such FCMs must, however, have minimum net capital of at least $20 million, 
assuring a responsible intermediary.  7 U.S.C. § 7a(b)(3)(B)(iv) (2000), 
amended by The Commodity Futures Modernization Act of 2000, Pub. L. No. 
106-554, 114 Stat. 2763A.   
 446. Most violations by broker-dealers, and certainly the most egregious, 
are committed by small under-capitalized firms that have little to lose if 
caught and much to gain by fraud and other misconduct.  Yet, the SEC makes 
little distinction between large and small brokerage firms.  The large firms 
must, therefore, bear the costs imposed by the fly-by-night firms.  Large firms 
do not need such intensive regulation.  They have an incentive to protect their 
assets from short-term profits generated by fraud that impose larger long-
term costs in damages and reputational loss.  Further, they have assets that 
are available to compensate those injured by employees who go astray. 
  The federal banking laws contain a limited recognition of the disparity 
of regulatory problems emanating from smaller, less capitalized institutions.  
Prior to 1991, all banks paid a uniform 12 cents per $100 of deposits as pre-
miums for deposit insurance.  The Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation 
Improvement Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-242, 105 Stat. 2236 (codified as 
amended in scattered sections of 12 U.S.C.), changed that methodology by 
instituting a system of risk-based deposit insurance premiums that imposed 
greater costs on institutions that provided the greatest threats to the deposit 
fund.  Banking regulations also utilize the concept of “well capitalized” to al-
low larger banks to engage in activities that less capitalized institutions 
would be inclined to engage in without adequate controls.  BROOME &  
MARKHAM, supra note 11, at 465 (also noting that the reserve fund for the 
FDIC is now fully funded for the required reserves and deposit premiums are 
not presently being collected).  For example, banks are also restricted in ac-
cepting brokered deposits unless they are well capitalized.  12 U.S.C. § 
1831f(a) (2000).  The GLBA requires that a bank holding company be well 
capitalized to be certified as a financial holding company that may engage in a 
broad range of financial activities outside customary banking channels.  12 
U.S.C. § 1843(l)(1) (2000). 
 447. An official of the Federal Reserve Board has argued that even unso-
phisticated consumers should be able to buy unregulated products.  Indeed, 
consumers already have a choice of depositing their funds either in an unin-
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In sum, a more modern regulatory model should also be based 
on the following principles: 
(1) Institutions dealing with other institutions should not be 
subject to intrusive regulation.  Institutions are able to watch 
out for themselves and do not need a government agency to 
protect them from other members of their industry. 
(2) Markets in which only institutions operate should not be 
regulated.  Once again, institutions are able to protect them-
selves and have the bargaining power to demand information 
needed for trading. 
(3) Unregulated markets should be allowed to operate in which 
non-institutional customers may gain access through well 
capitalized intermediaries.  Those intermediaries have assets 
and reputations to protect, which should be sufficient incen-
tive for them to avoid fraud. 
(4) Retail customers should be allowed to deal with unregu-
lated intermediaries even in regulated markets, provided that 
the intermediary is well capitalized and the customer is fully 
informed of the lack of regulation.  
(5) Markets should be allowed to operate, in which intermedi-
aries that are not well capitalized service retail customer or-
ders.  But such markets, and those intermediaries that are not 
well capitalized, will be subject to regulation to assure their 
financial soundness. 
IX. CONCLUSION 
The issue of the desirability of a single super regulator over 
securities and derivatives has been debated since the creation of 
the CFTC in 1975.  There has been little success in achieving 
any unified regulation.  Still, the issue will not recede, and a 
unified regulator seems to be a sound idea.  The model provided 
by the FSA-UK lends support for such unification, while the 
model presented by the FSA-Japan shows the weaknesses of 
such an approach.  Should America choose a super regulator, it 
must be cautious to avoid an agency that will seek to manage 
the economy or respond to every financial crisis with more in-
  
sured money market account or in an insured bank account.  Oliver I. Ireland, 
Fed. Associate General Counsel, New Regulatory Models Institutional vs  
Functional Regulation, Paper presented at the Annual Chicago-Kent Confer-
ence on Derivatives Transactions (Oct. 1999) (on file with author). 
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trusive regulation.  Until then, we must suffer under a competi-
tive system of regulation that is competing for more — and not 
less — regulation.  
